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Summary 
 
The thesis argues that civil disobedience is justifiable in the liberal democracy 
and there is a viable way to reconcile civil disobedience with democracy. Can 
civil disobedience be justified in the liberal democracy? What role does civil 
disobedience play in a democracy? How to reconcile civil disobedience and 
democracy? These are the questions which will be explored in the thesis. The 
thesis is divided into four main parts. 
 
The first part includes the first two chapters. The main aim of this part is to 
introduce the background of the research and to define civil disobedience. 
Since civil disobedience has been used in a variety of different meanings, 
defining it clearly at the outset is necessary. 
 
The second part is composed of the third and the fourth chapter. This part is 
devoted to the justification of civil disobedience, which argues that civil 
disobedience is justifiable in a democracy because it is beneficial to the 
development of democracy. The fourth chapter is a further explanation of the 
third chapter, which elaborates in what ways civil disobedience is beneficial to 
democracy. 
 
The fifth chapter is the third part. This chapter proposes that the practitioners 
  viii
of civil disobedience are more demanded by democracy than those citizens 
who obey all laws unconditionally. Therefore, these diosbedients deserve 
tolerance and respect of the democratic society. 
 
In the last part, the sixth chapter, I argue that there is a viable way of 
reconciling civil disobedience with democracy. Based on a critical review of 
the past suggestions, I suggest establishing a special defense for civil 
disobedience in the criminal law system and some other ways to show our 
tolerance of civil disobedience.
  1
Chapter I: Introduction 
I. Civil Disobedience and Its Debates 
 
Civil disobedience, understood as breaching a law out of moral or political 
grounds, is not a modern invention; it is a classical idea whose roots can be 
traced at least to ancient Greece when Antigone courageously broke the law to 
bury his brother.1 And Socrates, a great philosopher of ancient Greece, is also 
believed to be the first philosopher who thoroughly examined the question of 
whether to obey or disobey an unjust law. In Crito, he explained why laws 
should be followed and why disobedience to the law is rarely justified. In this 
dialogue, it becomes clear that, for Socrates, one should obey the laws of the 
city as one obeys his father and mother.2 
                                                        
1
 Sophocles’ play “Antigone” illustrates the conflict between obeying human and divine 
law. The play opens after Oedipus’ two sons Eteocles and Polyneices have killed each 
other in a civil war for the throne of Thebes. Oedipus’ brother in law Creon then assumes 
the throne. He dictates that Eteocles shall receive a state funeral and honors, while 
Polyneices shall be left in the streets to rot away. But Polyneices' sister, Antigone, 
believes that an improper burial for Polyneices would be an insult to the Gods. She vows 
that Polyneices' body will be buried, and Creon declares that anyone who interferes with 
his body shall be punished. This is the beginning of the conflict. The question is whether 
duties to the gods are more essential than obedience of the state and law. There is no 
compromise between the two. Both Creon and Antigone believe in the absolute truth of 
their obedience. 
2
 Socrates compares the obedience of law to that of how a child should not cause harm to 
his parents. From birth you are told to obey laws. You were brought to life from your 
mother and father and thus you should respect and obey the rules that they do. But the 
city’s laws were there before your mother and father, and are therefore equally if not more 
important than the laws of your mother and father. It is impious to bring violence to bear 
against your mother or father; it is much more so to use it against you country. One 
should obey one’s parents, but more important is the city. Because the city was that which 
has taught your ancestors and your parents, it must be superior to them. (Crito, 50c-51c) 
  2
 
Since Socrates’ time, many philosophers have expressed views about civil 
disobedience. Their attitudes towards civil disobedience can roughly be 
divided into two schools. The first school adopts an affirmative attitude toward 
civil disobedience by recognizing its justifiability under some circumstances. 
Those who hold this view include Henry David Thoreau, Martin Luther King 
Jr., Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi and Ronald Dworkin.3 A second school, 
whose representatives include Morris I. Leibman and Lewis H. Van Dusen Jr., 
assumes a negative stance against civil disobedience, totally denying its 
justness or propriety in the society. The voice of the latter school is much 
weaker than the former’s. The situation may be partly due to the fact that the 
view of the latter is the view which has been adopted by the state, so the 
scholars in the latter group feel that they have much less to say than the 
scholars in the former who have to strive for the recognition of their views. 
 
But the debates about civil disobedience take place not only on the theoretical 
level; they also took place in practice. Many people, from ancient to modern, 
have used their bodies, even lives, to participate in these debates. The 
afore-mentioned Thoreau, King and Gandhi, and many other civil disobedients 
                                                        
3
 The philosophers from the first school see eye to eye on the justifiability of civil 
disobedience, but their arguments are often based on very different grounds. Some mainly 
base their arguments on moral grounds, for example, King. Some others may mainly base 
their arguments on political grounds, for example, Rawls. For their main arguments, 
please see Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham City Jail”, in Why We 
Can't Wait (New York: New American Library, 1964) at 76-95 and John Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) at 335-343. 
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who are less famous or even unknown to history are all good examples. They 
were arrested, jailed and even sentenced to capital punishment in extreme 
cases.4 If punishment represents disapproval of the citizen by the state, then 
these civil disobedients were obviously regarded as unwelcomed persons by 
the authority. But history tells us that they are different from ordinary 
criminals who seek only their own interests. Their acts are typically intended 
to benefit the whole society. Even today, many still benefit from the noble 
actions of Gandhi and King. Without them and their noble actions of civil 
disobedience, today’s world would be much darker. 
 
It is understandable why an authoritarian regime might punish the civil 
disobedient because the goal of such a regime, as generally believed, is to 
protect the privileges of the few. Anyone who dares to challenge the interests 
of the dominant class might be punished without consideration of the 
reasonableness of the challenge. Punishment, under such a regime has no 
necessary relation to justice. But it is totally different in a democracy. A 
democracy purports to be a system committed to justice. Punishment, 
therefore, in a democracy should also be used to enhance justice. So any 
                                                        
4
 Actually, the most horrible prospect for the civil disobedient is not the death penalty, but 
brutal massacre and assassination. The Amritsar massacre, which took place in 
British-colonized India in 1919, is a good example of this. On the 13th of April 1919, 
about 10,000 demonstrators unlawfully, but peacefully, protested at Amritsar. Although 
these civilians were unarmed and not violent, the then British General Edward Dyer 
ordered his solders to open fire. Nearly 400 were killed and more than a thousand were 
severely injured. Please see Tim Coates (ed.), The Amritsar Massacre, 1919: General 
Dyer in the Punjab 1919 (London: Stationery Office Books, 2001). 
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punishment meted out in a democracy should have a justification. In view of 
this important relationship between justice and punishment in a democracy, we 
should ask: Is civil disobedience justified in a democracy because of its 
promotion of justice? Must civil disobedients be punished in a democracy as 
they are punished in a totalitarian regime? If not, then what is the best way to 
moderate or eliminate the penalty for them? 
 
On the one hand, the law denies the claim that civil disobedience is a right; on 
the other hand, civil disobedience is an important part of the political 
landscape, a common and familiar event.5 This reality requires that we have a 
better understanding of civil disobedience and democracy. Thus, the aim of 
this thesis is to consider the justification for civil disobedience in a democracy 
and attempt to reconcile the two by softening the predicament of the civil 
disobedient. 
 
II. The Reconciliation of Civil Disobedience and Democracy 
 
The main theoretical question in this thesis concerns the justification for civil 
disobedience in a democracy because understanding how civil disobedience 
                                                        
5
 Chemi bin Noon, “Civil Disobedience, Rebellion, and Conscientious Objection”, online: 
<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=438>, last visited on January 9, 
2010. 
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might be justified theoretically enables us to see how to reconcile civil 
disobedience and democracy in practice. Many scholars have remarked that 
civil disobedience is inconsistent with democratic values. For instance, Joseph 
Raz argues that the need for civil disobedience is confined to illiberal societies 
because in liberal societies people enjoy extensive freedom and have many 
ways to influence the government. Thus, there is no need for them to resort to 
civil disobedience to express their views. 6  Other opponents of civil 
disobedience see it as a threat to democratic society and the forerunner of 
violence and anarchy.7 However, I follow some liberals such as John Rawls in 
arguing that civil disobedience is still justified in contemporary democracies. 
But my justification for civil disobedience is not a simple repeat of previous 
liberal arguments. I will invoke the concepts of democratic deficits and justice 
deficits to show that contemporary democracy is imperfect. In an imperfect 
democracy, citizens are justified in resorting to civil disobedience in order to 
be loyal to democratic ideals. Additionally, in order to show the justification of 
civil disobedience, the role of civil disobedience in a democracy will also be 
                                                        
6
 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979) at 266-275. In his account of a right to civil disobedience, Raz 
places great emphasis upon the kind of regime in which a disobedient acts. Raz argues 
that only in an illiberal regime do certain individuals have a right to civil disobedience. 
Given that the illiberal state violates its members' right to political participation, 
individuals whose rights are violated are entitled, other things being equal, to disregard 
the offending laws and exercise their moral right as if it were recognized by law… 
“[M]embers of the illiberal state do have a right to civil disobedience which is roughly 
that part of their moral right to political participation which is not recognized in law.” By 
contrast, in a liberal state, Raz argues, a person's right to political activity is, by 
hypothesis, adequately protected by law. Therefore, in such a regime, the right to political 
participation cannot ground a right to civil disobedience. 
7
 For example, see Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience (New York: 
The World Publishing Co., 1968), at 55. 
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discussed because it can help us better understand the positive effects of civil 
disobedience on democracy. 
 
Based on the justification of civil disobedience and its potential contributions 
to the evolvement of democracy, I argue that the civil disobedients are good 
citizens that are needed by democracy. Compared to those citizens who obey 
any law enacted by the state, the civil disobedient only obeys the law 
conditionally. When he finds that a law is in conflict with the spirit of ideal 
democracy, he will seek to redress it, even in the form of disobedience. This 
spirit of vigilance serves as a reminder to the state that its power is not 
unrestricted and, therefore, might be able to prevent democracy from 
degenerating into authoritarianism. 
 
The ultimate aim of my thesis, however, is to find a way to reconcile civil 
disobedience and democracy. There have been many debates about the 
justification of civil disobedience, but the literature on the practical 
reconciliation of civil disobedience and democracy is rare. Few scholarly 
efforts have concentrated on this issue. Briefly speaking, three sporadic 
suggestions can be found. 
 
One suggestion is that the civil disobedient is entitled to avail of the necessity 
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defense to exempt himself. 8  On this view, practitioners commit civil 
disobedience out of urgency and with the view to preventing a more severe 
harm; this is a typical act of necessity. Thus, the practitioners of civil 
disobedience can avail themselves of the necessity defense to get an 
exemption of the punishment. A second suggestion is that the most important 
difference between civil disobedience and crime lies in the motivation of the 
actor. Therefore, the court can utilize the good motive defense to acquit the 
civil disobedient.9 A third suggestion is to use the mistake of law defense to 
acquit the civil disobedient. If a defendant really believes that a law is 
unconstitutional and consequently violates that law to obtain a chance to 
challenge the law, the mistake of law defense should be available to the 
defendant. 10  Indeed, these suggestions work in some cases of civil 
disobedience. For example, the necessity defense has been successfully 
adopted in several cases by the state courts of the United States.11 
 
                                                        
8
 Luke Shulman-Ryan, “The Motion in Limine and the Marketplace of Ideas: Advocating 
for the Availability of the Necessity Defense for Some of the Bay State's Civilly 
Disobedient”, (2005) 27 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 299, at 299-364; And also see John Alan 
Cohan, “Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense”, (2007) 6 Pierce L. Rev. 111, at 
111-175. 
9
 Martin C. Loesch, “Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience Justification” (1991) 5 
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 1069. 
10
 Graham Hughes, “Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine”(1968) 43 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 1. 
11
 See, for example, California v. Jerome (Cal. Mun. Ct. Oct. 1987) (defendants blocked 
main gate to nuclear weapons laboratory; arrested for traffic violation; Traffic 
Commissioner permitted necessity defense; prosecuting attorney moved to drop charges; 
motion granted); California v. Block, (Cal. Mun. Ct. Aug. 1979) (defendants demonstrated 
against nuclear power at nuclear power plant; charged with trespass and resisting arrest; 
judge permitted necessity defense). 
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In my opinion, these defenses, however, are not without flaws. In the first 
place, they do not work in most cases of civil disobedience. In addition, they 
pose the danger of excessively politicizing the court and extend the existing 
defenses too much. I will suggest that the most feasible way to soften the 
predicament of civil disobedients is to mitigate the punishment by establishing 
a special defense for civil disobedience. When a claim of civil disobedience is 
raised in the court, the court should decide whether the conduct amounted to 
civil disobedience, and if the court finds that the prosecuted action fully satisfy 
the standards of civil disobedience, it can decide to reduce or abolish the 
punishment for the defendant. This suggestion has obvious advantages. First, 
it is applicable to all cases of civil disobedience; second, it can allow the 
benign character of civil disobedience to be considered in the court while at 
the same time retaining civil disobedience as a viable means of protest in 
democracy. 
 
III. Plan of the Thesis 
 
As mentioned above, this thesis is about the reconciliation of civil 
disobedience and democracy. The aim of the whole thesis is to argue that civil 
disobedience should be tolerated by democracy and there is a viable way to 
reconcile civil disobedience and democracy by making some changes to the 
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present constitutional and criminal systems. The thesis will be divided into 
seven chapters, with the Introduction and Conclusion respectively as the first 
and last chapter. 
 
In the second chapter, I define civil disobedience. Civil disobedience has been 
used by philosophers in a variety of different meanings, it is necessary, 
therefore, to give a definition of civil disobedience at the outset. 
 
The third and fourth chapters are devoted to the justification of civil 
disobedience in a democracy. In order to achieve the final aim of reconciling 
civil disobedience and democracy, the first step is to prove that there is 
possibility for them to be reconciled. However, it has long been argued that 
civil disobedience may be justified in an authoritarian regime, but it is never 
justified in a democracy where people are allowed to vote and to protest. Thus, 
the main aim of these two chapters is to establish that civil disobedience is in 
consistent with democracy and it will not be in vain to make endeavors to 
reconcile them. Along this line, the third chapter argues that civil disobedience 
is still needed in liberal democratic societies as in the authoritarian regimes 
because the existing liberal democracies are far from perfect. It would be 
helpful to retain civil disobedience as an effective way in liberal democracies 
to eliminate injustice and improve democracy. The fourth chapter is a natural 
extension and a further explanation of the third chapter. The third chapter 
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argues that civil disobedience should be retained as a helpful way to develop 
democracy, but it does not explain what kind of help civil disobedience can do 
to a liberal democracy. Thus, the fourth chapter is written to fill that gap by 
elaborating on the contributions that civil disobedience could make to the 
development of democracy. I argue that civil disobedience not only can help to 
stabilize democracy, but also can help to nurture certain characters of 
citizenship that are required by any viable democracy. 
 
The fifth chapter explains the virtues of the practitioners of civil disobedience. 
In a society, there are citizens who would obey any law at any time and there 
are citizens who obey laws conditionally. The practitioners of civil 
disobedience are among the second type. In general, they acknowledge the 
necessity and the justness of obeying law, but at the same time they retain their 
own judgments. When faced with great injustices, they will stage their protest 
in the form of civil disobedience. My argument in this chapter is that citizens 
who obey all laws at all times are more damaging to democracy than the 
practitioners of civil disobedience. Good citizens must, at times, be 
disobedient as well as obedient. Proving that the practitioners of civil 
disobedience are good and responsible citizens is essential to the reconciliation 
of civil disobedience and democracy because it allows us to encourage civil 
disobedience by protecting its practitioners. 
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In the sixth chapter, I try to reconcile civil disobedience and democracy in 
practice. One stark contradiction of today in political and legal sphere is that, 
on the one hand, we hail civil disobedience as noble actions which are 
beneficial to democracy, but on the other hand, the state spares no effort to 
punish the practitioners of civil disobedience. Therefore, the most important 
thing to reconcile civil disobedience with democracy is to minimize the undue 
punishment of civil disobedience. I propose that this can be done on many 
levels: first, for those states with a competent judicial system, a special 
defense for civil disobedience may be enforced by the courts; secondly, for 
those states which are not so liberal, civil disobedience may be protected by 
the legislature and the constitution. 
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Chapter II: 
The Definition of Civil Disobedience 
Many practitioners and philosophers have talked about of civil disobedience, 
but there have never been unanimity on what is the accurate meaning of civil 
disobedience. The disputes about the definition of civil disobedience are so 
extensive that there are scholars who even doubt that civil disobedience is 
capable of genuine definition.12 Therefore, it is necessary to define civil 
disobedience before I proceed to discuss further questions. 
 
Two tendencies must be avoided when defining civil disobedience. One 
tendency is to define civil disobedience too broadly; the other is to define it 
too narrowly. If defined too broadly, the definition of civil disobedience will 
include all kinds of protest; civil disobedience, therefore, will lose its status as 
an independent and distinguished phenomenon. But it is not good to define 
civil disobedience too narrowly either. If defined too narrowly, civil 
disobedience may retain its distinguished character, but such a definition will 
have little practical meaning because very few acts in reality can meet its 
standard. Therefore, in order to avoid these two tendencies, two rules will be 
strictly followed when I try to give a definition of civil disobedience. The first 
                                                        
12
  George Anastaplo, The American Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government (Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press, 1992) at 552. 
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rule is that the definition of civil disobedience should be able to include all 
typical cases of civil disobedience; the second rule is that civil disobedience 
must be retained as an independent phenomenon with distinguished characters 
from other kinds of protests. 
 
The task of defining civil disobedience will be completed in four steps. First, I 
will briefly describe the typical cases of civil disobedience in history because I 
try to make all of these typical cases to be covered by my version of definition. 
Second, I will elaborate the various characteristics of civil disobedience. It is 
by these characteristics that civil disobedience is differentiated from other 
kinds of protests. Third, I will analyze the differences between civil 
disobedience and other related phenomena with a view to further clarify the 
meaning of civil disobedience. Finally, I will summarize what I find and give a 
definition of civil disobedience. 
 
I． Typical Cases of Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil Disobedience in the meaning of violating a law on the grounds of moral 
or political principle can be traced in western history as far back as to ancient 
Greece. At that time, the choice between breaking and obeying the law had 
been a question for both Socrates and Antigone despite their different social 
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backgrounds. While Socrates finally chose to respect the law, even if the law 
was an unjust one, Antigone courageously chose the opposite. She believed 
that she should follow the law of divine, rather than the law made by man. 13 
Some scholars believe Antigone’s spirit of resistance is the very origin of civil 
disobedience.14 
 
In my opinion, the historical development of civil disobedience might roughly 
be divided into three stages. As I explained, the origin of civil disobedience 
can be traced to ancient Greece, but the very term “civil disobedience” is 
popularly believed to be coined in the nineteenth century by David Thoreau in 
his famous essay “Civil Disobedience”. 15 Thoreau used civil disobedience to 
boycott the war on Mexico and the American slavery system, but at that time 
civil disobedience did not attract much attention of the public. So the time 
from antiquity to Thoreau can be viewed as the birth stage of civil 
disobedience. Then, in the twentieth century, the practice of King and Gandhi 
finally made civil disobedience famous. Their practice also attracted the 
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attention of both scholars and politicians around the world. Many academic 
meetings were summoned and a great number of papers and books on civil 
disobedience were published. Both theoretically and practically, civil 
disobedience emerged as an important political concept during this period, 
which can be viewed as the developing stage of civil disobedience. Generally 
speaking, this period stretches from Thoreau’s time to the civil rights 
movement in the United States. The third stage is the maturity period. In this 
stage, civil disobedience began to be practiced in more areas and many 
organizations which adopted civil disobedience as their main tactic were 
established. The typical cases in this stage include the anti-globalization and 
environmental movements. 
 
Before I venture into a detailed discussion of the definitional requirements for 
civil disobedience, I will briefly describe the most important and well-known 
events which are believed to be typical cases of civil disobedience. In 
consideration that these events will be cited more than once in this dissertation, 




Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) played a vital role in the development of 
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civil disobedience. He is the man who made the theory famous, put it into 
practice, and gave the practice the name “civil disobedience”. 
 
Thoreau’s theory of civil disobedience is not very complicated. There are two 
principles underlining it. The first is that the authority of the government 
depends on the consent of the governed. The second is that justice is superior 
to the laws enacted by the government, and the individual has the right to 
judge whether a given law reflects or flouts justice. In the latter case the 
individual has the right and duty to disobey the law and accept the 
consequences of the disobedience. He claims that the only obligation one has a 
right to assume is to do at any time what one thinks right. Otherwise, why has 
every man a conscience?16 
 
In order to protest the injustice of slavery and Mexico War in which the 
American government was engaging, Thoreau refused to pay the poll tax. In 
1846, he was arrested and thrown into jail for this. He could easily have 
afforded the tax, but he felt that it took at least one person to stand up for what 
they believed in. However, the next day a friend paid the tax for him, much to 
Thoreau's regret, and he was released. Thoreau’s protesting gesture and his 
theory of civil disobedience did not get much attention at the time, but many 
years later they influenced many, sparked political struggles, and changed 
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 Henry David Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience”, in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.), Civil 
Disobedience in Focus (London: Routledge, 1991), at 29. 
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world politics forever.17 When Bedau talked about Thoreau’s contribution to 
the development of civil disobedience movement, he said this: 
 
[Thoreau] seems to stand at a pivotal point in the history of the 
movement. In one way or another the concept of Civil Disobedience 
has been voiced and acted upon for at least 2,400 years, but never has 
it received such mass support, never has it been the object of so much 
public attention as during the century since Thoreau laid down in 
such clear intellectual terms the reasons why men should seek to 
govern their own actions by justice rather than legality.18 
 
B. Gandhi and His Movement 
 
Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi (1869–1948) is the man who broadened the 
scope of civil disobedience and helped civil disobedience to gain international 
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fame.19 Gandhian civil disobedience originated in 1906, in South Africa, as 
part of his campaign for the defense of the civil rights of the disenfranchised 
Indian immigrants. There, he successfully compelled the government of the 
Union of South Africa to make important concessions to his demands, 
including recognition of Indian marriages and abolition of the poll tax for 
Indians.20 In early 1915, Gandhi returned to India. As soon as he returned to 
his own country, he began to use the techniques he had developed in South 
Africa to protest against oppressive taxation and widespread discrimination, 
and above all to fight for the independence of India. Gandhi famously led 
Indians in the disobedience of the salt tax on the 400 kilometer Gandhi Salt 
March in 1930, and an open call for the British to quit India in 1942. Gandhi 
was imprisoned for many years on numerous occasions in both South Africa 
and India, but his movement attracted a huge number of followers from the 
Indian public. Thus, Gandhi was able to use the technique as an effective 
political tool and played a key role in bringing about the British decision to 
end colonial rule of his homeland. Gandhi’s India independence movement 
was one of the few relatively unqualified successes in the history of civil 
disobedience. His success made civil disobedience known to the world. 
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Gandhi called his practice Satyagraha, a Gujarati21 word meaning “firmness 
in adhering to truth”.22 He considered truth as the sovereign principle: “Truth 
is God.”23 To be binding, laws had to be truthful. All untruthful laws had to be 
resisted. However, Gandhi’s theory does not end here; he further proposed that 
despite untruthful laws must be resisted, the end does not justify the means. 
The means itself must be equally noble and pure. Thus, non-violence was 
always at the very center of Gandhi's thoughts and struggles. In his eyes, there 
is an obvious relationship between the doctrine of truth and non-violence, that 
is, non-violence is the fundamental means by which truth can be realized. 
 
The seeker after Truth should be humbler than the dust. The world 
crushes the dust under its feet, but the seeker after Truth should so 
humble himself that even the dust could crush him. Only then, and 
not till then, will he have a glimpse of Truth.24 
 
By stressing love and non-violence, Gandhi successfully deepened the 
meaning of civil disobedience. His place in civil disobedience and humanity is 
measured not in terms of the twentieth century, but in terms of history. His 
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teachings inspired nonviolent movements all over the world, notably the Civil 
Rights Movement led by King in the United States and the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement in South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. 
 
C. Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 
 
Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) was another figure who contributed 
greatly to the development of the practice of civil disobedience. Like Gandhi, 
he helped make civil disobedience a respected practice worldwide. 
 
King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” is considered the most widely read 
and discussed manifesto on civil disobedience after Thoreau's essay. Although 
aware of Thoreau’s writings, King was more directly influenced by Gandhi 
and the Christian humanism.25 In his essay, he maintained that there were two 
types of laws: just and unjust. He contended that those laws which square with 
the moral law or the law of God are just, whereas those laws which are out of 
harmony with the moral law are unjust. Just laws should be advocated; unjust 
laws should be disobeyed because they degrade human personality.26 Like 
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Thoreau and Gandhi, King insisted on the nonviolence nature of civil 
disobedience. And, like Thoreau and Gandhi, he emphasized the importance of 
accepting the penalty. “One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, 
lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty.”27 Moreover, King was 
not only a theorist but also a great practitioner of civil disobedience. He played 
a very active role in the African-American civil rights movement, similar to 
the role which Gandhi had played in the independence movement of India. 
 
Generally, the African-American Civil Rights Movement refers to the reform 
movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s which was aimed at 
abolishing racial discrimination against African-Americans. Those days were 
an uneasy and unforgettable time for Americans. The Montgomery bus boycott, 
the lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the Mississippi Summer and the 
March on Washington all took place in that period. Though not all of the 
events that made up the Civil Rights Movement would qualify as civil 
disobedience, there can be no doubt that the movement as a whole showed the 
great power of civil disobedience in changing unjust social orders.28 King was 
at the forefront of the Civil Rights Movement. Beginning with the 
Montgomery Boycott, and over the course of his life, King helped to bring 
together African-Americans and created a great movement and changed 
United States forever. His strategy of civil disobedience and his philosophy of 
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non-violent resistance also made himself one of the most influential 
Americans to ever live. 
 
After nearly a decade of nonviolent protests and marches, Congress of the 
United States passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, guaranteeing basic civil rights for all Americans regardless of race; the 
civil rights movement triumphed and the strength of civil disobedience was 
also made clear once more. 
 
D. Civil Disobedience in the Contemporary World 
 
In the past, civil disobedience was connected with struggles for basic human 
rights. Now the situation of human rights has greatly improved in the western 
liberal democracies since King’s time. But, civil disobedience has not 
disappeared with such improvements on human rights. On the contrary, it is 
even more prevalent and is adopted as a tactic by various protest groups 
worldwide. The anti-nuclear movement, the green movement, and the 
movement against globalization have all adopted civil disobedience with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. Such movements help civil disobedience go 
beyond the national boundary and become an international phenomenon. 
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The anti-nuclear movement is a loosely-linked international social movement 
opposed to the use of nuclear technologies, which originated in United States 
and soon spread to almost the whole world.29 Soon after the successful test of 
the atomic bomb and its subsequent use on Japan in 1945, people began 
worrying about its destructive power. As concern mounted, citizens formed 
groups to protest. Inspired by King and the Montgomery bus boycott of 1956, 
some activists formed the Committee for Non-Violent Action in 1957 and 
many members of this organization were arrested for trespassing when they 
tried to enter the gates of the atomic test site.30  In the same year, the 
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was formed and began pressing for a 
halt to weapons testing. These two events heralded the beginning of the 
anti-nuclear movement in the United States. In the following decades, 
hundreds of thousands of people participated in this movement. The 
participants did not restrict their protests to legal demonstrations. Civil 
disobedience tactics such as sit-ins, trespassing and blockade of roads were 
also extensively used by them. The movement soon spread to Europe and the 
rest of the world in 1950s, and the decision of the NATO to deploy nuclear 
weapons in Europe, in particular, sparked a series of massive civil 
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disobedience protests in many European countries. For example, in the last 
week of October 1983, nearly one million people protested in several cities of 
West Germany by blocking roads and offices of the defense ministry, sit-ins 
and forming human chains, and so on. London saw a demonstration of nearly 
300,000 people, an equal number protested in Brussels, more than 200,000 in 
Copenhagen, 500,000 in Rome and more than 550,000 in The Hague.31 The 
movement lost its momentum at the end of last century, but it still continues 
today. One recent event took place in Germany in 2008 when over 15,000 
people turned out to disrupt a delivery of nuclear waste across Germany.32 
 
The anti-globalization movement is another major movement which uses civil 
disobedience. 33 The movement burst into mass consciousness with the “The 
Battle of Seattle” in November 1999. In the series of demonstrations that took 
place over the course of several days, the protestors participated in 
unauthorized marches, blocked delegates' entrance to WTO meetings and 
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forced the cancellation of the opening ceremonies and lasted the length of the 
meeting until December 3. After Seattle, mass civil disobedience actions 
continued to take place in many other cities such as Melbourne, Prague and 
Genoa wherever the world leaders met to discuss the implementation of 
neo-liberal policies. Besides the widely-known protests taking place at the 
international level, more protests were held by various groups at the local and 
national levels including strikes in South Korea, the mass mobilization of civil 
society in Argentina following the country's 2001 economic collapse, and 
Indonesian protests in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.34 There 
are great differences among the different segments of the anti-globalization 
movement, and their goals are sometimes inconsistent,35 but the tactic of the 
civil disobedience has been a common and visible characteristic of this 
ever-expanding movement. 
 
In contemporary world, the tactic of civil disobedience is also widely used by 
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the environment activists. Environmental and forest demonstrations, with acts 
of civil disobedience such as sit-ins, blockades, tree sits and forest occupations, 
have emerged in the last decade, prompted by the continuing mass clear cuts 
and destruction of the forest ecosystem and widespread environmental 
consequences. 36  Today, most famous environment organizations such as 
Greenpeace, the Rainforest Action Network, the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society, the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front have all 
adopted civil disobedience as a way of publicizing their views and achieving 
their aims. Actually, the tactic of civil disobedience is so widely recognized 
and used in environmental movements that even the former vice-president of 
United States, Al Gore, called the people to practice environmental civil 
disobedience.37 
 
The tactic of civil disobedience is also contemporarily used in many other 
movements, including movements against war and movements against racial 
discrimination. Moreover, more civil disobedience actions are practiced 
individually rather than by organizations. So civil disobedience is still widely 
practiced in the modern world, only the people involved and the causes have 
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I draw attention to these important events of civil disobedience in history and 
in the contemporary world because those events not only are important for our 
discussion but also should guide our response to civil disobedience. Having 
discussed the typical cases of civil disobedience, I will now try to define civil 
disobedience by identifying its main characteristics. 
 
II. The Characteristics of Civil Disobedience 
 
In the previous section, I discussed some famous cases of civil disobedience. 
In this section, I analyze the common characteristics of these civil 
disobedience cases. Civil disobedience is best understood as a set of diverse 
actions that tend to possess certain general attributes. Understanding these 
characteristics will be greatly helpful to the understanding of the definition. 
Thus, the following section is devoted to the enumeration of these 
characteristics. I suggest there are four characteristics of civil disobedience: 
intentional breach of law, predominantly nonviolence, publicity and 
willingness to accept punishment. 
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A. Intentional Breach of Law 
 
The first characteristic of civil disobedience is that it must involve an 
intentional breach of law. Though there have been and will continue to be 
serious disputes over exactly what the term “civil disobedience” means, on 
this point scholars almost unanimously agree.39 Actually, it is reasonable to 
call this characteristic the most prominent characteristic of civil disobedience 
because almost all of the disputes about civil disobedience can be traced to 
this characteristic. As Weber said, if there is no breach of law, there will be no 
need to justify it.40 In order to make it easier to understand, I will further 
divide this characteristic into three sub-characteristics. 
 
Firstly, it means that there must be a breach of law. In other words, if no law is 
violated in a protest, then that protest is not qualified as civil disobedience. 
This requirement is necessary to distinguish civil disobedience from legitimate 
protest in the public square such as organized marches, parades or 
demonstrations. A classic case in point here is the famous Montgomery bus 
boycott led by King in 1955-56. King had called on his followers to boycott 
the buses by walking and organizing car pools. Such boycotts, at least initially, 
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did not breach any law, so they should not be considered civil disobedience, 
contrary to the view of some scholars whose views will be considered 
shortly.41 The same point also applies to Gandhi when he called Indian people 
to resist using any goods imported from England. 42  Refusing to buy 
something is not against the law, so such acts do not qualify as civil 
disobedience either. 
 
Secondly, the breach of law must be intentional. “One feature of the 
disobedient's violation of law is especially notable. He not only breaks the law 
but does so knowingly and deliberately.”43 This is very important. It means 
that disobedience itself is an essential, not an accidental, element in the 
disobedients’ act. In other words, accidental violations of law, even in the 
course of a protest, cannot be classified as civil disobedience. For example, a 
man in a legitimate demonstration broke a window out of negligence and was 
arrested by the police. Though such an act is a breach of law and also takes 
place in a protest, it is not an act of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience, 
after all, is not just done; it is deliberately and knowingly committed. 
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Finally, the breach of law is intended to be a protest. The purpose of civil 
disobedience is to call attention to an unjust law or policy and ultimately 
change it. Therefore, the civil disobedient does not commit civil disobedience 
merely for amusement or out of self-interest. They must seek to benefit 
society.44 That is to say, when a civil disobedience action is staged, its 
purpose must be to protest or persuade. So in the previous example, if the man 
broke the window to steal a necklace he wanted for his wife, this would not be 
an act of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is a noble action. 
 
Although, as mentioned earlier, almost all scholars agree that intentional 
breach of law is an essential part of civil disobedience, minor disputes on this 
point persist. Two main disputes are involved here. The first is what the word 
“law” means. The second is whether the breach of law can be indirect. 
 
Some scholars claim that breaking an unconstitutional law is not civil 
disobedience. For example, Leslie J. Macfarlane proposed that actions taken in 
furtherance of the constitution against unconstitutional practices could not be 
validly construed as acts of civil disobedience.45 And Stuart M. Brown, Jr. 
also contended that “if the only statute that a freedom rider ever breaches are 
unconstitutional, then he commits no crime or act of civil disobedience. The 
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notion of disobeying implies a legally valid rule or command.”46 In my 
opinion, this is a very unrealistic view because it excludes many typical cases 
of civil disobedience. For instance, the segregation and discriminating laws 
opposed by King and his followers were unconstitutional in reality, but this 
did not prevent them from being civil disobedients. To take a step back, if we 
accept the view that breaking an unconstitutional law is not civil disobedience, 
then the conclusion would be this: only constitutional law itself and those laws 
which are in line with it would qualify as targets of civil disobedience. To a 
large degree, this would mean that only constitution itself could be the target 
of civil disobedience since all other laws are under the constitution. No doubt, 
this is a very unrealistic view. If it were adopted, there would be hardly any 
cases of civil disobedience because many of the typical cases of civil 
disobedience, such as those described earlier in this chapter, would have to be 
excluded as cases of civil disobedience. 
 
So what kind of law should qualify as a target of civil disobedience? And what 
does the word “law” means in this context? In my view, the law targeted by 
civil disobedience is one that is either constitutional or unconstitutional. As 
long as the authorities consider the law valid and are ready to enforce it by 
coercive means, the law would qualify as the target of civil disobedience. The 
reason is that before the unconstitutionality of such laws is officially 
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recognized by the court or other government branches, they are still 
enforceable and a prospective practitioner of civil disobedience would have to 
face the danger of punishment, just as in those civil disobedience cases which 
target laws that are, in reality, unconstitutional. 
 
The other dispute here is whether breaches of law in civil disobedience can be 
indirect. Must a civil disobedient breach the very law that is being protested? 
Or he can breach one law in order to protest another law? According to one 
view, breaching one law to protest another law is forbidden. Its most 
well-known representative is Judge Abe Fortas who said that civil 
disobedience “is never justified in our nation where the law being violated is 
not itself the focus or target of the protest”.47 However, such a view is not 
accepted by most scholars. As John Rawls points out in A Theory of Justice, 
direct disobedience is impossible at times because one cannot protest a law on 
treason by committing treason or protest a law on rape by committing rape.48 
In my view, Rawls’s view is preferable, but a more important question is how 
far indirect civil disobedience can go. Is it possible to protest a segregation law 
by killing a white person? Is it right to protest an unfair university policy by 
stealing? Obviously, indirect civil disobedience should not be allowed to go so 
far. Otherwise, the social order would be damaged, if not completely destroyed. 
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So where should the demarcation line be drawn? Undoubtedly, the answer is 
not an easy one. It differs from case to case. But the general rule is clear: The 
connection between the law breached and the law protested must not be so far 
as to appear ineffective and absurd. And here it is also important for the civil 
disobedient to let both the authorities and the public know that he is 
deliberately violating a law or an injunction in protest at a law that has no 
direct bearing upon the nature of the law or injunction violated.  Ultimately, 
civil disobedience is a symbolic and instrumental act;49 its fundamental aim is 
not to breach the law or paralyze the social order but to redress the law which 
is considered unjust. So communication between the civil disobedient and the 
authorities is vital, especially in the case of indirect civil disobedience. 
 
B. Predominantly Nonviolent 
 
The second characteristic of civil disobedience is non-violence. This means 
that the civil disobedient must be committed to a peaceful protest. He does not 
try to achieve his aim by the use of violence or threatening use of violence. 
 
Almost all academic commentators of today consider non-violence an 
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essential characteristic of civil disobedience.50 But some scholars disagree. 
There are some commentators who claim that civil disobedience can be 
violent as well as non-violent. For example, Berel Lang in his “Civil 
Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction with A Difference” claims that 
acts of civil disobedience need not be nonviolent. Any justification of civil 
disobedience also serves as justification for a subclass of actions involving 
violence. 51  John Morreall also contends that civil disobedience directed 
against certain immoral laws or policies can be violent and still be 
justifiable.52 However, in my opinion, the argument that civil disobedience 
can be violent is either based on misunderstanding or is looking at completely 
different concepts. For example, what John Morreal tried to propose in his 
article is that violent disobedience is justifiable. It is true that violent 
disobedience, even violent revolution, may be justifiable under certain 
circumstances, but this does not mean that these violent disobediences qualify 
as civil disobedience. Civil disobedience does not include all kinds of 
justifiable disobedient actions, and there is no civil disobedient or theorist of 
civil disobedience who claims that only civil disobedience is justified and all 
other acts of disobedience are not. So whether an action is justifiable is one 
thing; whether it qualifies as civil disobedience is another. 
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I will therefore follow most philosophers of civil disobedience and the original 
meaning of “civil” by defining civil disobedience as a non-violent action. This 
is more of a concept-mapping question than a contentious philosophical 
question because defining civil disobedience as non-violent does not imply 
that I deny the justifiability of other kinds of disobedience. But the resulting 
definition does have advantages by giving civil disobedience a distinguishable 
characteristic. It can help to distinguish civil disobedience from other kinds of 
protests, including revolution and overt terrorism, which, if ever justified, 
would require a distinct justification.53  
 
Having defined civil disobedience as non-violent, I need to further clarify 
what I mean by non-violence because even those scholars who agree that 
non-violence is an essential characteristic of civil disobedience are also 
divided on its meaning. The first group of scholars, whose most known 
representative is Rawls, adopts an almost zero-tolerance attitude towards 
violence.54 A second group is tolerant of some violence. They maintain that 
civil disobedience should be only predominantly non-violent.55  
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In my view, the latter view is preferable. The former is generally rejected for 
two reasons. First, it overlooks the complicated social context in which civil 
disobedience takes place. Civil disobedience in nature is a non-violent, 
benevolent resistance. However, since it usually takes place during a time of 
great social strife and acts of peaceful resistance have historically been 
countered with violence from the side of those who try to preserve the status 
quo, it is difficult under such circumstances for the civil disobedients to keep 
their actions completely peaceful. Sometimes, even when all reasonable steps 
are taken to ensure the peaceful nature of an act of civil disobedience, sporadic 
violence will still happen. In Kevin Smith’s words, the civil disobedient may 
find the reality of the street is such that his resolve and effort to do no harm 
evaporate.56 Moreover, civil disobedience is often practiced on a mass level; 
there are thousands, even millions of participants protesting together. It would 
be unimaginably hard for the organizers to control such a large number of 
participants. 
 
Second, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find a precise dividing line 
between violence and non-violence. It is unclear, for example, whether 
self-inflicted “violence”, minor “violence” to property (such as burning of 
draft cards), or minor “violence” against others (such as a vicious pinch) 
should be counted as “violence” so as to disqualify otherwise peaceful acts as 
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acts of civil disobedience. If they are not considered violence, it is 
counter-intuitive because general knowledge tells us they are violence, just as 
the words I used to describe them suggest. However, if they are included in the 
conception of violence, such a strict definition of violence would disqualify 
many acts (including largely peaceful mass demonstrations) from being 
regarded as acts of civil disobedience. Moreover, non-violent acts or legal acts 
sometimes can cause more harm to others than violent acts.57 For instance, a 
legal strike by ambulance workers may well have much more severe 
consequences than minor acts of burning one’s own draft cards. Undoubtedly, 
this further blurs the difference between violence and non-violence. Since 
violence and non-violence are difficult to differentiate clearly, the pure 
non-violence attitude will become impractical, if not naïve. 
 
Thus, in consideration of the complicated social context and the difficulty in 
distinguishing violence and non-violence, the “predominantly non-violent” 
approach is preferable. But, what does “predominantly non-violent” mean? On 
the one hand, “predominantly non-violent” means that the civil disobedient 
does not try to accomplish his aim either by initiating or by threatening 
violence. Even when confronted with violence, he should not respond with 
violence. Rather, he should be prepared to suffer.58 In addition, it also means 
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that disobedients must not only eschew violence at the outset of their actions 
but also assess their ability to remain peaceful during the protest. 59 
Disobedients should act with the best interests of the community in mind.60 
Civil disobedience is peaceful in nature; actions that are intended to or 
threaten to physically harm other people are beyond the pale of civil 
disobedience. 
 
On the other hand, civil disobedience actions need only to be predominantly 
non-violent.61 The civil disobedient is not intended to use violence, but he 
may find the reality of the street is such that he is incapable of remaining 
completely non-violent. He may, for example, have to protect himself properly 
from the violence of the police. Also, he may have to resort to minor violence 
such as burning of his own draft card or sitting-in in order to dramatize the 
situation. This character should not deprive him of the status of civil 
disobedient. Likewise, violence caused by a small number of participants 
should not disqualify others from the status of civil disobedient and violence 
used by government members against the bystander or the civil disobedient 
should not cause the civil disobedient to lose the status. Therefore, in view of 
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the complicated reality of the street, the question of violence must be assessed 




The third characteristic of civil disobedience is publicity which requires the 
action of civil disobedience to be carried out in the open, in a non-secretive or 
overt manner.63 There are two elements involved in this requirement. 
 
In the first place, publicity means that people who violate law for reasons of 
civil disobedience must state or demonstrate the reason for their disobedience. 
Civil disobedience is an action intentionally committed for protest; it is vital, 
therefore, for the disobedient to let both the government and the public know 
what they are protesting against. They cannot achieve their aim of redressing 
the law or policy if no one knows what they are complaining about. That is to 
say, the goal of civil disobedience can be achieved only if civil disobedients 
successfully convey their intentions to the authorities and the public. 
 
In the second place, publicity requires that the civil disobedient’s violation of a 
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law must either be public or done in a manner in which the civil disobedient 
“leaves the signature” on the action. This requirement would exclude 
disobedience like the Underground Railroad,64 which succeeded because of 
its covert operation, from the definition of civil disobedience. 
 
Publicity is an important characteristic of civil disobedience, but it should not 
be defined too narrowly. For example, some writers go so far as insisting that 
publicity means the civil disobedient must give prior notice to the authorities 
before committing civil disobedience.65 But, practically, it is unreasonable to 
construe publicity in such a strict meaning because it may put the civil 
disobedient into a fragile and powerless situation. The authorities, after being 
informed, may dispatch personnel to impede the performance of civil 
disobedience and prevent it from being made public, so advance notice should 
not be a requirement of all civil disobedience,66 though it is not rare for the 
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authorities to be informed beforehand by the civil disobedient. I therefore 
suggest that it will suffice to meet the characteristic of publicity as long as the 
civil disobedient commits civil disobedience publicly or leaves his signature 
on the protest so that the authorities know who is disobeying the law and what 
he is protesting against. 
 
It is also unnecessary that civil disobedience be carried out in the public 
square where the civil dialogue of any society takes place, as in a mass 
meeting or before the media, as some writers have suggested. 67  The 
requirement of publicity emphasizes that the intention of the protest and the 
identity of the protestor be known to the public and the authorities; it does not 
require civil disobedience to be committed necessarily with the presence of 
many people or in view of the media. A public declaration of intention and 
identity immediately after the act should be enough to satisfy the requirement 
of publicity. For example, some civil disobedients may secretly, rather than 
publicly, trespass on the nuclear test site and paint some protesting slogans on 
the buildings, but their actions would be still sufficient to meet the 
requirement of publicity as long as they announce their intentions after the 
action.  
 
But, at the same time, another trend of denying publicity as a characteristic of 
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civil disobedience must also be avoided. A few scholars adhere to the view 
that civil disobedience also can be done in complete secrecy. Two typical cases 
often mentioned by them are the Underground Railway Movement of 
America68 in which many people secretly harbored or protected salves from 
their owners in defiance of the Fugitive Salve Act and the soldiers’ defiance 
action in Nazi Germany69 when many German soldiers secretly defied their 
senior’s orders to kill the Jewish people. The reason why these scholars 
wrongly believe that civil disobedience can be committed in complete secrecy 
is the same reason expounded in the last section, which leads some writers to 
wrongly believe that civil disobedience can be violent. They all confused civil 
disobedience with justified defiance of law. They all, therefore, mistakenly 
believe the theory of civil disobedience should cover every justified breach of 
law. But, actually, civil disobedience is only one type of justified breach of law. 
It does not cover every justified breach of law, nor has the necessity or 
obligation to do so. No doubt, the defiance actions of the soldiers in the Nazi 
Germany to protect Jews are just and should be encouraged, but this does not 
mean they must be considered as civil disobedience. In fact, this line of 
thought followed by them is very harmful to the study of civil disobedience, 
because it will blur the line between civil disobedience and typical crimes and 
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cause civil disobedience to lose the character as an independent and 
distinguished form of protest. 
 
In summary, publicity is an essential character of civil disobedience, but it 
does not mean that civil disobedience must be committed with witnesses or 
audiences; it merely highlights that the intention of disobedience and the 
identity of the committer be known to the public and the relevant authorities. 
 
D. Willingness to Accept Punishment 
 
Another characteristic of civil disobedience is willingness to accept 
punishment, which requires that the protesters who engage in civil 
disobedience not only be peaceful and open, but also be willing to pay the 
penalty for their actions. That is to say, the civil disobedients should not seek 
to shirk accountability for their actions or hide what they have done. Rather, 
he should come forward and accept any punishment which the authorities 
impose on them70 
 
This characteristic, i.e., willingness to accept punishment, is closely related to 
the non-violence characteristic of civil disobedience. Non-violence 
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characteristic requires all proper measures to be taken in the part of the civil 
disobedient to avoid the occurrence of violence. The civil disobedient should 
not incite violence himself, and he should also refrain from resorting to 
violence when provoked by others in order to avoid stirring more violence. In 
order to keep the protest nonviolent, it is necessary for the civil disobedient to 
willingly submit himself to the relevant authorities because if he resists or 
even only tries to escape, violence may ensue. Therefore, in some sense, 
willingness to submit to punishment is the inner requirement or natural 
extension of the meaning of nonviolence. 
 
Willingness to submit to punishment is also an expression of the civil 
disobedient that he is not putting his own interests over those of the others’ 
and, rather, he is committed to the rule of law.71 Civil disobedience, given its 
place at the boundary of fidelity to law, is said to fall between legal protest, on 
the one hand, and revolutionary action, militant protest and organized forcible 
resistance, on the other hand.72 It is not, and must not become, an open 
invitation to anarchy.73  The civil disobedient is different from anarchist 
because he still has faith in the rule of law. The civil disobedient is also 
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different from violent revolutionists because he believes that the authorities 
may accept his plea finally and there is chance to change the injustice 
peacefully. He does not want, at least in the beginning, to break abruptly with 
the authorities in power. Very often, the target of civil disobedience is not the 
whole political system, but only one law or a small number of laws.74 
Therefore, it is reasonable for the civil disobedient to show his allegiance to 
the political system by submitting himself to the authorities willingly after 
breaking the law, especially in those cases of indirect civil disobedience in 
which a just law has been broken merely serving the aim of showing the 
injustice of another law. 
 
But some scholars deny that the civil disobedient should willingly submit 
himself to the authorities. Howard Zinn holds that accepting punishment for 
civil disobedience would be contradictory. The contradiction would lie in the 
fact that the civil disobedients disrespect the law in the first place, with their 
law-breaking action, and then accept the legal punishment with the aim of 
showing their respect to the law itself. Why is it all right to disobey the law in 
the first instance, but then, when you are punished, start obeying it? The 
principle should be if it is right to disobey unjust laws, it is right to disobey 
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unjust punishment for breaking those laws. 75 The same puzzle is underscored 
by Paul Power, who contends that willingness to accept punishment is 
inacceptable: “To accept jail penitently as an accession to the rules is to switch 
suddenly to a spirit of subservience, to demean the seriousness of the 
protest”.76 This seems to be a serious challenge for those who endorse the 
principle that civil disobedience requires the willingness to accept punishment. 
However, the challenge is built on the misunderstandings of civil disobedience. 
First, Zinn misunderstands the aim of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is 
not to overthrow the political system or build a new government. It is only a 
protest against some of its laws. Though the civil disobedient complains of 
these laws sometimes, he is still loyal to the larger political system. When he 
disobeys a particular law, he is protesting its injustice, but when he submits 
himself to the punishment, he is trying to express his allegiance to the whole 
political system. The fact that he accepts the punishment imposed by the law is 
only to show that he is still willing to cooperate with the authorities in 
resolving the problem. Therefore, there is no contradiction as suggested by 
Zinn.77 Second, willingness to accept punishment does not necessarily mean 
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that the civil disobedient must plead guilty or acknowledge the propriety of the 
government to punish him; it only means that he should not try to hide his 
identity and should submit himself to punishment peacefully if the authorities 
seek to punish him. And raising possible defenses is not inconsistent with the 
requirement of willingly submitting to punishment, the civil disobedient may 
choose to continue his fight with words in the court to show the rightness of 
his cause and the injustice of the law. In this light, it is not sound to conclude 
that willingly submitting to punishment is a sign of spiritual subservience or a 
demeaning of the seriousness of the protest as claimed by Power. 
 
Another point which deserves attention is that willingness to accept 
punishment does not require the civil disobedient to go to jail automatically or 
voluntarily request to be punished. The reasons advanced so far for 
encouraging willingly submitting to punishment would be largely satisfied by 
a course of action that allows the authorities to impose punishment. It is wrong 
to argue that the civil disobedient must request to be punished.78 Certainly, it 
is true that some civil disobedients may wish themselves to be arrested and 
jailed because they think this will be a very helpful way to expose the brutality 
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of the authorities and arouse the public, but this is another question which 
concerns the specific tactic of civil disobedience instead of the inner 
requirement of willingness to accept punishment. 
 
In short, willingness to accept punishment is an essential characteristic of civil 
disobedience which requires the civil disobedient to refrain from resisting 
enforcement of laws and willingly submit to punishment. But it does not 
require the civil disobedient to plead guilty. It is a misunderstanding to 
interpret willingness to accept punishment as pleading guilty and admitting 
impropriety. 79  The civil disobedient, through willing acceptance of 
punishment, indicates that he is seeking redress of the injustice by cooperating 
with the authorities rather than breaking off with them completely. 
 
III. Civil Disobedience and Related Phenomena 
 
Based on the characteristics of civil disobedience elaborated above, I will try 
in this section to differentiate civil disobedience from its related phenomena. 
This will not only contribute to the further clarification of the implications of 
civil disobedience, but will also help to justify my analysis of civil 
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disobedience as an independent kind of protest. 
 
A. Civil Disobedience and Common Crimes 
 
Both civil disobedience and common crimes involve violations of law, and 
very often deliberate violations of law. Therefore, they look very similar under 
some circumstances. Sometimes, it is not easy to draw a clear line between 
them because there are bound to be difficult cases at the boundary.80 However, 
under most circumstances, there is no difficulty in differentiating them. 
 
Their main difference lies in the motive. The common crimes are generally 
committed because of such familiar motives as personal gain, malice and hate 
etc.,81 but civil disobedience is not undertaken out of selfishness (or at least 
not merely out of selfishness); rather it seeks to enhance the common good 
through changes in the policies or laws of the state. Perpetrators of civil 
disobedience believe that they are engaged in a noble cause and they also 
believe that the public will eventually come to agree with them. On the other 
hand, most criminals know what they are committing is not commendable and, 
therefore, they rarely have the extravagant hope that people will view them as 
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Further, acts of civil disobedience may be distinguished from typical cases of 
crime by their outer characteristics. First, civil disobedience is characterized 
by publicity, whereas typical cases of crime are characterized by secrecy.82 
The civil disobedient aspires both his actions and identity to be known by 
others, and the more people know, the better. Nevertheless, typical criminals 
try to break the law secretly. Generally, they want others know neither their 
acts nor their identities. 
 
Second, civil disobedience is committed non-violently; while criminal acts can 
be violent. Non-violence is an inner requirement of civil disobedience; the use 
of violence may lead to the loss of the civil disobedience status. But, 
non-violence is not a necessary component of crime and the use of violence 
does not negate the status of crime either, though there are some crimes that 
are necessarily committed peacefully, such as fraud and theft. 
 
Third, the civil disobedient is willing to submit himself to punishment; at least 
he does not try to hide or escape. However, typical criminals often do 
everything possible to avoid punishment. 
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Fourth, civil disobedience is an intentional breach of law, i.e. it is committed 
with the purpose of protest. Accidental breach of law does not constitute civil 
disobedience. However, the situation of common crimes is much more 
complex. Most crimes are committed voluntarily, but there are also some 
crimes which can be committed involuntarily such as involuntary killing and 
negligence of duty. 
 
After elaborating all of these differences, it should be pointed out that the civil 
disobedient is typically punished as a common criminal today, though some 
form of mitigation is often provided; almost all of the modern penal codes of 
the world, if not all, fail to specify a special treatment for civil disobedience. 
Certainly, the civil disobedient is not punished under the crime of civil 
disobedience because there is no such a crime. He is punished according to 
specific rules which he breaches. It has been argued by some scholars that this 
response is inappropriate and some of them have also suggested ways to revise 
the penal code in order to distinguish the civil disobedient and his acts from 
criminals and criminal acts.83 
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B. Civil Disobedience and Legal Protest 
 
In a democracy, citizens enjoy the rights of protest. The rights of protest can 
be expressed in demonstrations, strikes, parades, petitioning, public debates, 
and direct appeals to the media, and so on. Legal protest has a great deal in 
common with civil disobedience, in that both civil disobedience and legal 
protest are public responses to a certain situation created by law or policy 
which the protesters feel harmful either to them or to the society.84 And they 
are both committed to justice and serve the law’s need for growth and reform. 
But, legal protest and civil disobedience also have significant differences. 
 
The key difference is that civil disobedience involves breaking the law, while 
legal protest does not. Civil disobedience is a protest beyond the legal system 
which requires laws to be broken. That is to say, violation of law is an 
essential part of civil disobedience, without which civil disobedience will 
cease to exist. But legal protest is a protest within the legal system which 
requires citizens to exercise their rights of protest in accordance with the law. 
In fact, this difference is a reflection of the protestors’ different attitudes 
towards the existing legal system. The legal protestors still believe that 
injustices and departures against which they are protesting can be cured in the 
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legal system itself by resorting to the legal channels provided by it, whereas 
the civil disobedient is more pessimistic who considers that the legal means 
are either unavailable to them or ineffective. It is believed that on the 
continuum of protest civil disobedience lies in the middle. One end of the 
continuum of protest is legal protest, and the other end is rebellion.85 Legal 
protest is protected by law and is not considered as an infraction to the law, 
while civil disobedience represents only a limited respect for the law. 
 
Further, the means of expression adopted by legal protests are generally 
considered more benevolent than those adopted by the civil disobedients. 
Legal protest is expressed in such ways permissible by law as parades, strikes, 
dialogues, fasting and boycotting. However, civil disobedience does not 
follow the legislated rules, often involving disturbing the government in 
various ways, such as sitting-in, refusing to pay tax, refusing to serve in 
military forces, and blocking the road. Civil disobedience, therefore, is 
generally believed to be more likely to create problems for society than legal 
protest. That is why some scholars suggest that civil disobedience should be 
used only as a last resort, after all legal means have been tried.86 
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C. Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection 
 
Conscientious objection is noncompliance with a more or less direct legal 
injunction or administrative order, whose aim is to safeguard the conscience of 
a person.87 One typical case is the conscientious objection to military service 
on the basis of religious or secular pacifism. Conscientious objection is very 
similar to civil disobedience in many aspects. For example, they both involve 
disobedience of law; they both have close links with the conscience and the 
moral standards of the protestors. Therefore, sometimes it is very easy to 
confuse them. But, actually they belong to different categories and deserve 
different treatment. 
 
First, conscientious objection is a private act which does not try to fight for 
common good. As Rawls observes in A Theory of Justice, the conscientious 
objector does not seek to impose his conscience on the society and, 
accordingly, does not make efforts to ask the redressing of law. He hopes only 
that the society will take his special case into account and grant him a special 
exemption from the relevant law. On the contrary, the civil disobedient seeks 
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to redress or abolish the protested law and does so not only out of conscience 
but also out of sense of justice, compassion or similar motives.88 What the 
civil disobedient is demanding is not only to preserve their own integrity and 
conscience, but also to fight for the social good. Therefore, compared to 
conscientious objectors, the civil disobedient focuses more on the big picture 
of society rather than on the small world of personal suffering. 
 
Second, civil disobedience can be performed directly or indirectly, whereas 
conscientious objection must be practiced directly. The civil disobedient may 
choose to violate a just law to protest another law which he considers unjust. 
Nevertheless, the conscientious objector cannot do so because his conscience 
will not be preserved by violating another law. 
 
Third, conscientious objection is always passive, but civil disobedience can 
assume an active role at times. Conscientious objection is always a passive 
response to the requirement of law or order, but it is different in the case of 
civil disobedience. Some cases of civil disobedience are passive responses to 
the requirement of law, but in other cases civil disobedience can become very 
aggressive by demanding and coercing the authorities to take steps to change 
the status quo. In the latter cases, the civil disobedient is in the status of a 
challenger rather than a passive respondent. 
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Finally, civil disobedience and conscientious objection are also different in 
their outer characteristics. Civil disobedience must be performed publicly, 
non-violently and with a willingness to accept punishment, whereas 
conscientious objection has no such strict inner requirements. Conscientious 
objection may be performed secretly, with some violence and with an obvious 
intention to escape punishment. These differences in outer characteristics 
originate from the different aims of these two kinds of breach of law. 
Conscientious objection is largely a private action aimed at defending oneself 
from what is seen as immoral, while civil disobedience is a 
politically-motivated breach of law designed to contribute to the improvement 
of law and, therefore, it is important for others to know their action and the 
sincerity of the motive behind it.89 
 
D. Civil Disobedience and Rebellion 
 
Rebellion is an organized group act of law-breaking, which is politically 
motivated; its purpose is to change the regime or the existing constitutional 
arrangements.90 Typical examples of rebellion include the Chinese bourgeois 
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democratic revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in 1911, French revolution in 1789, 
Russian revolution in 1918 and American War of Independence. Rebellion is 
an act far more violent and aggressive than civil disobedience. 
 
In the first place, rebellion has no respect for the existing political system and 
authority. A rebellion usually occurs when there is an extreme disparity 
between the expectations of the rebelling group and the actual situation. When 
an extreme disparity occurs, the rebel group does not recognize the existing 
laws of the state any more and, instead, it seeks to overthrow the government 
or change the constitutional arrangements. In other words, it contemplates the 
wholesale destruction of the state, that is, the entire system by which law is 
made, interpreted, and administered.91 Nevertheless, civil disobedience is not 
an effort to overthrow the government. It only seeks reform the political order 
from within.92 
 
In the second place, the means of resistance used by rebel groups are far more 
violent and aggressive than those of civil disobedience; they are not 
necessarily limited to nonviolence. These means might take the form of 
terrorism, armed struggle, or political protest of various types. The act of 
rebellion is often accompanied by great loss, both in terms of lives and in 
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terms of property. And its practitioners have no wish to receive punishment; 
rather they do their best to escape it. On the contrary, civil disobedience is 
much more restricted. It must be predominantly non-violent and take into 
account the interests of others. 
 
Finally, rebellion indicates an organized opposition to the government and its 
laws. Therefore, rebellion is always committed by a mass which is organized 
to some degree, whilst civil disobedience can be committed both collectively 
and individually. Actually, most cases of civil disobedience are individual 
civil disobedience, not mass civil disobedience. 
 
E. Civil Disobedience and Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is best defined as acts of violence committed against innocent 
persons or noncombatants with the intention of achieving political ends 
through fear and intimidation.93 Like civil disobedience, terrorism is usually 
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politically-motivated, that is, terrorist actions are intended to guide or 
influence governmental policy. 94  Moreover, both civil disobedience and 
terrorism seek to achieve their aims by the violation of valid laws. Therefore, 
it is difficult to differentiate them accurately in some borderline cases. But in 
most cases, there is no difficulty in differentiating them. 
 
The first difference between civil disobedience and terrorism is their attitudes 
towards the existing political system. The civil disobedient believes that only 
part of the system goes wrong and its faults can be redressed within the 
existing system. However, terrorists do not necessarily hold such views. 
Typical terrorists believe that the existing system is better to be toppled than 
retained. That is to say, terrorists have much less respect for the existing 
system and the authorities. But it deserves to point out here that the political 
motivation behind the terrorism is very complex. Some terrorist groups are 
motivated by more or less just causes such as getting independence from 
foreign rule, fighting for more freedom, and so on. It is inappropriate to 
blindly deny all motivations of terrorism as unjustifiable merely because it 
shows less respect for the existing system.95 
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A second difference between civil disobedience and terrorism concerns their 
attitudes toward violence. As mentioned above, civil disobedience must be 
predominantly nonviolent and the civil disobedient has an obvious abhorrence 
to violence. But on this point terrorism is just the opposite, given its reliance 
on violence. Terrorists often try to achieve their aims by using violent means, 
such as assassination and bombing. Moreover, terrorism usually does not 
differentiate the innocent from the combatant; in order to achieve its aim 
terrorism is often connected with the deliberate killing of innocent people.96 
Even weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical or biological, are open 
to consideration by the terrorist. But in the case of civil disobedience, 
intentional attacks on innocent people are strictly prohibited. 
 
Thirdly, terrorism usually seeks to spread fear among a wider group than those 
directly harmed or killed.97  While terrorists commit violent acts out of 
different motivations and goals, terrorist groups typically have a tactic in 
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common: intimidation.  Terrorism uses violence, or threat of violence, 
against one portion of a society to compel the greater body of that society or 
their leaders to make a change out of fear. The message of the terrorist is most 
strongly conveyed through violence and the threat of more violence. But civil 
disobedience does not work by intimidation. Its tactics are much softer. 
Persuasion, self-suffering and soft coercion are its main tactics. 
 
IV. Conclusion: the Definition of Civil Disobedience 
 
In the light of the analysis above, I define civil disobedience as follows: civil 
disobedience is a deliberate, public violation of law with the intent to protest, 
performed non-violently, with a willingness to accept punishment. This 
definition still needs some clarification. 
 
First, this definition is not applicable to those extremely totalitarian regimes 
such as Nazi Germany. The society to which my definition is applicable needs 
not be a “nearly just society” as defined by Rawls,98 but it must be a society in 
which the right of protest and freedom of speech have been legally recognized, 
for in a society which forbids any kind of protest, all acts and gestures which 
intend to protest, even only a few dissenting words, will tend to be classified 
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as disobedience.99 Moreover, in such a society, civil disobedience action has 
no way to be known by the public because the authorities are prepared to do 
everything possible, if necessary, to prevent it from being disseminated. 
 
The reason why I do not follow Rawls to confine the social background to a 
“nearly just society” is because I think “nearly just society” is a confusing 
concept. Given the complexity of social reality, it is very difficult to determine 
whether a society is nearly just or not. For example, Rawls often cite cases 
from the slavery era in the United States, but not everyone agrees that 
nineteenth-century America was nearly just considering the fact that 
African-Americans were treated brutally and women also had no right to vote. 
Therefore, it is contentious whether such a society was “nearly just”. 
 
Second, when I give this definition, I follow two rules as I have said in the 
beginning. The first rule is that I try to make most typical cases of civil 
disobedience fall within my definition. If civil disobedience is defined too 
strictly, many typical cases of civil disobedience would be excluded. Such a 
definition would be purely theoretical, with no significance to reality. The 
second rule is that I try to maintain the independent character of civil 
disobedience. I consider that civil disobedience should be an identifiable 
                                                        
99
 In fact, lots of the confusions and misunderstandings in the definition of civil 
disobedience are caused by different social backgrounds in which civil disobedience 
happens. When social backgrounds are different, the definition of civil disobedience will 
tend to vary. 
  63
action which can be distinguished by observable characteristics from other 
forms of law-breaking such as rebellion or conscientious objection. 
 
Third, this definition restricts civil disobedience to disobedience of political 
authority, namely, the disobedience of laws or policies of the government. 
Civil disobedience I discuss here does not include the disobedience of private 




Civil disobedience is a kind of political protest which has a long tradition. 
Many philosophers have used civil disobedience in different ways; it is, 
therefore, necessary to define civil disobedience at the outset to avoid 
confusions in subsequent chapters. In this thesis, civil disobedience will be 
defined as a deliberate, public and predominantly nonviolent violation of law 
committed with the intent to protest and with a willingness to accept 
punishment. This definition satisfies the two rules noted above: it covers most 
typical cases of civil disobedience which occurred in the past and it retains 
civil disobedience as an independent and distinguished phenomenon. 
 
Now that we have a better idea of what civil disobedience is, I turn to the 
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justification of civil disobedience in the next chapter. The justification of civil 
disobedience is all the more important to the reconciliation of civil 
disobedience and democracy because it is only if civil disobedience can be 




The Justification of Civil Disobedience in Democracy 
 
Having defined civil disobedience in the previous chapter, I now turn to the 
justification of civil disobedience. Though there is general agreement that civil 
disobedience is justified in an authoritarian regime, its justification in a 
democratic state is highly controversial. I will argue that civil disobedience 
remains necessary in modern western democracy and the argument will be 
made in three steps. First, I will explain the phenomenon of democratic and 
justice deficits in the modern western democracy. Second, on the basis of the 
democratic and justice deficits theory, I will justify civil disobedience from the 
perspective of the ideal democracy. Finally, I will respond to potential 
criticisms of my justification of civil disobedience. 
 
I. Democratic Deficits and Justice Deficits 
 
Democracy is widely considered the best mechanism of governance, but it has 
never been fully realized. All existing democracies are imperfect. In my 
opinion, the defects of actual democracies can be explained from two 
perspectives: democratic deficits and justice deficits.  
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A. The Essence of Democracy 
 
Democracy is often considered a form of government superior to all others. 
Very few regimes in existence today, if any, would be willing to admit that 
they are not democratic. But both in theory and in practice there is no 
universally accepted definition of democracy. Modern textbooks on the topic 
generally state that “the word democracy comes from the Greek and literally 
means rule by the people”.100 The idea of the “rule by the people” means that 
people can elect their own government and influence or participate in its 
decisions: in other words, democracy means a government by persons who are 
freely chosen by and responsible to the governed. Thus, Plato characterizes 
democracy as “the form of government in which the magistrates are 
commonly elected by lot”.101 
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Today, the notion of democracy has grown much richer and more complex 
since antiquity when it was discussed by Plato. In fact, it has become so 
complex that even political theorists struggle with its meaning. This situation 
is vividly reflected by the multiplicity of terms introduced into democratic 
dialogue. For example, liberals speak of “modern”, “liberal”, “representative”, 
“constitutional” or “parliamentary” democracy; social democrats speak of 
“social”, “economic” or “industrial” democracy.102 There are both thinner and 
thicker conceptions of democracy. However, a minimal definition of 
democracy can be secured that is generally satisfactory. 
 
First of all, democracy continues to be understood, as in antiquity, as a form of 
government. In this sense, democracy is viewed as a mix of procedures, 
processes and institutions which are devised to ascertain and reflect the will of 
the people.103 Since the sovereign power is vested in the people, rather than 
the government, the legitimacy of the government comes from its position as a 
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servant of the people.104 The national assembly or parliament is ‘sovereign’ 
because it expresses the delegated power of the people and it is legitimately so 
because it is representative of the people’s will.105 Therefore, the aim of the 
democratic system is to ensure that the sovereign will of the people to be 
reflected in the government decisions, policies and laws as accurately as 
possible. This is an understanding of democracy from the perspective of 
procedure. 
 
However, it is not enough to understand democracy merely from the 
perspective of procedures and processes. Democracy not only means a form of 
government but also a set of values which are above “democracy”. 106 
Otherwise, the minority will be very easily subjected to the tyranny of the 
majority. Some values such as equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
religion should be independent of the majority and the government. This is 
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most obvious in the emphasis that all actual democracies place on the values it 
promotes, such as equality, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on. 
The American Constitution, for example, limits itself, forbidding the 
legislation of any law which would infringe freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion, even if a majority of the people or a majority of the 
legislature votes to establish that law.107 Since democracy aims to be a regime 
of freedom, it should be conducted in the light of values which are 
independent of the majority and the government because democratic processes 
per se do not guarantee the fulfillment of these values.108 Consequently, a 
good democracy should not only be responsive to the will of the majority, it 
should also ensure social justice and meet some substantive standards. In 
consideration of this goal, some scholars point out that “the rule of the people” 
is not a good definition of democracy; a more accurate one would be “the rule 
of the people restricting itself against the tyranny of the majority of the 
people”.109 
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So, in summary, although democracy “stands above all else for a method 
whereby men can resolve peacefully which of competing moralities shall 
temporarily prevail”,110 it also should have some substantive stipulations. I 
will not propose, in this dissertation, what substantive standards should be met 
if a society can be considered democratic because the justification of civil 
disobedience does not require such an elaboration. It suffices, here, to 
remember that democracy has two essential elements: on the one hand, it is a 
system to give expression to the people’s will; on the other hand, it has certain 
substantive standards which cannot be transgressed. Every good democracy 
should be an appropriate combination of procedural and substantive 
elements.111 
 
B. The Generation of Democratic and Justice Deficits 
 
The essential test for a democracy, then, is whether it reflects the will of the 
people accurately and, at the same time, meets the necessary substantive 
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standards. Here, I will use this simplified test to differentiate different kinds of 
democracy. 112  The democracy which can perfectly satisfy both of these 
requirements may be called an “ideal democracy” or “perfect democracy”. 
According to this standard, unfortunately, no democracy in existence today 
can claim itself to be an ideal democracy, viz. it can claim that it has 
accurately reflected the will of the people and perfectly realized the 
substantive standards required by the ideal democracy. All existing 
democracies have flaws. Though the flaws they have may be different both in 
substance and degree, the common character they share with each other is that 
they all aspire to be ideal democracies. I will therefore call these existing 
democracies “imperfect democracies” or “actual democracies”. And call the 
gaps between imperfect democracy and ideal democracy as “deficits”. There 
are two kinds of deficits. 
 
The first is a “democratic deficit”. An ideal democracy can reflect the 
sovereign will of the people very accurately so that there is no gap between the 
state will and the will of the people, viz. the state will and the people’s will in 
an ideal democracy are highly consistent with each other. But, in an imperfect 
democracy, the situation is different. Gaps often exist between the will of the 
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people and the state will as reflected in the laws and policies. When such a gap 
occurs, that is, when the state will departs from the will of the people, a deficit 
is produced. I call this kind of deficit a “democratic deficit”.113 Democratic 
deficits reflect the departure of the state will from the sovereign will of the 
people. 
 
A second kind of deficit also arises in imperfect democracies. As I discussed 
above, a democracy has substantive standards which must be met; however, an 
imperfect democracy may fail to meet these standards. Though democracy is 
the form of government “most likely to produce the decisions and results that 
treat all members of the community with equal concern,”114 it is wrong to 
presume that a democracy will never behave unjustly.115 In an imperfect 
democracy, it is still possible for the basic rights of minorities to be denied and 
for freedom of speech and association to be endangered. Therefore, when an 
imperfect democracy fails to meet the substantive standards required by ideal 
democracy, a gap arises between the ideal and imperfect democracy. I will call 
this gap of substantive elements “justice deficits”. The “justice deficits” is the 
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gap between the substantive standards which a democracy should support and 
the actual realization of those standards. 
 
Having defined democratic and justice deficits, now I explain how these two 
deficits are generated in an imperfect democracy. But, here, I will not go into 
depth. For my present purpose, it is enough to consider the issue briefly. 
 
There are at least two causes of democratic and justice deficits. The first is that 
the actual democratic procedures are open to manipulation and abuse by 
powerful members and groups of the society. Most people in an imperfect 
democracy do not have enough resources or time to be fully involved in the 
decision-making process; therefore, the right to make decisions is generally 
committed to legislators and public officials who are periodically elected by 
the people. Since they are difficult to remove once installed,116 there is the 
risk of centralizing power in the hands of those best placed to assert that they 
are the true judges of what is the people will.117 However, we must not forget 
that the people are sovereign in a very different sense from the Parliament.118 
Some critics of the actual, i.e. the imperfect, democracy even view the current 
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form of representative democracy today as a mechanism devised to exclude 
the vast population from politics:119 “Once more, the people are not admitted 
to the public realm, once more the business of government becomes the 
privilege of the few”.120 There is indeed some truth in these observations. 
Besides being subject to manipulation by those in power, democratic 
procedures are also open to manipulation by those societal members with great 
wealth, more knowledge, more experience, and so on. The tenth of population 
that is richest has between about 52% and about 70% or 72% of the society's 
total personal wealth in Sweden, Britain, and the United States respectively. 
The poorest tenth has barely any worth speaking of, far less than 1%.121 As 
for income, the best-paid tenth has between about five times (Scandinavia) and 
about twelve times (U.S.) as much as the worst-paid tenth. The subsequent 
consequence is that the top tenth of population has at least 30 times the 
economic power of the bottom tenth. Moreover, economic power correlates 
with fundamental rights because most determinants of political power can be 
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bought. 122  Therefore, when democratic processes are captured and 
manipulated by special interests, democratic and justice deficits could be 
generated.123 
 
The second reason for the generation of democratic and justice deficits is 
intrinsic to democracy. This is best explained perhaps by an analogy between 
the formation of the sovereign will and an individual will.124 We all know an 
individual sometimes makes wrong or improper decisions. This may be 
because the information on which he depends to make decisions is insufficient 
or inaccurate, because of his failure to notice some aspects of the event or 
foresee his decision’s severe consequences at the time of making decision, 
because he has not understood the event correctly at that time, or because 
some elements grow more important after the decision. Whatever the reason, 
the outcome is that now he cannot agree with the decisions he has made before. 
He wants the decision to be reconsidered and invalidated if possible. This also 
applies to the sovereign will because it is based on the individual will. But the 
difference is that it is relatively easy for an individual to change his decision, 
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nevertheless, it is far more difficult to change the collective decision because 
of the barriers like institutional inertia.125 The democratic sovereign “contains 
more internal barriers to reconsideration than even the most pathologically 
mulish individual will”, “once a democratic sovereign has made a collective 
choice, this decision necessarily becomes difficult to reverse.”126 For example, 
Malaysia after its independence adopted many laws and policies ranging from 
business licenses and government contracts to education opportunities and 
wealth ownership to enhance the welfare of Malay-Malaysians at the expense 
of other races’ equal chances (mostly Chinese and Indians).127 At that time, 
these policies might have been seen as understandable because the ethnic 
Malays were poorer and less-educated than other races. However, the problem 
is, after many years’ implementation of unequal policies, some of the 
background conditions that justified these policies have arguably disappeared; 
Malays have become dominant in both politics and business, but the policies 
persist.128 Under such circumstances, deficits will arise unavoidably. In fact, 
the historical experience shows that challenge to the status quo could be 
difficult, lengthy and even deadly dangerous for those involved in it. So, not 
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all people are courageous enough to challenge the status quo. As a 
consequence, the existence of democratic and justice deficits is inevitable. 
 
In conclusion, in imperfect democracies, public decisions do not always reflect 
the real will of the people and often depart from the substantive standards 
required by ideal democracy. The reality of democracies is that they are 
imperfect, and thus suffer from democratic and justice deficits. I will therefore 
argue in the next section that these deficits open the door to an important role 
for civil disobedience. 
 
II. The Necessity of Civil Disobedience 
 
Having explained the generation of democratic and justice deficits, I will now 
contend that our commitment to democracy is to ideal, not imperfect, 
democracy. When imperfect democracy is in conflict with the standards of 
ideal democracy, our loyalty goes to the ideal democracy. Both imperfect 
democracy and its citizens have obligation to enhance the realization of ideal 
democracy. Citizens should first use legal means to do so, but when legal 
means are unfairly blocked, civil disobedience may become necessary. 
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A. The Necessity of Civil Disobedience 
 
a. The Commitment to Democracy 
 
It is generally considered that democracy is a form of government which is 
better than any other form of government. Thus, people have a general 
obligation to support democracy and the laws enacted by a democratic 
system.129 However, as I have discussed above, democracy is not a single 
entity or a settled concept. It can be further classified into imperfect and ideal 
democracy. Then, the following question is which kind of democracy is the 
democracy we should be committed to. In other words, ought we to be more 
committed to the actual democracy or the ideal democracy? The answer to this 
question is both important and obvious.  
 
It is important because the answer will directly determine whether there is 
room for civil disobedience in a democracy. If people’s commitment is to 
imperfect democracy, then the commitment will require them to obey all of 
the laws enacted by it, whereas if their commitment is to ideal democracy, 
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then their commitment to imperfect democracy will be a limited one, subject 
to the higher demands of ideal democracy. Partially disobeying the laws 
enacted by the imperfect democracy may be necessary in some circumstances. 
 
It is obvious because it is clear that people should be more committed to ideal 
democracy than to imperfect democracy. I have suggested above that most 
actual democracies are imperfect, suffering from democratic and justice 
deficits. They sometimes enact laws that are not democratic, even 
anti-democratic as compared to ideal democracy. Actually, imperfect 
democracy is a temporary step toward realizing ideal democracy. The mission 
of the imperfect democracy is to attain the ideal democracy, notwithstanding 
no one yet knows for sure what an ideal democracy is. But we do know that 
the meaning of democracy includes “freedom”, “equality”, and so on; it 
cannot be reduced to actually existing interpretations, and its content is up for 
grabs.130 The fact that the statue book of all democratic states is forever 
changing — laws are added, removed, modified and replaced — is often a 
reflection of the effort of imperfect democracy to try to progress toward the 
ideal democracy. In fact, from a long-term perspective, imperfect democracy 
can be viewed as an unfinished project which is fallible and revisable, whose 
purpose is to improve the existing procedures in order to make them more 
responsive to the people’s will and to interpret the system of rights better with 
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the view to making it more just and legitimate; in other words, its purpose is to 
strive to realize ideal democracy. Therefore, when the imperfect democracy 
conflicts with the ideal democracy, it is clear that we should be more 
committed to our ideals. 
 
Actually, being totally committed to the imperfect democracy is problematic 
because it would justify every injustice imposed on minorities and other 
vulnerable groups. Therefore, it is better to view imperfect democracy as a 
limited justice and we are only conditionally committed to it. 
 
A question which may arise here is why we should be committed to imperfect 
democracy at all since our final commitment is to the ideal democracy. The 
answer is that it is our commitment to ideal democracy that requires us to do 
so. First of all, the law of the imperfect democracy is possible to be in conflict 
with the ideal democracy, but, very often, it is in line with the ideal. Therefore, 
we have an obligation to support it just as we have an obligation to support the 
ideal democracy. Next, imperfect democracy is, with high probability, the best 
means to actualize ideal democracy. So, we are committed to it is because of 
its aim of realizing ideal democracy and because it may be the most effective 
way available to us to achieve that aim.131 This is why we treat the imperfect 
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democracy with respect. But our respect to it is only conditional. When its 
laws and practices are in line with the ideal democracy, we are obligated to 
obey them, but when its laws and practices are unnecessary departures from 
the ideal democracy (the democratic and justice deficits), our obligation to it 
also ends. In order to defend the ideal democracy cherished by us, we are 
entitled to adopt appropriate means including both lawful means and civil 
disobedience, to address the deficits. 
 
But if there are many lawful means available in the imperfect democracy to 
address the deficit, why is civil disobedience needed? After all, today’s 
democracy, though not perfect, has made great progress from those 
authoritarian regimes in the past; it allows people to petition, to persuade, to 
protest, to organize themselves to fight for almost everything they want to 
achieve. So why is civil disobedience necessary?132 In the next section, I 
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consider this question. 
 
b. The Argument of Lawful Means 
 
I have proved above that the imperfect democracy is fallible and our 
commitment is to ideal democracy rather than to imperfect democracy. 
Therefore, when imperfect democracy conflicts with ideal democracy, it is our 
duty, if our commitment to ideal democracy is sincere, to find ways to address 
the democratic and justice deficit. But we cannot conclude from here that civil 
disobedience is justified because lawful means are available in a democracy to 
the dissenters and legal means are generally presumed as preferable to illegal 
ones. So, in order to prove that civil disobedience is necessary, we must prove 
further that legal means are not enough to meet our ends. Three reasons can be 
given. 
 
First of all, lawful means are distributed unfairly among the society. It is 
noticed by Brian Martin that in today’s democracy the lawful means are 
distributed unfairly and disproportionately among the social members.133 The 
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rich and the powerful obviously have more channels to influence the laws and 
policies of the government. Many alleged lawful means such as hiring 
lobbyists and engaging in a “capital strike”134 are clearly unavailable to the 
poor. What makes this situation even worse is the fact that the lawful means 
mainly used by the poor such as strikes and demonstrations are carefully 
scrutinized and often stigmatized, while those actions taken by powerful 
groups often go unexamined. Jackie Esmonde also observed that in existing 
democratic capitalist society, equality is only realized in its procedural 
meaning, not its substantive meaning, so people’s participating rights and 
freedoms are always limited. In such a situation in which people have 
disproportionate access to state power and law is manipulated to maintain 
unequal social relations, disobedience may be the only avenue for those 
without political power to press for change.135 In fact, it has been a very old 
technique for dominant groups in society to defend their own interests by 
promoting a narrow conception of “acceptable protest”, for example, by 
defining the lawful means in a limited way or by requiring protests to be only 
to the government instead of directly to the rich and powerful guys.136 To 
                                                                                                                                                 
Action 13, at 14-6. 
134
 Capital strike means using capital as a way to influence the policy of the government 
such as redirecting investments out of a particular area or the withholding of new 
investment in an area. A capital strike most often occurs where governments pursue 
policies that investors consider “unfriendly” or “inflexible”. 
135
 Jackie Esmonde, “Bail, Global Justice, and the Limits of Dissent”(2003) 41 Osgoode 
Hall L. J. 323, at 329. 
136
 Supra note 133, at 13-24. 
  84
some degree, even the term “protest” itself is a reflection of bias because it is 
generally applied to actions of groups that are painted as outside the 
mainstream; the actions of the mainstream are rarely called protest. 137 
Therefore, the first trouble with legal channels is that they are very limited and 
biased in favor of privileged groups. Totally restricting protests to lawful 
means may be unfair for unprivileged members of society. 
 
The second difficulty with this argument is that lawful means sometimes are 
blocked in practice. As observed by Thoreau, the legal channels of change 
may be only open in theory, but closed or unfairly obstructed in practice.138 
Sometimes, they are too time-consuming. Voting and petitioning often achieve 
little in some societies and sometimes legal channels take too long. Man “was 
born to live, not to lobby”.139 Circumstances may arise, moreover, where sole 
reliance on appeal to legal means such as the courts may mean that serious 
injury or risk of injury is suffered from the unjust law or policy until a legal 
decision has been given and operated on.140 When this happens, when the 
incursions of government are precisely upon the availability of legal channels 
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and freedoms, the legal channels may well prove a vain hope.141 
 
Thirdly, lawful means are not a panacea for all problems. Every system, 
whether social or political, suffers from the problem of rigidity and inertia.142 
Once decisions and rules are made, they are not easy to change. Under some 
circumstances, the political inertia might be so strong that lawful means are 
not able to break it. As Gandhi observed, the mere appeal to reason has very 
limited effect on those who have settled convictions. Their eyes are not opened 
by mere argument, but by suffering.143 Compared to legal channels, breaking 
the law can be a forceful means of expression and can have effective value in 
bringing reform to unjust laws which cannot be repealed by lawful means.144 
Because of the significant sacrifice and suffering of disobedients, a regime that 
is generally insensitive to lawful appeals may become sensitized and may 
ultimately assent to the civil disobedients’ point of view.145 
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In addition, the historical experience also tells us that lawful means sometimes 
need to be combined with the extra-legal means, especially in the face of a 
drastic social change. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the social 
status of African-Americans could be changed simply by the enactment of 
laws and court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. After all, the implementation 
of laws and court decisions depends, at least in part, on public action which 
not only will refrain from opposing but will also take action to insist on their 
application; otherwise, decisions may become dead letters in dusty volumes of 
law. 146  The social attitude toward African-Americans, in particular, was 
mainly changed by their enduring struggles and deep sufferings, not by court 
decisions and laws. Civil disobedience played a critical role in educating the 
American people and winning dignity for African-Americans. 
 
Last but not least, it should not be forgotten that most of the so-called normal 
channels, which are recommended as prior to or preferable to civil 
disobedience, have themselves been established through “illegal means”. For 
example, civil disobedience played a major role in the ending of slavery, 
extension of the franchise, curtailing ruthless aspects of the exploration of the 
labor and extending rights to women and minorities. As observed by some 
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scholars, “the rights and privileges we take for granted today, many of which 
are enshrined in the constitution, are themselves the product of struggles 
aimed both at particular laws and the status quo itself”.147 Moreover, the 
experience of Nazism, by which Nazis came into power through legal means 
and promoted the inhumanity in a legal form, also teaches us not to rest the 
democratic order on legality alone. Constitutionalism and democracy are not 
safe unless individuals are secure in their right to defend it through acts of 
civil disobedience.148 This is the reason why Rawls views civil disobedience 
as the final device to maintain a just constitution;149 when legal means are 
proved ineffective, civil disobedience will be needed to rescue democracy. 
Probably, some extra-legal activity always has had to be, and always will have 
to be, accepted by the society150 because democracy can go so far on the 
wrong track that no legal means can cure.151 
 
In conclusion, since legal means are sometimes blocked or ineffective, their 
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existence is no obstacle to a justification of civil disobedience. Insofar as a 
democracy provides no effective means of remedying an otherwise remediable 
form of harm, departure or exploration, the democracy is defective. It would 
be understandable for the public to resort to appropriate illegal means 
including civil disobedience to develop democracy. 
 
c. The Problem of Violent Means and the Further Justification of Civil 
Disobedience 
 
It has been argued above that imperfect democracy may produce democratic 
and justice deficits. When the existing lawful means are not enough to redress 
such deficits, illegal means are necessary. Another question arises here: since 
civil disobedience is justifiable in a democracy, what of terrorism, rebellion or 
any other kind of violent means? Are they also justifiable? If so, when? If not, 
why not? Though I have touched on the problem of violence in the first 
chapter while discussing the characteristics of civil disobedience, I now 
explain in more depth why violent means are not justified in a normal 
democracy. 
 
We know from the first chapter that civil disobedience is predominantly 
non-violent, but this does not mean zero violence. In fact, in mass civil 
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disobedience, the existence of scattered violence is almost unavoidable given 
the fact that it is almost impossible for an organizer to control the whole 
process. No matter what line is drawn between civil disobedience and violent 
actions, there will always be borderline cases. But, thanks to the peaceful 
nature of civil disobedience, we can still demarcate civil disobedience and 
violent actions relatively clearly. Violence in violent actions is purposefully 
used by the practitioners as a means, even the main means, to achieve their 
aim, whereas in civil disobedience violence is not a means purposefully used 
by the civil disobedients, but something which they do not want to see. The 
occurrence of violence in the course of civil disobedience is unintentional. 
Civil disobedients, as the supporters of non-violence, believe they have been 
wronged or the government has departed from their dream, but they do not 
think that violence is the right way to redress such wrongs or departures. 
 
Having defined the difference between civil disobedience and unjustified 
violent opposition, I will claim that while civil disobedience can be generally 
justified in a democracy (if it is really a democracy), 152 violent means never 
can be. There are mainly two reasons to reject the use of violent means in a 
democracy. The first reason is that violent means are not in the spirit of 
democracy. One of the implications of democracy is that differences and 
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disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner.153 A key characteristic of 
democracy is that right is, or at least should be, might, while in authoritarian 
regimes might is right. However, violence as a way of resolving conflicts will 
make fruitful conversions impossible and render truth unheard because one 
cannot normally establish the justifiability of a cause unless and until those 
who oppose it have an opportunity to put forward their views in public. It may 
be argued that violence is a more effective way to enable imperfect democracy 
to realize its ideals. It is true that in the beginning violence sometimes plays an 
important role in overthrowing despotic regimes and establishing democracy, 
but after a democratic society has been established it is absurd to insist still 
that democracy can be developed further by violence because repeated 
violence can extinguish the spirit of democracy. According to Menachem 
Marc Kellner, “to ignore democratic procedure, then, in alleged pursuit of 
democratic ideals gives the lie to that pursuit; it is impossible to attain an end 
with means inconsistent with that end”.154 
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The second reason for rejecting violent means is that the use of violence will 
damage the actual democracy itself. In the pursuit of ideal democracy, it is 
important to preserve the democratic achievements we have already obtained 
thus far. Violence will stir more violence, which will endanger democratic 
achievements rather than help to realize ideal democracy. Compared to 
supporters of violence who are willing, if not glad, to see the collapse of the 
existing form of society, civil disobedients are peaceful reformers; their acts 
have far less impingement on the good social order and the rule of law.155 
Civil disobedients occasionally make mistakes and abuse their liberty in a 
manner inconsistent with promoting democracy, but because of their generally 
peaceful nature, we can be assured that they are not dangerous figures to the 
existing democratic achievements. Of course, on the other hand, it is not right 
to suppose that violent means cannot be justified at any time. In fact, even 
rebellion can be justified under extreme circumstances. When democracy is in 
great and urgent danger of being destroyed completely or has been destroyed 
completely, violence proportionate to the danger may be justified. This is 
precisely what happened in Nazi Germany and Italy. The stipulation of the 
right of resistance in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany is the 
very reflection upon this experience.156 But this does not deny the fact that 
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violent means are not justified in a normal democratic society. 
 
The aim of allowing the practice of civil disobedience is the advancement of 
democracy, but the practice may fail to serve that end and may even be 
harmful to that end. Even worse, some people may practice civil disobedience 
only out of selfish interests, hiding a sinister end under the cover of a noble 
mission. So the challenge is to ascertain who is sincere and who is hypocritical, 
and which practice is helpful to the advancement of democracy and which is 
not. However, the answer which can be given is pessimistic. For most cases, 
we have no way of knowing at that moment or even many years after the 
practice, whether these practices are helpful or not because of our inability to 
predict social developments. Generally, an evaluation of these practices will 
have to await the judgment of history. It is only with hindsight that we can 
decide which practice of civil disobedience served the aim of advancing 
democracy and which did not.157 Hence the decision a democracy must make 
is not that of judging which value is right, but allowing as much disobedience 
as can balance the need for self-preservation with the need for maximum 
liberty for the people. So a democracy should not judge which aim is right and 
which is wrong (since it has no such ability), but which kind of means should 
be allowed and which should not; that is to say, it should regulate the means of 
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protest rather than the content of protest. As long as the means used by the 
protestor are acceptable, the content and the aim they are seeking will not be 
so important. Therefore, what really matters in most protest cases is not the 
content of the protest but the means.158 Insofar as a protest is practiced in the 
law, even the aim it seeks is definitely wrong according to today’s value 
system (such as petitioning the government to drive out all foreigners instantly 
and unconditionally, certainly extreme cases excluded), the protest should also 
be tolerated.159 Civil disobedience ought to be tolerated in a democracy 
because it is a peaceful form of expression. If properly used, it can enhance the 
progress of democracy. Even maliciously misused, it cannot do much harm to 
the democracy as to put the democratic achievements into danger. 
Nevertheless, violent actions are too dangerous to our democratic 
achievements; therefore, they must be discarded except in the most extreme 
conditions discussed earlier. 
 
Therefore, the peaceful nature of civil disobedience, not the values it tries to 
protect, plays an important role in the justification of civil disobedience 
because most of the time we cannot know immediately whether the reforms 
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proposed by the civil disobedient represent the future of ideal democracy or 
merely an effort to return to an authoritarian past. The justification of civil 
disobedience comes from both its ends and its peaceful means. We can thus 
also see the problem with some suggestions which mix civil disobedience with 
violent actions by suggesting a kind of justified violent civil disobedience.160 
Violent actions may be disobedient, but they cannot be civil and cannot be 
justified in a normal democracy. 
 
d. Two Kinds of Civil Disobedience 
 
I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that two kinds of deficits might 
arise in a democracy, viz. democratic deficits and justice deficits. A democratic 
deficit is a gap between the state will and the will of the people. It reflects the 
fact that the sovereign will of the people is not reflected accurately in the laws 
and policies of the state. A justice deficit is the departure of the state will from 
the justice standard of the ideal democracy. Civil disobedience can be justified 
by both democratic deficits and justice deficits. 
 
First, people may have reason to think that some decisions adopted by the state 
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do not reflect the true will of the people; in other words, a democratic deficit 
exists. This may happen because the state neglects some considerations when 
making the decision or because the state decision is a decision of the past 
generation which was insufficiently democratic. Whatever the reason, citizens 
might ask that such state decisions be reconsidered when they believe a 
democratic deficit exists. If they fail to get the decision reconsidered through 
legal means such as judicial review and petitioning, they may be justified in 
resorting to civil disobedience. Their aim is not to abolish the decision or 
impose their views on others, but merely to request that the decision or some 
aspects of the decision be reconsidered. 
 
Second, people may consider some policies or laws of the state unjust, that is, 
they might believe that justice deficits exist. Under such circumstances, after 
failing to realize their aims through legal means, they might resort to civil 
disobedience as well. But, their aim is totally different from the first kind of 
civil disobedience mentioned in the previous paragraph. They not only ask for 
a reconsideration of the decision, but also request their views to be 
implemented. In other words, they want their views of justice to be imposed 
on the whole society because they think their views are better and more in the 
spirit of the ideal democracy. 
 
I now consider a controversy which has long existed in the study of civil 
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disobedience. Some scholars argue that civil disobedience should not be 
coercive and should be only used as a way of persuasion, publicity or as a plea 
for reconsideration,161 while others argue that since civil disobedience is a 
way to redress injustices, it can be coercive and, even takes the form of 
moderate violence. 162  The former is often called “persuasive civil 
disobedience”, “civil disobedience as a plea for reconsideration”, “democratic 
disobedience”, etc.; the latter is called “liberal disobedience” or “coercive 
disobedience”.163 However, from the standpoint of democratic and justice 
deficits, the dispute is very easy to understand. Actually, it is not a genuine 
dispute because civil disobedience is not a question of this or that; it is both. In 
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other words, civil disobedience can either be a plea for reconsideration or be a 
request for justice, the former is justified by democratic deficits and the latter 
by justice deficits. So, in order to correspond to the democratic deficits and 
justice deficits which justify these two kinds of civil disobedience respectively, 
I will call them democratic disobedience 164  and justice disobedience 
correspondingly. 
 
Now, I have pointed out the different justifications behind these two kinds of 
civil disobedience. If I stop here, it seems that the different justifications have 
no special importance in theory since these two kinds of civil disobedience 
have been suggested for a long time, but I will explain further that the 
different justifications have implications for practice because different 
justifications set different limits to these two kinds of civil disobedience. 
 
As we have seen, the aim of democratic disobedience is a request for 
reconsideration; therefore, once the decision has been fully reconsidered 
according to the highest standard of democratic process, democratic 
disobedience should stop because its justification has expired. Even if the final 
outcome is retaining of the old decision, the democratic disobedient must 
accept it readily. Moreover, the justification behind it also determines the 
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actions which can be adopted by democratic disobedience. It has been pointed 
out above that its justification comes from the democratic deficit, from the 
insistence that the will of the people is not reflected accurately; therefore, the 
means it adopts also should not unfairly influence the reconsideration it seeks. 
That means the democratic disobedient should not use coercive means to seek 
to impose their views on the rest of the society. Thus, such protesters 
sometimes have no concrete views of their own; what they do is only to 
protest and plea, pleading the decision to be reconsidered. Markovits thinks 
this rightly explains the criticism of the anti-globalization movement for its 
lack of a positive policy agenda. Insofar as the movement is an example of 
democratic disobedience, the lack of its own policy is perhaps a salutary thing 
for the movement.165 However, the situation is totally different for justice 
disobedience. Justice disobedience is justified by justice deficits, that is, the 
lack of justice in imperfect democracy as compared to the standard required by 
ideal democracy. Therefore, what the justice disobedience demands is justice, 
not mere reconsideration of the decision. The justice disobedient will not stop 
committing civil disobedience until their views prevail. As in the American 
Civil Rights Movement, what African-Americans demanded was equal 
treatment. Even when their demands were rejected by the vast majority of 
Americans, they still thought this was unfair and persevered. According to 
their justice justification, they had no responsibility to stop protest, after the 
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decision was reconsidered. At the same time, the justice disobedient is also 
more justified in using coercion to compel a government to abandon the 
policies, laws or practices which he thinks is in conflict with the spirit of ideal 
democracy since the content of these laws and policies of the state lack 
legitimacy in his eyes. 
 
B. Individual Conscience and the Justification of Civil Disobedience 
 
Having given my own justification of civil disobedience based on democracy, 
I will now consider other justifications of civil disobedience. Through history, 
many justifications for civil disobedience have been given by scholars and 
practitioners. Among them, the conscientious justification is the most famous. 
It not only originated almost at the same time as the very concept of civil 
disobedience, but has had many supporters all along. Though there are 
disputes among them, the supporters of the theory generally hold that civil 
disobedience can be justified by individual conscience. While law is important, 
it does not transcend the fundamental liberty of the people to follow their 
hearts.166 
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To Thoreau, the first responsibility of people is to follow their hearts and to do 
what they believe is right, not to obey the law legislated by the majority. 
Though a person has no obligation to devote his life to eliminating evils from 
the world, he is absolutely obligated not to conspire to commit evils. Therefore, 
when a government becomes unjust, people should refuse to cooperate with 
such a government and distance themselves from it. In his view, both slavery 
and aggressive war on Mexico were unjust and against the conscience of 
people, so the American government at that time deserved people’s 
disobedience.167 
 
Gandhi, heavily influenced by Thoreau, also claims that people’s conscience is 
the highest law of the world and far superior to the man-made law. 
Consequently, when conflict happens, people should obey the former rather 
than the latter.168 Furthermore, Gandhi elevated civil disobedience to a new 
level. To him, civil disobedience was not only the inherent right of a citizen, 
but also a sacred duty. As required by people’s integrity and conscience, it is a 
sacred duty not to participate in evil, so when the state has become lawless or 
corrupt, it is people’s sacred duty to assume an attitude of non-cooperation and 
practice civil disobedience because “a citizen that barters with such a state 
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shares its corruption or lawlessness”.169 
 
Some modern scholars also support the conscience justification of civil 
disobedience. They claim, directly or indirectly, that conscience is a moral 
imperative which human beings must obey. One cannot be moral by acting 
contrary to one’s beliefs. One must act according to what one believes to be 
right.170 “If society is going to exist in dependence upon man’s moral nature, 
on his ability to choose the right course from the wrong - on his conscience - 
then society is also going to have to recognize man’s right and duty to follow 
his conscience even if this leads to civil disobedience.”171 
 
Admittedly, the conscience theory once played a very important role in the 
development of civil disobedience. It had been an efficient way to arouse 
people to fight with injustice.172 But, in my view, the conscience theory is not 
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a sufficient justification for civil disobedience because of its several defects. 
 
The first defect the conscience theory suffers is that it attempts to answer two 
questions with one answer. The main disputing point about the justification of 
civil disobedience is whether one is justified to commit civil disobedience, 
whereas the point which the conscience theory often dwells on is whether one 
is right to do what one considers right. 
 
Undoubtedly, the answer to the latter question is in the affirmative. Especially 
in the sphere of pure morality, people do have the moral right to follow their 
consciences, and democracy also affirms man’s conscience. But the notion that 
each man is entitled to behave according to his conscience in morality cannot 
be translated directly into the notion that he has a right to subordinate the laws 
to his conscience.173 That is to say, the most we can say is that one has a right 
to pursue his own conscience; we cannot go on to say that pursuing one’s 
conscience in the form of law-breaking is always a right thing. Since it is 
considered by almost everyone that it is necessary to live peacefully in a 
society, it is necessary for everyone to curb their actions to some degree 
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against the dictates of their own conscience. “We have therefore a moral duty 
not to insist on what we would consider, in the absence of other people’s 
opposition, to be the morally right action - we need to distinguish what I after 
argument and deliberation honestly believe to be the morally right course, 
from what, in view of the often unreasonable obstruction of other people, I 
finally decide to go along with.”174 Therefore, even if the conscience theory 
can successfully prove that man has a right to conscience, we cannot conclude 
from it that man is justified to placing his conscience over the law of the 
society in the form of civil disobedience because considerations other than the 
protection of conscience have to be taken into account. 
 
A second criticism which can be leveled against the conscientious justification 
for civil disobedience is that it opens the door to absolutism and anarchy. The 
supporters of the theory claim that human integrity and conscience are the 
justification for civil disobedience. However, personal integrity and adherence 
to conscience are no guarantees of justification, although justification is 
impossible without them. “Madness does not become truer just because you 
believe in it. Truth does not arise from belief or passion.”175 It has been 
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proved by history, again and again, that the worst political excesses are often 
committed by men who have dedicated themselves to some cause which they 
hold to completely and sincerely. 176  Consider the sincere, thoughtful 
Inquisitor, the sincere, conscientious Nazi, and the sincere, committed Khmer 
Rouge, to mention only a few. Therefore, the supporters of the theory tend to 
be imbued with the spirit of absolutism, as the words of Thoreau demonstrate: 
“the only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I 
think right”; “there will never be a really free and enlightened State, until the 
State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent 
power……”.177 At the same time, by placing individual conscience over the 
law of the state, the theory also opens the door to anarchy. Certainly, law is 
fallible; “it may be pure ideology, mere heteronymous force, or the expression 
of the interests of the ruling class, but it is also true that individual conscience 
can be perverted by ideology or by psychological imbalances.”178 Therefore, 
in terms of infallibility, conscience should not be considered as superior to 
law. 
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Another defect of the conscience theory is that it assumes a stance of 
anti-democracy. The theory views civil disobedience as a conflict merely 
between the individual conscience and the law of the state. This is a very 
narrow-sighted view because it fails to see the fact that most perpetrators of 
civil disobedience do not merely intend to solve their own personal moral 
problems, but act for the common good and for the wellbeing of the society 
and, as a consequence, it also fails to see the great role of civil disobedience in 
the development of democracy. Relying on individual conscience to realize 
justice is an idea which has long been discarded. Actually, the very reason that 
law and democracy came into being is because of the unreliability of the 
human conscience. Democracy is the protector of conscience, but at the same 
time it also set limits on individual conscience. Therefore, placing individual 
conscience over law represents an effort to go back to the dark past of rule of 
man. It constitutes a denial to democracy and the rule of law. By assuming an 
anti-democracy stance, the civil disobedients under the conscience theory also 
lose the right to be tolerated in a democracy since they view democracy as a 
foe rather than as a friend. 
 
Thus, the conscientious justification of civil disobedience, despite its fame, is 
not a sufficient justification of civil disobedience. Conversely, it has the 
character of anti-democracy and consequently, its prevalence is a danger 
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instead of an opportunity to society. 
 
III. Some Objections Considered 
 
As a subsidiary to my justification above, in this section, I will respond to 
some arguments against civil disobedience. I will, in turn, introduce these 
arguments and then provide a brief response. My conclusion is that these 
counter-arguments are not sufficient to reject civil disobedience. 
 
A. Rights of Participation and Consent 
 
The most popular attempt in the history of endeavors to reject civil 
disobedience is probably the one which relies on the rights of participation. 
The right of participation, that is, the right of having a share in the making of 
the laws, is considered by some scholars as the right of rights.179 It is 
maintained that since all citizens in a democracy enjoy the right of 
participation, and since all proposed legislation is aired in public before its 
enactment, and since it is voted into law by representatives of the people, a 
special obligation devolves upon the democratic citizen to accept this 
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legislation as binding: “The dissenter incurs the obligation when he 
participates in the decision-procedure together with other members who are 
opposed to the dissenter’s views, but are prepared to accept and obey whatever 
decision” the procedure produces.180 By participating in the process, one has 
consented to obey the final outcome even if it is against his will. Thus, it is 
claimed that where people can exercise their participating rights they have no 
need again to resort to civil disobedience.181 
 
I am inclined to agree with most of these arguments because otherwise the 
democratic process would be superfluous. What would be the sense of having 
a vote if no one ever accepted the result of the vote? Voting would be pointless. 
However, this does not mean that the right of participation in elections 
undermines civil disobedience. There are several reasons to think otherwise. 
 
In the first place, not all citizens in an imperfect democracy can enjoy a fair 
right of participation. The supporters of the rights of participation theory 
generally base their analysis on the presumption that the election is held in a 
free and fair manner, but they neglect the fact that elections in the real world 
are rarely, or never, as fair and free as they have imagined. In practice, 
democracy (as I have discussed previously) is imperfect, suffering from 
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democratic and justice deficits. Whole segments of the population of a 
democracy may be, illegally or legally, disenfranchised and excluded from the 
decision-making processes. 182  Even people who are not overtly 
disenfranchised may, on occasion, justifiably feel that their participation is 
meaningless.183 Law is prone to be manipulated by the rich and the powerful. 
Despite of the existence of alleged free elections, minorities might find it 
exceptionally difficult to change the discriminating measures against them. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the right of participation can cut two ways. 
On the one hand, it can be used to deny civil disobedience; on the other hand, 
it can also be used to justify civil disobedience. If the denial of civil 
disobedience is conditioned on the existence of free and fair elections, then, 
when such elections do not exist and the rights of participation are unfairly 
blocked, civil disobedience would be justifiable.184 Thus, the mere existence 
of elections is not a sufficient reason to reject civil disobedience at all times. 
 
Another problem for the right of participation argument is that participation in 
the procedure does not necessarily mean that the participant consents to the 
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procedure. It is held that in voting, one’s voluntary behavior means that one 
consents to the decision-making procedure. But people sometimes vote 
without accepting the legitimacy of the procedure. They participate in the 
procedure simply because it is compulsory,185 expedient,186 or because they 
can see nothing better to do. Even the supporters of the argument from consent 
agree that the consent here is only a quasi-consent, tacit consent or historical 
consent187. Though it is held that one can choose to emigrate to another 
country if one disagrees with the procedure, emigration is not always possible. 
How can we seriously say, as pointed out by David Hume, that a poor peasant 
or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign 
language or manners, and lives from day to day by the small wages which he 
acquires?188 Therefore, the claim that participating in the procedure means 
that one consents to the procedure is not right. One may choose to obey the 
final decision just because one thinks it is a necessary condition for people to 
live a peaceful life together, not because he agrees with the procedure or with 
the outcome it produces. 
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Last but not least, even if consent exists it still does not mean that one has to 
abide by the final outcome. Consent is considered the most typical, 
undisputable source of obligations. Many have assumed that success in 
demonstrating that the law’s subjects have consented to obey it would serve to 
justify the duty to obey firmly and decisively.189 But this is not true at all 
times because occasionally other elements have to be taken into account. In 
other words, from the point of view of democratic theory those who 
participate in a procedure must accept its results; however, from the broader 
standpoint of political morality in general, this is only one factor to be taken 
into account in deciding how to act. For example, some German soldiers may 
have had participated in the formulation of Nazi’s policies such as annihilation 
of Jews during the Second World War, but this does not mean that they must 
loyally follow such policies. If some of them had chosen to save rather than 
kill the Jews, this breach of German policies would have been an act worthy of 
praise, not condemnation. As in personal relations, breaking instead of 
adhering to former promises sometimes is more praiseworthy. Giving up a 
promise to kill someone in revenge generally is an act in the right direction. 
Therefore, even we agree that participating in a procedure means that one has 
consented to the procedure still does not mean that one is under an absolute 
obligation to obey its outcome. It only means that other things being equal one 
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is obligated to obey the outcome. But when other things are not equal, it 
should be balanced against other elements. That is to say, the obligation 
incurred by participating in the procedure is a significant consideration which 
should never be ignored. However, it may sometimes be overridden.190 
 
In conclusion, the existence of rights of participation does not dissolve the 
need for civil disobedience. It might require stronger reasons for engaging in 
civil disobedience, but there is still space for civil disobedience to be justified 
under some circumstances. 
 
B. Slippery Slope Argument and Social Chaos 
 
Another counter-argument to civil disobedience is a slippery slope argument. 
It claims that if civil disobedience is allowed, if men are free to set aside the 
laws of the state whenever they find them in conflict with their own interests 
or dreams, social chaos and anarchy would result. This is why Socrates 
rejected Crito’s suggestion that he flee to escape execution. What reply could 
he make, Socrates asked Crito, if the Athenian government should come to 
him and say: “Tell us, Socrates! What are you about? Are you not going by an 
act of yours to overturn us including the laws and the whole state? Do you 
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imagine that a state in which the decisions of law have no power and are set 
aside and trampled upon by individuals can subsist and not be overthrown?” 
Crito admitted that he could offer no answer.191 
 
Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States, was also 
suspicious of the acts of resistance and disobedience. In his opinion, if such 
actions were allowed, the multitude unguided by sufficient stock of reason and 
knowledge would naturally develops habits of “contempt and disregard of all 
authority” would be “apt more or less to run into anarchy”.192  George 
Washington, another founding father of the United States, thus prayed that 
God “would incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of 
subordination and obedience to government.”193 Justice Fortas echoed the 
views of American founding fathers when he said, just “as we expect the 
government to be bound by all laws, so each individual is bound by all of the 
laws under the Constitution. He cannot pick and choose. He cannot substitute 
his own judgment or passion, however noble, for the rules of law.” Otherwise, 
anarchy would result.194 
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The slippery slope argument has its merits. It is worth noting, however, that 
this form of argument is easy to abuse and should be approached with caution 
because it can be used to oppose almost anything. If you do not like something 
but have no good arguments against it, you can always make up a prediction 
about what it might lead to; and no matter how implausible your prediction is, 
no one can prove definitely that you are wrong.195 Therefore, it is not a 
question of what would happen if everyone acted as you propose to act but 
what sort of people and how many of them are likely to imitate you in 
engaging civil disobedience. If there is no real likelihood that others would 
imitate the dissenters or if the imitators are so few as to cause no serious 
danger of social chaos, then the slippery slope argument is not justified. One 
cannot deny civil disobedience solely because it would be imitated by others 
without consideration of the real danger it poses to the society because such a 
stand would rule out all unwelcomed action, no matter how small its danger to 
society. 
 
It follows that the slippery slope argument poses very little threat to the 
justification of civil disobedience. That is to say, civil disobedience is not 
likely to cause anarchy and social chaos in a democratic society. First, the 
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slippery slope argument is based on the false assumption that there are so 
many unjust laws in a democratic society that most of the people, at least a 
large part of the population, would resort to civil disobedience if civil 
disobedience were allowed. However, this is not true. Unjust law constitutes 
only a small part of the legal system of a democracy and most such laws can 
be redressed through legal means. Therefore, the threat of social chaos as 
imagined by the supporters of slippery slope argument is unlikely to be 
realized. Moreover, civil disobedience requires more courage than resorting to 
legal channels. Sometimes, the civil disobedient has to face arrest, suspicion, 
stigmatization, even loss of life from both the state and the public who are 
opposed to the civil disobedient’s position. To understand this, simply 
consider what happened to Thoreau, King, and Gandhi, who were all 
imprisoned for their actions. Most people, consequently, would be hesitant to 
engage in civil disobedience even if they find some laws repugnant. It is more 
likely that they would appeal to legal channels when they feel compelled to do 
something to change the repugnant law. So as long as there is no serious 
problem in a society, the number of citizens resorting to civil disobedience 
would be very limited and unlikely to cause the collapse of society. According 
to Dworkin, while it is surely true that society cannot endure if it tolerates all 
disobedience; “it does not follow, nor is there evidence, that it will collapse if 
it tolerates some”.196 
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Another flaw of the slippery slope argument is that it falsely assumes that 
order in a democratic society is totally dependent on state law. In fact, what 
holds society together is not simply law but also the customs, moral codes, and 
the sentiments of the people. And a breach of law is not something rare and 
unusual.197 We all break laws such as traffic regulations, income tax laws, 
litter laws, prohibitions on gambling occasionally, even very often for some 
people, but social order is not destroyed. There is no reason to think that when 
people break the law in such cases, social order would be maintained as usual, 
whereas when it is the civil disobedient who breaks the law, the social chaos 
would result. Conversely, if properly guided, civil disobedience can enhance 
the social cohesion by serving as a safety valve. So it is unlikely that social 
chaos would result just because some laws are broken by the civil disobedient. 
 
Finally, even if civil disobedience were widespread and some social chaos 
were to result, this should not necessarily to be seen as a bad thing because 
order is not always better than disorder. Disorder sometimes comes with 
opportunities. The greater the number of participants in civil disobedience, the 
more likely it is that substantial disappointment exists in the society. The 
disorder may well be consistent with broader democratic values. To be sure, 
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disorder brings with it an uncertain risk. But is there not an equally serious 
risk if stability is valued ahead of everything?198 
 
In an otherwise well-functioning democracy, disobedience of a particular law 
should not be viewed as a real threat to social order. Anarchy and social chaos 
will not result simply because some instances of civil disobedience are 
tolerated. If some social disorder is generated by civil disobedience, it may 
well be as much an opportunity for strengthening democratic values as a threat 
to those values. 
 
C. Gratitude and Fairness 
 
The third argument against civil disobedience is the gratitude and fairness 
argument. The gratitude argument and the fairness argument are different, but 
closely related. The argument from gratitude proceeds as follows. In general, 
by accepting benefits from others we incur debts of gratitude. Socrates, under 
sentence of death, is urged by his friends on the grounds of the injustice of the 
sentence to escape and flee to another country. In his reply, recounted by Plato 
in Crito, he refuses to do so on the ground that by doing so he would be 
showing ingratitude to the state that had brought him into existence, had 
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regulated his education, had provided for his training in the accomplishments 
of music and gymnastics; ingratitude to the state that had been as a parent to 
him, whose benefits he has accepted, and to whom he owed all that had been 
of value to him in his life.199 That is to say, since we have accepted the 
benefits of the state such as the protection of the police, the armed forces, and 
the public health service, and the benefits of the money system and public 
schools, we are said to have a debt of gratitude to the state and an obligation to 
obey its laws. Not to do so would be ungrateful. 
 
Like most theories that have been defended by great philosophers in the past, 
the gratitude theory contains a grain of truth. It reminds the public that rights 
and responsibilities are inseparable. One should not enjoy rights while at the 
same time try to evade responsibilities dishonestly. But the truth of the theory 
is a very limited one. It has been met with three main responses. 
 
Firstly, citizens of the state arguably receive benefits involuntarily, and 
therefore the citizens do not need to show gratitude to the state by obeying its 
laws and policies.200 Consider this example. Suppose that a young woman 
receives flowers from an admirer on many occasions, despite her continued 
efforts to discourage him. Here, the young woman has no responsibility to feel 
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gratitude to the admirer because what the admirer did for her is not something 
she desires. On the contrary, his acts may have brought her many 
inconveniences. A citizen in the modern state also often has no choice in 
receiving the benefits of the state provided by the government. And as noted 
earlier, it is unreasonable to suppose that he can simply or easily choose to 
emigrate. 
 
Secondly, for a beneficiary to owe gratitude to his or her benefactor, the 
benefactor’s act must be carried out with the intention of benefiting its 
receiver.201 In other words, a benefactor must operate from altruistic motives 
in order to deserve the beneficiary’s gratitude, but the state is not necessarily 
altruistic. Those who maintain public facilities in the name of the state may do 
so for self-serving reasons. Sometimes it is out of a realization that the 
provision of public benefits is critical to the state’s subsistence. And it is also 
possible that the public benefits are used only as a means to deceive citizens in 
order to rule them. Under such circumstances, no responsibility of gratitude 
arises, at least for some citizens, if not for all. 
 
Thirdly, even if we admit that there is some sort of gratitude required on the 
part of citizens, this does not mean that the gratitude must be expressed in the 
form of obedience. If a citizen feels some gratitude to the state, generally he 
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should behave in the best interests of the state and defend it when it is in 
danger of being destroyed. But unconditional obedience to its laws may not be 
the best way of protecting the state because it will allow dissatisfaction to 
grow. Proper disobedience of its laws may be helpful to the improvement of 
the state and its system of law.202 Thus, obedience to the law does not 
necessarily represent the only appropriate way to express gratitude to the state, 
just as a son does not necessarily to show his gratitude to his parents by 
obeying every instruction they give him.203 
 
The fairness argument is related to the argument from gratitude, but with some 
distinctions. The argument is also based on the benefits which citizens receive 
from the state, but it claims that each individual citizen’s duty of obedience is 
owed ultimately, not to the state, but to other citizens: “When a number of 
persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their 
liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their 
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submission.”204 This means that as a citizen who reaps the benefits of his 
membership within society, he is obligated to share in the burdens of society 
such as obedience to law due to the concept of fairness. Otherwise, he is 
unfairly taking advantage of the work of others and is, therefore, morally 
wrong in doing so.205 If the government tolerates those who break the law, it 
allows them to unfairly secure the benefits of everyone else’s deference to law. 
 
This argument is a serious one. It cannot be answered simply by saying that 
the disobedients would allow everyone else the privilege of disobeying a law 
he disapproved of.206 According to Chaim Gans, the principle of fairness can 
indeed be a source of obligation in some circumstances.207 There are, however, 
flaws in the argument which make it far from an absolute principle. First of all, 
it suffers from the same flaw as the gratitude argument. In a modern state, a 
citizen receives the benefits involuntarily who has no choice of making 
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otherwise decisions. The benefits provided by the state are similar to a 
compulsory loan which is forced on the citizen. The second flaw in the 
argument is that there are many cases where violating the law does not take 
advantage of anyone.208 In other words, the element of exploitation is not 
involved necessarily in every instance of law-breaking; such breaches of law, 
therefore, do not constitute unfairness to other citizens. Conversely, the actions 
of the civil disobedient sometimes represent an additional self-sacrifice in 
defending the legal system. The third flaw in the argument is that the benefits 
of government and the rule of law are never equally distributed among the 
citizens of a modern democracy. To achieve fairness, different individuals 
must be allowed to have different burdens in obeying the law rather than 
asking them to obey the law indiscriminately. For those disadvantaged groups 
such as the African-Americans before the civil rights movement, even if, as a 
matter of fairness, they should have shared the burdens of the society, their 
share would have been much smaller than that of the whites who benefited 
significantly from the system, according to Rawls209 So long as there is 
economic deprivation, social discrimination, and unequal access to powerful 
offices, society is not a “mutually advantageous” cooperative venture. If there 
were an obligation of obedience derived from the principle of fairness, 
therefore, it would apply at most to the more favored members of the 
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In conclusion, while both of these arguments, the gratitude argument and the 
fairness argument, have some weight, neither provides a conclusive reason, 
either in theory or in practice, for holding that disobedience cannot be justified 
in a democratic political systems. In other words, both of them can indeed be 
sources of obligation under some circumstances, but they are unable to justify 
obedience to law on every occasion. 
 
D. The Majority Principle 
 
Very often, arguments against civil disobedience in democracy are based on 
appeals to principles of majority rule. In traditional democratic theory there is 
unanimous agreement that the majority’s decision shall be binding on 
everyone, and thus the decision to either perpetuate or dissolve a government 
rests on popular consent. Civil disobedience, in contrast, implies that a small 
minority of citizens, even an individual, have a right to break laws made by 
the majority. Therefore, it would amount to condoning the coercion of the 
majority by the minority to allow civil disobedience. Addressing himself 
specially to the issue of majority rule Rex Martin stresses that “part of being a 




good citizen in democracy requires the citizen to adhere to the principle of 
democratic authority, that all decisions are made by elected representatives, 
and ultimately by majority vote, in accordance with established procedural 
rules, and that all persons are bound by such decision.”211 Thus, like any 
coercion of one person by another, civil disobedience needs justification, the 
more persons coerced into yielding their wills to those of others, the more in 
need of justification such coercion is. 
 
It is true that civil disobedience does need justification since we suppose that 
the law should be obeyed in general. However, the above claim which uses the 
majority principle to reject civil disobedience is not acceptable because, in my 
opinion, it is based on false premises or presumptions. The first false premise 
it depends on is that it supposes that the majority principle is an absolute rule 
or the ultimate goal of democracy which should not be contradicted at any 
time in any case. But, in fact, the majority principle has only a subordinate 
place as a procedural device in a democracy, despite the fact that it is generally 
considered as the best available way of ensuring equality for all.212 Many 
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great philosophers have viewed their skepticism with the majority principle, 
rightly from Alexis de. Tocqueville’s “the tyranny of majority” 213  to 
Thoreau’s 214and Rawls’215 recent comments about it. The majority rule is 
widely adopted by the democracy, but it is also one of those things against 
which a mature democracy must guard. For example, in America, many 
constitutional constraints have been devised to restrain its use and impact. 
Judicial review by the court and the enumeration of the inalienable rights of 
the people in the Constitution are the most obvious examples. The former does 
not adhere to the principle of majority rule and the latter states clearly that 
there are some rights which even the majority has no right to deny. That is 
why Daniel Webster said that by adopting a constitution, “the people agreed to 
set bounds to their own power,” because it would be the death-blow of 
constitutional democracy to admit the right of the numerical majority to alter 
or abolish constitutions at their pleasure.216 Therefore, the rule of majority is 
not an absolute principle which enjoys sacred status and must not be breached 
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at any time; rather, it is the very inner requirement of democracy to set it aside 
in some cases. Consequently, it is not right to deny the justification of civil 
disobedience merely because of its possible conflict with the majority 
principle. Especially when democracy as an end is endangered, the good 
democrat may be forced to violate the principle of majority in the form of civil 
disobedience in order to defend democracy. 
 
The second premise on which the argument is based is that civil disobedience 
is in conflict with the majority rule. But we must ask: in what sense is a civil 
disobedient who violates the law openly, peacefully, and with acceptance of 
punishment violating the principle of majority rule? The answer is that the 
civil disobedient displays his fidelity to law and strictly minimizes his 
deviation from it and he willingly allows himself to be punished for an act for 
which he thinks he ought not to be punished; all this is meant to show respect 
for the will of the majority. The ‘coercion’ employed by the civil disobedient 
is soft and persuasive and the success of civil disobedience still depends on 
whether the disobedience action can attract enough followers to support the 
cause. Therefore, civil disobedience is not necessarily subversive of the 
majority principle and, on the contrary, it often works through it. As Carl 
Cohen persuasively argues: 
 
The disobedient forces society to hear his objections; but he pays a very 
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high price for that, and he is very unlikely to get his own way, nor is he 
likely to disrupt in any way the process by which laws are adopted. His 
push is no more disruptive than that of an influential publisher who uses 
the news columns of his paper to editorialize vigorously on behalf of one 
candidate in an election, or the push of a legislator who, in the effort to 
combat what he believes to be oppressive legislation. Therefore, the claim 
that every case of civil disobedience violates the fundamental procedural 
principles of democracy, or subverts the rule of the majority, simply 
cannot be substantiated.217 
 
In summary, the majority principle is not an absolute rule in a democracy, but 
even if it were absolute, civil disobedience would not likely to be subversive 
of it. The broad acceptance of majority rule does not preclude civil 
disobedience. By this, I am not saying that minorities should have right to 
make decisions for the majority, I only mean that majority is not necessarily 
wiser than the minority. An evil does not become right only because that evil 
is approved by the majority; in such a case the evil is even greater.218 Some 
form of the majority principle is necessary. In agreeing to a democratic 
constitution one accepts at the same time the principle of majority rule. As 
long as the laws enacted by the majority are bearable, and its injustice does not 
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exceed certain limits, we are obligated to obey them in order to show respect 
to the will of the majority and make a constitutional regime workable; but 
when the enactments of majority exceed certain bounds of injustice, the citizen 





Being imperfect, democracy is an unfinished project that needs refining from 
time to time. Civil disobedience is an effective way to develop democracy, to 
help democracy to realize its ideals, especially in those situations where lawful 
avenues are blocked or ineffective. In this sense, civil disobedience is justified 
in a democracy. 
 
After pointing this out, the challenge now is to explain specifically how civil 
disobedience can help the development of democracy; we must substantiate 
the argument by explaining why civil disobedience is effective and in what 
way. Therefore, the aim of the next chapter is to explain the advantages and 
mechanism of civil disobedience in helping the development of democracy, 
especially when compared with lawful means. 
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The Role of Civil Disobedience in Democracy 
 
In the previous chapter, I justified civil disobedience on the basis that it is 
consistent with and justified by democratic values, but I said very little about 
how precisely civil disobedience could help to improve democracy. In this 
chapter, I fill that gap by explaining how it could do so. In other words, this 
chapter serves as an extension of the previous chapter by substantiating its 
argument that civil disobedience contributes to the development of democracy.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is devoted to the 
elaboration of the positive functions of civil disobedience in a democracy; the 
second focuses on the mechanism of civil disobedience, explaining why civil 
disobedience is so powerful in fulfilling its missions; the third further 
emphasizes the significance of civil disobedience by refuting an argument 





I. The Positive Functions of Civil Disobedience in a Democracy 
 
Civil disobedience is of great benefit to democracy. It not only enhances the 
development of democracy, but it also helps to stabilize democracy and 
prevent it from degenerating into tyranny. In addition, it also plays an 
important role in cultivating democratic citizens. 
 
A. The Democracy-enhancing Function of Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience enhances democracy in two ways. First, it plays an 
important role in the establishment of democracy. Second, it is a powerful 
instrument in promoting the further development of democracy, from 
imperfect to ideal, from lower levels to higher levels. 
 
As we know, many democratic systems today were established after long 
political struggles, which often included some form of civil disobedience. 
From the independence of the United States of America to the establishment of 
India, from the anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa to the collapse of 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, civil disobedience has contributed 
significantly to their foundation. Moreover, in some of these cases, such as in 
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India, South Africa, civil disobedience played a decisive role in the transition 
to democracy. Civil disobedience and mass protest, rather than revolutionary 
violence or top-down political reforms were often the main instruments for 
establishing democracy in these countries. In other countries, such as the 
United States, civil disobedience was not the major cause of the establishment 
of democracy, though it nevertheless played an important role. For example, 
the actions of the Boston Tea Party (in which citizens of the colony of 
Massachusetts trespassed on a British ship and threw its cargo overboard into 
the sea, rather than be forced to pay taxes without representation to Britain) 
was one of the many acts of civil disobedience leading to the War for 
Independence that established the United States of America as a sovereign 
state.220 
 
The significant role of civil disobedience in the establishment of democracy is 
persuasively explained in a recent study led by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter 
Ackerman. The study titled “How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to 
Durable Democracy”221 covers transitions that have occurred from 1971 to 
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2004. Altogether, the transitions of 67 countries are included.222 One of the 
principal findings of the study is that “people power” movements, including 
civil disobedience, matter and nonviolent civic forces are a major source for 
decisive change in most transitions. “The force of civic resistance was a key 
factor in driving 50 of 67 transitions, or over 70 percent of countries where 
transitions began as dictatorial systems fell and/or new states arose from the 
disintegration of multinational states.”223 It is clear that civil disobedience and 
other nonviolent protests, rather than revolution and violence, were the main 
tactics for bringing about political change in these countries. Moreover, the 
study also found that democracies that were established through nonviolent 
tactics are more stable and sustainable than those founded on violence. 
Recourse to violent conflict in resisting oppression is significantly less likely 
to produce sustainable democracy.224 Therefore, it is safe to conclude from the 
study that civil disobedience and other similar tactics are instrumental in the 
establishment of democratic states. It is also reasonable to suggest that 
nonviolent disobedience, if available, is a preferable way of fighting for 
democracy than violent resistance. 
 
But civil disobedience is more than just a case of asserting democratic values 
                                                        
222 Western Europe, Japan, small countries with populations of less than one million and 
countries where major political transitions occurred in the last two years before the report 
(2003 and 2004) such as Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia are excluded from the study. 
223 Please see Report: “How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable 
Democracy”, in The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Volume 7, Issue 3 (June, 
2005), at 6-7. 
224 Ibid., at 8-9. 
  133
against autocratic or authoritarian, and hence illegitimate, regimes. It is an 
integral part of a well-functioning democracy, which can help to improve the 
quality of democracy and promote its development.225 As argued in the 
previous chapter, democracy is not a settled or static concept. Rather it is an 
evolving and aspirational one. No democracy is perfect. After basic democracy 
is achieved in a state, it still needs to be refined continuously to realize its 
ideals. Government may not be a dependable source for accomplishing this 
task. As Thoreau complained in the 19th century, government was rarely 
important in the development of American democracy: “It was not the 
government that created the conditions for liberty, educated the people, settled 
the frontier, and made possible the beauties of nature. Nor should Americans 
be so naïve as to believe that politics provide the means by which society 
could be reformed.”226 Civil disobedience and other kinds of protest, not 
government, play the major role in the development of democracy.227 And 
when normal means of protest are not available, the role of civil disobedience 
becomes crucial. It is questionable whether American democracy could have 
emerged had there been no such famous civil disobedience movements as the 
anti-war movement, the women’s suffrage movement, the abolition of slavery 
movement, the civil rights movement, and the labor rights movement, and so 
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on.228  Civil disobedients were generally punished and even subjected to 
severe criminal punishments. Yet, in the long term, civil disobedients 
invariably were vindicated by having their views adopted by larger society. 
Acts of nonviolent civil disobedience have proven to be central to the 
achievement of social and political reform, in other words, to the improvement 
of democracy.229 
 
However, some may argue here that since these days democracy in western 
society has become more mature and more advanced and that the serious 
injustices have been eradicated; the “golden age” of civil disobedience has 
passed, only to be replaced by other means of legal protests. Unfortunately, 
this is only an illusion rather than an accurate reflection of the current situation. 
In fact, western countries where mass civil disobedience was largely a 
memory of the 1960s and 1970s have witnessed a recent resurgence in the 
practice. In the United Kingdom alone, mass civil disobediences between 2002 
and 2008 involving several hundred thousand people have taken place in 
protest of both the government's anti-hunting legislation230 and the recent 
invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Needless to say, in those 
                                                        
228 For a detailed discussion of the role of civil disobedience in promoting US 
democracy, please see Howard Zinn, “ The Role of Civil Disobedience in Promoting US 
Democracy”, online: <http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0299/029904.htm>, last accessed on 
August 18, 2008. And also see Kayla Starr, “The Role of Civil Disobedience in 
Democracy”, online: <http://www.civilliberties.org/sum98role.html>, last accessed on 
August 18, 2008. 
229 Supra note 155, at 14. 
230 The movement was mainly led by such rural organizations as the Countryside 
Alliance and the Avon Vale Hunt. 
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countries that are still in pursuit of a decent democracy, civil disobedience has 
a greater role to play. Consider, for example, mass protests in the Philippines 
in 1986; Chile and Poland in 1988; Hungary, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia in 1989; the Baltic States in 1991; South Africa in 1994; 
Serbia and Peru in 2000; Georgia in 2003; and Ukraine in 2004. These are all 
the latest cases of civil disobedience in a series of successful transition to 
democracy. Therefore, it is too hasty to conclude that a golden age of civil 
disobedience has passed. Actually, as long as the democracy is imperfect, 
democratic and justice deficits will arise and civil disobedience will endure as 
a way of eliminating those deficits. Especially at a time when there is 
declining faith in representative democracy in liberal states owing to many 
unpopular policies it creates,231 it is quite possible that civil disobedience will 
experience resurgence in the near future. 
 
B. The Democracy-stabilizing Function of Civil Disobedience 
 
Another important function of civil disobedience is that it helps to stabilize 
                                                        
231 Bhikhu Parekh once described the alienation of the policy of the representative 
democracy and the people as such, “Representatives were to be elected by the people, but 
once elected they were to remain free to manage public affairs as they saw fit. This highly 
effective way of insulating the government against the full impact of universal franchise 
lies at the heart of liberal democracy. Strictly speaking liberal democracy is not 
representative democracy but representative government.” Bhikhu Parekh, “The Cultural 
Particularity of Liberal Democracy” in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), at 172. 
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democracy. First, civil disobedience can function as a safety valve for 
discontent which prevents democracy-destroying violence from happening. 
Second, civil disobedience can be used as a tool to eliminate or eradicate 
injustice from society which is beneficial to the stabilization of democracy. 
 
a. Civil Disobedience as a Safety Valve 
 
Civil disobedience is not a threat to democracy and the constitutional order, 
but provides a mechanism for stabilizing it.232 In fact, an important function 
of civil disobedience is to serve as a safety valve for discontent, with the effect 
of preventing anger from accumulating and escalating into violence. As 
Haksar argues in his book Civil Disobedience, Threats and Offers: Gandhi and 
Rawls, “civil disobedience, when properly conducted, can be a stabilizing 
device and can work as a safety-valve” because minorities or the 
disadvantaged may feel compelled to resort to violent measures if civil 
disobedience were not allowed, even as a last resort.233 Indeed, it is easy to 
imagine that a social movement, if suppressed, could migrate from a purely 
nonviolent form of civil disobedience to a more drastic form, and if further 
suppressed, to revolution.234 For example, if the movement led by Gandhi had 
                                                        
232 For this point, please see supra note 146, at 221. 
233 Vinit Haksar, Civil Disobedience, Threats and Offers: Gandhi and Rawls (Oxford: 
Oxford University press, 1986), at 2. 
234 According to Martin, something of the same sort happened in American political 
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been brutally suppressed by English colonists, the Indians might have resorted 
to violent revolution to gain the independence of India. Similarly, if the civil 
rights movement in the United States had been met with systemic and lethal 
violence, the African-Americans might have to win their freedom through civil 
war rather than nonviolent civil disobedience. Therefore, civil disobedience, 
though illegal, could in some cases prevent violent actions from taking place 
and serve to stabilize democracy. 
 
The possibility of violent escalation is all the more important given that those 
who resort to civil disobedience are often those who feel discriminated against 
and prejudiced by existing political system. Lawful means, they often feel and 
insist, are not available or not sufficient for them to advance their cause. As a 
result, they often believe that there is no fair and effective way for them to 
participate in the deliberative process of democracy. Thus, if the government 
continues to insist that they must resort to lawful means and refuses to tolerate 
their acts of civil disobedience, greater hostile attitude toward society would 
likely result. Seen in this light, tolerating civil disobedience may be a way to 
give a voice to those whose voices cannot otherwise be heard within the 
existing democratic system235 and, to retain or even regain their confidence in 
                                                                                                                                                 
experience and consciousness at the time of the Revolution; a political attitude was first 
replaced by a revolutionary attitude of civil disobedience, and then, somewhere 1774 and 
1776, another gray zone was passed over into revolution proper with the Declaration of 
Independence. Please see Rex Martin, “Civil Disobedience”, (1970) 80 Ethics 123, at. 
134. 
235 In the view of Habermas, those who engage in civil disobedience are often those 
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and loyalty to democracy. The hope is that as long as they still have some 
confidence, no matter how little, in the existing democracy, it is less likely that 
those who are discontent with particular policies would adopt a hostile attitude 
that supports violence as the way of changing the existing system. 
 
The contribution of civil disobedience to the stabilization of democracy can 
also be explained by the theory of elastic systems. According to this theory, 
elastic systems are more stable and dynamic than rigid systems. “More elastic 
systems, which allow open and direct expression of conflict within them and 
which adjust to the shifting balance of power that these conflicts both indicate 
and bring about, are less likely to be menaced by basic and explosive 
alignments within their midst.” 236  Civil disobedience, by venting high 
systemic pressures, may enable systems to become more elastic and stable. 
 
b. Civil Disobedience Can Right Injustices 
 
While democracy is considered by many to be the most just form of 
government, it remains imperfect. One of its most important deficiencies is 
                                                                                                                                                 
who are excluded from the deliberation process of democracy. Civil disobedience, 
therefore, can be viewed as an alternative way to let them to take part in the process of 
deliberation. See Lasse Thomassen, Deconstructing Habermas (New York: Routledge, 
2008), at 109. 
236 Supra note 142, at 29. 
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that it does not always guarantee justice, no matter how young or how mature 
it is.237 Indeed, many great injustices, such as colonization, the slave trade, 
and the use of nuclear bombs against civilians, were all committed by the 
so-called civilized and democratic countries. To a large degree, democracy is a 
system based on the majority rule. But, unfortunately, the majority is not 
always right. “If 49 per cent of the population can be wrong, so can 51 
percent.”238 The existence of injustices, especially serious injustices, is a 
terrible threat to the stability and sustainability of democracy because 
injustices seriously endanger the social cohesion on which democracy greatly 
depends. Therefore, another way in which civil disobedience can contribute to 
the stability of democracy is by helping to right injustices that could endanger 
it. 
 
Certainly, the effect of civil disobedience on the stability of democracy may 
not be discernable immediately after its practice. Sometimes, it even makes 
the democracy appear more fragile. For example, the civil rights movement 
led by King was criticized fiercely as a threat to the social stability in his time, 
and King himself was hated and harassed by both the American government 
and white segregationists, and even the mainstream media. In fact, the 
indecency and barbarism aimed at him were so strong at that time that they 
                                                        
237 Or, as Churchill famously quipped “the worst form of government, except for all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” 
238 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
Second Edition, at 299-300. 
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finally led to his murder. But when we look back at those turbulent years, it is 
not difficult to agree that King contributed much to American democracy. 
Democracy in the United States has become more stable rather than more 
fragile after King. As previously discussed, had there been no King and no 
civil rights movement, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would 
now enjoy its status as a relatively successful democratic country. Thus, the 
conclusion is that while civil disobedience might cause short –term disruptions 
to the society, in the longer term it often makes the democracy more confident, 
more stable and more durable. 
 
Some might argue here that civil disobedience is not the only way to right 
injustice; every democracy has some checks, balances and normal avenues to 
ensure justice. The answer to this argument, as I discussed in the previous 
chapter, is that normal avenues are not always enough. Indeed, it is impossible 
for a democratic system to anticipate all of the injustices it generates and to 
develop lawful means that perfectly redress all of them. Neither the court nor 
the practices of voting, lobbying, or lawfully demonstrating can perfectly 
accomplish the task of eradicating injustices. When normal avenues are 
obstructed or ineffective, the only sensible way left for those people who want 
to stop injustice is to commit civil disobedience239 to arouse the public and to 
                                                        
239 “Because of this, the only sensible way to get things accomplished is to wake the 
public up to faults of certain laws.  The best way to do this, perhaps, is to civilly disobey, 
since getting anything accomplished in Congress is impractical and civil disobedience can 
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compel the government to confront questions which, otherwise, it is unwilling 
to. For example, the great movements for civil rights, workers’ rights, 
women’s rights, animal rights, environmental protection all represent a 
democracy society being forced to look into its soul to find better ways to 
redress the injustices it generates.240 Seen from this light, civil disobedience is 
not simply a safety valve, but also a useful and ethical means of serving 
humanity, justice and the common good.241  
 
C. The Degeneration-preventing Function of Civil Disobedience 
 
Democracy can move closer to its ideals, but it can sometimes also regress, 
degenerating into tyranny. Civil disobedience, with its vigilance against state 
power and emphasis on the spirit of protest and sacrifice, may function as a 
roadblock to rescue the democracy from degeneration. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
occur immediately.” Please see Kristi Roberts, “Civil Disobedience”, online: 
<http://members.aol.com/wutsamada2/ethics/essays/roberts.htm>, last accessed on 
August 20, 2008. 
240 Bhupal Lamichhaney, “Democracy, Injustice, and Nonviolent Civil Disobedience”, 
online: <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0605/S00371.htm>, last accessed on August 
20, 2008. 
241 Supra note 12, at 541. 
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a. The Degeneration of Democracy 
 
Democracies do not always remain democracies. They may descend into 
tyranny.242 The experiences of Germany, Italy, and Poland in the inter-war 
period and of Pakistan and Greece in the last decade are all good examples of 
degeneration. Two factors make democracy especially vulnerable to the 
danger of degeneration. 
 
First of all, the limited breadth of the existing democracy makes it fragile to 
the danger of degeneration. Democracy, today, is generally considered the best 
way to organize government and tackle problems, but it has not been 
effectively applied to every area of political life. In most democratic countries, 
there are many vital issues that do not attract political scrutiny. As pointed out 
by some scholars, the most vital decisions of today relating to international 
politics and financial policies have escaped the democratic processes and rule 
of law, and depend on the judgment of particular individuals.243 Absent 
effective democratic restraints, these powers are easily abused by politicians. 
For example, a war which is avoidable may be waged irresponsibly or merely 
because of the personal ambition of politicians and an economic recession or 
                                                        
242  Steven D. Laib, “The Degeneration of Democracy”, online: 
<http://www.intellectualconservative.com/2007/11/01/the-degeneration-of-democracy/>, 
last accessed on August 12, 2008. 
243 Supra note 146, at 214. 
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financial crisis may be triggered by the corruptive policies of selfish officials 
irrespective of what the people want. These abuses might then become a 
catalyst for social instability, lawlessness and tyranny. In addition, another 
way for democracy to degenerate into military dictatorship or tyranny is 
through the use of “emergency powers”. One argument in favor of emergency 
powers is that liberal democracies must temporarily become dictatorships to 
protect their long-term viability as democracies.244 While this appears to have 
been the case in Britain and United States during the world wars, it is also true 
that the power has often been used by dictators to uphold their own tyranny 
and suppress dissent. Actually, this has occurred in numerous countries in 
recent decades. A good example is Indonesia where Suharto maintained his 
own dictatorship for several decades in the name of avoiding Communism. 
And unfortunately, even those countries with long traditions of liberal 
democracy such as Germany and Chile also could not escape. 
 
Additionally, the weakness of human nature also makes democracy vulnerable 
to the danger of degeneration. Fear, lust, jealousness and hatred are all normal 
feelings of men, but they also expose men to submission, craze and the danger 
of being controlled. Highly proficient political leaders always know how to 
achieve their own aims as full as possible by maneuvering these feelings of 
                                                        
244
 For example, see Clinton Lawrence Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis 
Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948). 
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men. In extreme cases, military dictatorship and tyranny are also possible. It is 
easy to forget that this was what happened in Germany and Italy during 1930’s, 
with Germany smarting from its defeat in 1918 and Italy seeking to recreate 
the Old Roman Empire. It may be argued here that such things will not happen 
again because, with the advent of satellite broadcasting and the internet, it is 
increasingly difficult for governments and politicians to distort facts, to 
conceal news and manipulate the feelings of their populations. However, the 
“war on terror” suggests that the attitude is too opportunistic. To say nothing 
of the “significant intelligence failures” claimed by President Bush,245 the 
often one-side perspective of the mainstream media in reporting terrorism is 
disappointing. These reports typically abandon themselves to the vivid 
depiction of the barbarism and cruelty of the terrorists, but devote little to the 
underlying causes of terrorism, as well as the discrimination, marginalization, 
helplessness, despair and exceptional sufferings experienced by some who 
resort to political violence. Frankly, I cannot discern any progress in this 
attitude when compared with the mainstream attitude to communism decades 
ago.246 
                                                        
245 It is believed that the CIA had distorted evidence on Iraq’s alleged mass destruction 
weapons in order to tell the White House what it wanted to hear and help make the case 
for war. Moreover, some doubts that President Bush had knew that there was little 
evidence which could prove the ownership of mass destruction weapons by Iraq before 
the war, but he still decided to use it as an excuse to win support for the war. Please see 
Patrick Martin, “Behind the Resignation of CIA Director George Tenet: the Bush 
Administration Begins to Break Up”, online: 
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jun2004/tene-j07.shtml>, last accessed on September 
1, 2008. 
246 Certainly, I am not a supporter of terrorism. Nor I think terrorism is the right way to 
solve problems. I am only claiming that at least we should let the people see the two sides 
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b. The Desanctifying Effect of Civil Disobedience 
 
Any form of government could fail. So when the degeneration of a democratic 
government has become obvious, what should people do? There are different 
answers to the question. According to one interpretation of legalism, a law is a 
law which should be obeyed under any circumstances, no matter right or 
wrong. Any action taken by the government, no matter how barbaric or 
dehumanizing, is considered as legitimate because there is no standard by 
which the government can be judged.247 Therefore, under this theory, there is 
no limit to the power of the state, except for those limits that the state chooses 
to place upon itself. 248  The consequences of this kind of legalism are 
frightening because it places citizens in a dangerous and vulnerable position. 
When a government becomes totalitarian and blocks the legal protests, its 
citizens would have no choice but to surrender to the authority and accept the 
degeneration of democracy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the story. Terrorists are not born, but are created by their social experiences which are 
often full of tears and throws. I deeply believe that, for most terrorists, they choose this 
way only after too many exceptional sufferings. To a large degree, they are also victims 
just as those innocent people who died unfortunately in their terrorist attacks. But, 
unfortunately, most people and most media only see terrorists’ eyes full of hatred, but 
never ask themselves where the hatred is from. It is my deep belief that the way to 
eradicate terrorism is to ask ourselves more about where the hatred is from and do our 
best to eliminate its origin rather than annihilate the terrorists simply. 
247
 For example, this is the view taken by the legalists of ancient China in Warring Times, 
Fa Jia, whose most famous representatives are Shang Yang and Han Feizi. 
248 Mortimer J. Adler, Six Great Ideas (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1981), at 200-201. 
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On the contrary, the theory of civil disobedience is in a far better position to 
defend democracy. It takes a limited view of government. For civil 
disobedients, the state, its law and its functionaries have only a contestable 
claim to legitimacy.249 The government, while powerful, is not infallible and 
its actions should still be subject to evaluation based on their compliance with 
an objective standard of justice and its consistency with democratic ideals. 
Therefore, when there is a practical danger of degeneration, citizens may 
resort to civil disobedience to defend democratic values. This character of civil 
disobedience may be effective in rescuing democracy from degeneration 
because it sends a clear message to the government that the people will refuse 
to go along with it if it departs too far from the democratic way. Moreover, 
occasional exhibitions of civil disobedience by respectable citizens and in 
obviously good causes can help to nurture within society a respect for the 
spirit of resistance, thereby encouraging their government to be more humane 
and cautious in what it demands of its people.250 
 
Indeed, civil disobedience, along with other kinds of resistance, is a powerful 
weapon for defending democracy. The founding fathers of the United States 
were aware of this when they included the right of resistance in the 
Declaration of Independence: “Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever 
                                                        
249 Supra note 147, at 172. 
250 Supra note 12, at 543. 
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any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it...” 251 “What country can preserve its 
liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people 
preserve the spirit of resistance”,252 the primary drafter of the Declaration, 
Thomas Jefferson, asked rhetorically.253 Locke too was well aware of the 
importance of civil disobedience. He argued that when government escapes 
from institutional constraints, substantive limitations of the government power 
will rest with the citizenry, with that “right of resistance” which is the ultimate 
restraint of the political order. Indeed, Locke insisted that the people must be 
enabled to act before any usurpation occurs, for once established, it may 
become impossible to remove.254 
 
In conclusion, by desanctifying the government and its power, civil 
disobedience may play a unique role in rescuing democracy from degeneration. 
That is also the very reason why it is considered as the final device for 
maintaining the stability of a just constitution.255 
                                                        
251 “The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America”, July 4, 1776. 
The full text is available online at 
<http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm>, last accessed on September 
1, 2008. 
252 “Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Smith” (Nov. l3, l787), reprinted in Julian 
P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1955), at 356. 
253 Harris G. Mirkin argues that though Jefferson also supports the idea of revolution, he 
views civil disobedience as a better choice because acts of resistance “forced the society 
to deal with problems before they assumed proportions that would justify real 
revolution.” Harris G. Mirkin, “Rebellion, Revolution, and the Constitution: Thomas 
Jefferson's Theory of Civil Disobedience”, (1972) 13 American Studies 61, at 64. 
254 John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, Sect. 159, 160, 220, 240, 242. 
255 Supra note 85, at 337. 
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D. The Function of Cultivating Democratic Citizens 
 
There are many disputes about what kind of citizen is needed for a democracy 
to function well, and, most likely, this is not a question which can be settled in 
the foreseeable future. In spite of this, it is widely agreed that democracy, in 
order to be vital and effective, requires a highly educated electorate with some 
special characteristics. For example, the citizens should have a good spirit of 
participation; they should have a good sense of equality and good self-esteem, 
neither thinking themselves superior to others nor bowing to others very easily; 
and, crucially, they should have capabilities to form their own opinions and 
own courage to defend them. These characteristics desired by democracy are 
not innate; they need to be cultivated and learned. The conventional ways of 
protest and civil society are good places for citizens to receive democratic 
education, but civil disobedience can also provide such training to citizens.256 
Not only can civil disobedience greatly enhance respect for human dignity and 
the spirit of participation among the people, it also has an active therapeutic 
                                                        
256 For example, it is claimed by some scholars that civil disobedience does not serve to 
educate the public about democratic mechanics, nor does it train leaders or socialize 
dissidents into the pattern of conventional oppositions. Please see, Paul F. Power, “Civil 
Disobedience as Function Opposition”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1, (Feb., 
1972), p. 46. However, such criticism is based on the misunderstanding of civil 
disobedience. Civil disobedience, in fact, also provides training to citizens which 
especially can make citizens aware of the shortcomings of the mechanism of democracy. 
More than often, civil disobedience is practiced after the failure of conventional protest. 
Civil disobedience, therefore, is based on a higher understanding of democracy, both its 
advantages and disadvantages. Today, more and more organizations which are committed 
to civil disobedience are established which also provide a lot of education to participants 
about how democracy functions. 
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effect on the marginalized. Therefore, an indirect contribution of civil 
disobedience to democracy is that it can instill in its citizens the most 
important qualities needed for participation in democratic life. 
 
a. The Spirit of Participation 
 
Since democracy means the existence of a government “of the people, by the 
people and for the people”,257 citizen participation is vital. So for democracy 
to function well there must be a spirit of participation among the people. If the 
participation rate is too low, not only will the function of democracy be 
damaged but its legitimacy will be threatened.258 Civil disobedience, like 
legal protest, is able to encourage citizens to take part in the democratic 
processes. 
 
                                                        
257 The Gettysburg Address delivered on November 19, 1863 by American President 
Abraham Lincoln, the address is available online at 
<http://www.gettysbg.com/gettysburgaddress.shtml>, last accessed on August 21, 2008. 
258  Some scholars have argued that for democracy to function well, a sizable, 
semi-passive citizenry is vital. High levels of participation in the social area will threaten 
intellectual freedom, economic opportunity, and personal development. Moreover, 
extensive politicization will destroy the balance between consensus and cleavage that has 
been established by moderate levels of participation and support for flexible, responsible 
elites. Please see Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1965), at 142-54. However, in my opinion, it is obvious that it is not in the interest of 
democracy if the participating rate is too low. Letting decisions to be made by a few elites 
without extensive participation, actually, is not in line with the true meaning of democracy. 
And letting decisions to be made by a few elites is also a dangerous idea because it not 
only contributes to the alienation of men from one another and from their social and 
political systems, but also discourages their attempts to gain access to social 
decision-making. 
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In the first place, civil disobedience can mobilize and galvanize opinions. By 
presenting the dispute in a dramatic way, it can help people to see 
controversial issues which are otherwise unnoticed by them. And by 
intensifying the conflicts, it is able to attract otherwise politically-indifferent 
people to be involved in the democratic process. For those who have been 
unsuccessful in traditional forms of protest, civil disobedience gives them new 
hope for success and, hence, encourages them to remain engaged in the public 
issues. As history shows, as in the 1960s in the United States, civil 
disobedience was often able to widely kindle or rekindle citizens’ spirit of and 
passion for participation. Moreover, civil disobedience is also a way to 
organize and unite people with similar views behind a cause. Organizations 
committed to public issues may be formed in the civil disobedience movement 
and these organizations will generally continue to exist and function as part of 
an active democratic force after the civil disobedience ends. Some 
organizations which arose from civil disobedience movements such as 
Greenpeace, the Environment Left and American Civil Liberties Union have 





b. Dignity of Human Person 
 
Civil disobedience also enhances self-respect and the dignity of the person 
which are valuable to the functioning of democracy. Democracy is based on 
the assumption that as independent beings with the capacity to make up their 
own minds, individuals are the best judges of their own interests. As such, they 
should neither be arrogant, nor easily subdued by injustice. In other words, it 
is vital to protect the conscience and dignity of the person. 
 
The practice of civil disobedience proclaims a powerful message about the 
dignity of human beings. It sends a clear message that the law, while important, 
does not transcend the fundamental liberty of human conscience at all times.259 
By practicing civil disobedience, those who cannot abide by the decrees of the 
majority because of their own integrity and conscience can find a mechanism 
to voice their discontent, and hence to disassociate themselves from the 
wrongs done by the government. As Bernard Boxill pointed out in 
“Self-respect and Protest”, individuals have reason to protest not only to stop 
injustice but also to show self-respect and to know themselves as 
self-respecting; if they fail to express openly outrage at injustice, however 
assiduously they works against it, they will, in the long run, lose 
                                                        
259 Supra note 55, at 667. 
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self-respect.260 On this view, the main goal of civil disobedience is not to 
awaken people’s innate aggression or sheer animosity toward authority “itself”; 
its purpose is not to turn back citizens to a “state natural” but to develop moral 
virtue, civil courage and human dignity in them: “one could not be free 
without the feeling of human dignity: one would rather be to deliver himself to 
the imbecile comfort of subjection and the other poisoned fruits of voluntary 
slavery”.261 
 
c. Therapeutic Effects on the Victims 
 
Civil disobedience also has special therapeutic effects on victims of 
discriminatory laws. Civil disobedience is often directed toward a law which 
denies certain rights to a disadvantaged group. The assumption behind the 
discrimination is that the disadvantaged are inferior in some fashion or possess 
some stereotypic and negative attributes. The existence of such laws and their 
underlying assumptions may result in low self-esteem and a sense of group 
inferiority among the law’s targets. They may feel powerlessness, despair and 
alienation from the society.262 As King said when he referred to the slavery 
                                                        
260 Bernard R. Boxill, “Self-Respect and Protest”, (1976) 6 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 58, at 59. 
261 Supra note 218, at 8. 
262 Supra note 56, at 129. For a discussion of the psychological and emotional effects of 
discrimination and oppression, please see Ali Khan, “Lessons from Malcolm X: Freedom 
by Any Means Necessary”, (1994) 38 Howard Law Journal 79, at 79 ff. 
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system, it gave the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a 
false sense of inferiority.263 Civil disobedience, on the contrary, can function 
as a beneficial activity to liberate the victims from the false sense of inferiority 
and other negative feelings. First of all, at the group level, the practice of civil 
disobedience can bind them together as a whole. As a united group, they 
become powerful and are able to take steps to make others take them seriously. 
Gradually, they may gain a sense of group identity and group solidarity and 
recover from the negative sense of powerlessness and alienation. At the 
individual level, civil disobedience is also a cleansing force. During the 
practice of civil disobedience, the victims, instead of simply existing within 
and at the whim of an oppressive system imposed by others, become proactive 
by taking steps designed to change their own circumstances, rather than 
passively being at the mercies of others.264 Such active practices help to free 
the victim from his inferiority complex, from his despair and inaction, and 
make him courageous and fearless. Seen in this light, it is safe to conclude that 
civil disobedience may be a good cure to that sense of inferiority which comes 
with the discriminating laws. Moreover, as long as the sense of inferiority is 
dispelled, the discriminating laws will be unlikely to persist either because, as 
claimed by Wilson Carey McWilliams, the essence of tyranny lies in the effort 
to perpetuate a sense of individual isolation and weakness that creates a felt 
                                                        
263 Supra note 138, at 76-95. 
264 Supra note 56, at 131. 
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need for and a willingness to endure the rule of the strong.265 
 
This fact can be vividly explained by the experiences of African-Americans. 
James Lawson pointed out, African-Americans, because of their miserable 
experiences and inferior social status, for many years, have hated themselves 
rather than turning their hatred, vindictiveness and ill will against white men. 
Because of that, they have developed an inverted violence, a depreciated and 
rejected selfhood.266 But during the civil rights movement these same people 
could hold up their heads with justifiable pride, working collectively to solve 
racial problems. A nonviolent movement can do something to the hearts and 
minds of those committed to it: “It gives them new self-respect; it calls up 
resources of strength and courage they did not know they had.”267 After the 
movement, African-Americans had a new sense of courage and 
self-confidence. 
 
II. The Mechanism of Civil Disobedience 
 
We learned from the previous section that civil disobedience plays an 
important role in democracy. But what is the mechanism that civil 
                                                        
265 Supra note 146, at 221. 
266
 James M. Lawson, Jr., “Non-Violent Way,” (1960) 13 The Southern Patriot 1, at 1. 
267
 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Pilgrimage to Nonviolence,” (1960) 77 The Christian 
Century 439, at 439-41. 
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disobedience depends on? What characteristics make civil disobedience so 
powerful in helping democracy? As I argue in this section, there are mainly 
three weapons which make civil disobedience powerful: publicity through 
dramatization, persuasion through suffering, and coercion through 
nonviolence. 
 
A. Publicity through Dramatization 
 
The first weapon which makes civil disobedience so powerful is its character 
of dramatization. 
 
a. The Publicity Power of Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience is a powerful attention-getting device, which is far more 
effective than normal protests in publicizing contested issues. 268  Its 
effectiveness comes, first, from the fact that “it is a form of political 
                                                        
268 For example, Susan Tiefenbrun points out that breaking the law can be a forceful 
means of expression. Please see Susan Tiefenbrun, “Civil Disobedience and the U.S. 
Constitution”, (2003) 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 677, at 698. Leslie Gielow Jacobs also holds the 
view that civil disobedience is a unique mode of communication because it can grab the 
majority attention in a way that lawful means may not. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, “Applying 
Penalty Enhancements to Civil Disobedience: Clarifying the Free Speech Clause Model 
to Bring the Social Value of Political Protest into the Balance”, (1998) 59 Ohio St. L.J. 
185, at 243. 
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participation available to citizens without the money, media support, lobbying 
resources, voting strength, political skills, or political access necessary to 
influence decision-makers through more traditional means.”269 That means 
civil disobedience is a cheap tactic which nearly everyone can resort to. 
Therefore, it can help make otherwise unheard voices of the poor and the 
disadvantaged heard by the whole society. 
 
But the most important reason behind the publicity power of civil 
disobedience is its character of dramatization and provocation. Civil 
disobedience is not only a public protest but also a public show and a public 
violation of legal rule. In the first place, due to the fact that civil disobedience 
does not need to be pre-approved, its practitioners can fully use their 
judgments to devise their performance in order to generate surprise and 
publicity. The more dramatic, the more attention it can get. Additionally, civil 
disobedience is a provocative act calculated to gain attention and provoke 
discussion. The act of breaching the law can ensure it will not be ignored 
easily by the government. The character of dramatization and provocation 
together can make civil disobedience a powerful means of publicity. As 
pointed out by scholars, one of the primary operational objectives of 
governments is the maintenance of civil order. Failure to secure this goal is 
                                                        
269. Gordon Neal Diem, “Civil Disobedience”, in St. James Encyclopedia of Pop Culture, 
online: <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_g1epc/is_/ai_2419100256>, last accessed on 
September 1, 2008. 
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likely to provoke retaliation and complaint from constituents. “An excluded 
group can thus gain attention to its grievances from even unsympathetic elites 
and governments by interrupting the smooth functioning of the system.270 
 
The leaders of civil disobedience movements are usually aware of the 
dramatic character of civil disobedience and its usefulness in promoting their 
goals. For example, Gandhi used the technique almost perfectly in his protest 
against the salt tax law. “In 1930, Gandhi launched the Satyagraha campaign 
by walking to the sea with 78 disciples to break the salt tax laws. ‘Day by day 
the tension mounted,’ reports one writer, ‘as all India followed the elderly 
Mahatma plodding through the countryside on his crusade.’ Then the dramatic 
moment came: as hundreds of congressmen and government officials watched, 
Gandhi made salt from the sea, breaking the law and setting the rest of India 
into a ‘semi-comic frenzy of producing uneatable salt.’”271 Through a simple 
act of dramatization and provocation, Gandhi achieved his aim of protesting 
and exposing the injustices of the salt tax laws. 
 
                                                        
270 Don Von Eschen, Jerome Kirk, and Maurice Pinard, “The Conditions of Direct 
Action in a Democratic Society”, (1969) 22 The Western Political Quarterly 309, at 
309-25. 
271 Jerry M. Tinker, “The Political Power of Non-violent Resistance: The Gandhian 
Technique”, (1971) 24 The Western Political Quarterly 775, at 784. 
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b. Civil Disobedience and Judicial Review 
 
Having discussed the publicity power of civil disobedience, in the following 
paragraphs, I will explain how this publicity power works in a democratic 
society. It may be best explained, perhaps, by drawing an analogy to another 
practice of democracy: judicial review. 
 
Although civil disobedience and judicial review arise in very different settings, 
they have striking similarities. Like civil disobedience, judicial review is 
criticized as being anti-majoritarian or anti-democratic.272 It involves a group 
of people who seemingly enjoy no democratic legitimacy, but who 
nevertheless try to thwart the laws of democratic government. Indeed, the 
tension between judicial review and democracy is even greater than that 
between civil disobedience and democracy. Judicial review directly invalidates 
democratic laws, whereas civil disobedience merely defies them.273 As early 
as the eighteenth century, the founding fathers of the United States took note 
of the similarities between judicial review and disobedience when they said 
that judicial review is a peaceful revolution by which groups that could 
otherwise achieve their goals only by violent revolution could protect 
                                                        
272 As H.L.A. Hart says, English political and legal thinkers find this extraordinary 
judicial phenomenon to be particularly hard to justify in a democracy. Please see H.LA. 
Hart, “American Jurisprudence through English Eyes”, in Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), at 125. 
273 Supra note 124, at 1929. 
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themselves against arbitrary government.274 Owing to these similarities, civil 
disobedience may well contribute to democracy in a similar manner as judicial 
review. 
 
Judicial review contributes to democracy in many ways, but one of its 
important functions is to ensure, as John Hart Ely claims, that the political 
process is open to all viewpoints; that is, judicial review protects persons 
against being cut off, in one way or another, from democracy.275 It is true that 
citizens can exert their voting rights periodically in a democracy, but not every 
group can influence the issues discussed in an election. For example, issues 
that most concern minority groups may get lost amid the general bundle of 
arguments and policies offered by the opposing parties and, as a consequence, 
those laws and policies that most concern them may not be considered.  
 
When normal democratic means fail to address their concerns, another 
mechanism which citizens can depend on is judicial review. By triggering 
judicial review, citizens can get a valuable chance to have their concerns 
reengaged. Under the threat of its laws being struck down, the legislature, or 
even the wider society, may be induced or compelled, to reconsider these 
                                                        
274 More about the topic, please see Harris G. Mirkin, “Judicial Review, Jury Review, & 
the Right of Revolution against Despotism”, (1973) 6 Polity 36, at 36-70. 
275 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), at 74. 
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laws.276 Judicial review is an effective mechanism for bringing otherwise 
ignored issues onto the agenda. Civil disobedience also works along these 
lines. 
 
Civil disobedience, through its power of publicity, is also able to trigger a 
democratic reengagement with issues that the status quo has kept off the 
political agenda. As Rawls observes, by engaging in civil disobedience a 
minority can lead the majority to consider whether they want to have their acts 
taken in this way, or whether, in view of the common sense of justice, they 
wish to acknowledge the claims of the minority.277 In other words, civil 
disobedience can help those causes that have been marginalized by political 
parties and are unlikely to become part of the policy-making or legislative 
agenda. Realizing the problem is the first step in addressing it. By dramatizing 
the problems of the society, civil disobedience contributes significantly to the 
development of democracy. For example, when the United States was formed, 
almost no one thought that women needed to be enfranchised; indeed, most 
Americans at the time of the Revolution and for decades after thought that 
women were well represented by men. It is only after the rise of the suffrage 
movement that Americans began to realize that women were not satisfied with 
                                                        
276 It is observed that judicial review contributes to democracy not by irreversibly 
striking down the undemocratic laws and replace them with judicially divined alternatives, 
but rather by intervening in the political process in ways that induce the legislature to 
reconsider statues that are out of date, out of phase, or ill adapted to the legal topography. 
Please see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statues (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), at 18. 
277 Supra note 219, at 240-55. 
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the status quo.278 Another good example is the contemporary globalization 
movement which has introduced many new issues onto the meeting agendas of 
world leaders. Though global movements are fiercely criticized for their lack 
of a unified argument, a series of massive disobediences across the world in 
Seattle, Bolivia, Washington, Prague, Quebec City, Genoa and Argentina have 
successfully placed such topics as poverty, global inequality, job insecurity, 
and third world debt into the political agenda of world leaders. 
 
B. Persuasion through Suffering 
 
A second weapon which makes civil disobedience so powerful is the 
persuasive power produced by its character of self-suffering. 
 
a. The Persuasive Power of Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience is considered not only as an attention-getting device, but 
also as a persuasive technique for galvanizing support for the goals of civil 
disobedients. So where does this persuasive power come from? 
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The answer given by many philosophers and practitioners of civil 
disobedience is suffering. The voluntary suffering of the civil disobedients is a 
great catalyst to win them sympathy, belief and support. Thus P. T. Sorokin 
can write about “love begetting love”, while King can insist that unmerited 
suffering is always redemptive.279 But the most ardent supporter of the belief 
that suffering can melt the hearts of the people was Gandhi. He was convinced 
that the success of the civil disobedients lies in their willingness to suffer and 
to be arrested and imprisoned, rather than in their endeavors to avoid 
imprisonment. According to his view, even if there is but a single unarmed 
policeman, civil disobedients should surrender to him instead of running away. 
The triumph of the civil disobedients “consists in thousands being led to the 
prisons like lambs to the slaughter house…If the lambs of the world had been 
willingly led, they would have long ago saved themselves from the butcher’s 
knife. Our triumph consists in being imprisoned for no wrong whatever. The 
greater our innocence, the greater our strength and the swifter our victory.”280 
Success is the certain result of suffering of the extremist character, voluntarily 
undergone.281 
 
                                                        
279 James F. Childress, “Nonviolent Resistance and Direct Action: A Bibliographical 
Essay”, (1972) 52 The Journal of Religion 376, at 392. 
280 Mahatma Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (New York, Schocken Books, 1961), at 
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According to Gandhi, enormous self-sacrifice is involved in the practice of 
civil disobedience. The practitioners must keep their actions nonviolent and 
must voluntarily submit to whatever punishment the authorities decide to 
impose. At certain times, especially in a regime which is not so democratic, 
the punishment undergone by the civil disobedients is unusually harsh. Not 
only criminal punishments may be imposed, but practitioners might lose their 
jobs, be isolated by social companions, and suffer defamation. That is why 
King said that civil disobedience is not for cowards; it is the way of the 
strong.282 A stigmatic adherence to internal violence and suffering may seem 
unrewarding at times, in particular when the opponent is determined to 
suppress the movement with iron and blood, but it does play an important role 
of communication between civil disobedients and opponents, as well as the 
general community. It sends a clear message to the society that the civil 
disobedients have no wish to redress their wrongs or realize their political 
goals by violence. It also helps civil disobedients to convince the majority of 
fellow citizens that their acts are indeed conscientious and sincere. Therefore, 
the commitment to nonviolence and the willingness to suffer are very helpful 
in persuading both the opponent and the general public to sympathize with the 
                                                        
282 Martin Luther King, Stride toward Freedom (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 
at 102ff. In discussing nonviolence, King points out six principles that should be present 
in a campaign: (1) it is not for cowards, it is the way of the strong; (2) it does not seek to 
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cause of the civil disobedients. In addition, this is also the very reason why 
civil disobedience is more powerful than normal protests in persuading the 
audience, including political opponents. According to Haksar, because of the 
significant sacrifice and suffering on the part of disobedients, a regime that is 
generally insensitive to lawful appeals may become sensitized and may 
ultimately accede to the civil disobedients’ point of view.283 In Gandhi’s 
words, “the eyes of their understanding (those people who have settled 
convictions) are opened not by argument but by the suffering of the 
Satyagrahi.”284 
 
The power of civil disobedience was well illustrated by the civil rights protests 
in the American South, which undoubtedly succeeded, at least partly, by 
convincing the white majority of the evil of the American “apartheid.” In that 
movement, the nonviolence character of the movement greatly helped the 
protestors win the sympathy of the observing public and reduced fears of 
whites that blacks intend to retaliate violently for past suppressions.285 At the 
very least, it did a great deal of good in winning “neutral” or “moderate” 
whites to sympathize with the blacks.286 
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b. The Importance of the Audience 
 
The persuasion of civil disobedience is aimed at both opponents and 
on-lookers, but opponents, at least those with strongly settled minds, are 
sometimes difficult to persuade. Indeed, studies show that though the suffering 
of civil disobedients plays a great role in winning the hearts of the moderate 
opponent, the pacifist approach of civil disobedience practically has no 
positive effect in inducing the most hardened opponent to adopt a cooperative 
attitude, and perhaps even has a negative effect. 287  Because of the 
nonviolence and self-suffering character, it is highly probable that the most 
hardened opponent may develop a false impression that civil disobedients are 
cowardly, powerless, troublesome rather than courageous, self-confident and 
honest. This may further enhance their contempt of the civil disobedients. 
Therefore, under some circumstances, whether the civil disobedients can 
achieve their goals is dependent on whether they can persuade most of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
no reaction when he repeatedly blew cigar smoke into the student's face. Third, a group of 
white boys attacked two Negro demonstrators after receiving no response during remarks. 
A third demonstrator was pushed down the stairs in the accompanying confusion.” Frazier 
thinks the wide dissemination of this kind of information could have done a great deal of 
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America, Zashin points out that civil disobedience had very limited effect in changing the 
hearts of the dominant whites in the South. Please see Elliot M. Zashin, Civil 
Disobedience and Democracy(New York: The Free Press, 1972), at 195-223. In a 
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audience and win their support rather than on whether they can persuade their 
opponents to change their minds. 
 
The scope of a conflict can often determine who will be the winner. It has been 
noted that in a conflict the general tendency of the weaker is to broaden it and 
to expand the battle lines in order to involve more parties, whereas the 
tendency of the stronger is to privatize it, to contain it and to limit attempts to 
involve the larger audiences.288 The reason is that the stronger can win the 
conflict without the intervention of the third party, while often the only chance 
for the weaker to win is to change its status as weak by inviting more 
supporters to join in the conflict. Compared to their opponents (often the 
regime and its most loyal supporters), civil disobedients are generally weaker. 
Therefore, it is often in the interests of civil disobedients to expand their 
conflict with the opponent by inviting the intervention or support of third 
parties. Indeed this is the main reason why the civil disobedients try to 
publicize their protest, whereas the regime seems more interested in avoiding 
publicity. Thus, it is essential for civil disobedients to persuade the 
non-involved audience to support their goals. In Kuper’s words, civil 
disobedience “wins, if it wins, not so much by touching the conscience of the 
                                                        
288 In almost every conflict, one protagonist struggles to privatize it—to contain it and 
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see E. E. Schattschneider, The Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
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masters as by exciting the sympathy of disinterested onlookers”289 
 
As we have seen, one of the most important ways for civil disobedients to 
persuade is to suffer. The suffering, on the one hand, can legitimize their own 
claims, showing their integrity and honesty; on the other hand, can show the 
injustice, cruelty and tyranny of the regime.290 Moved by the sufferings of 
civil disobedients or angered by the cruelty of the government, otherwise 
latent supporters of the civil disobedients may decide to act on their behalf. 
When a large number of on-lookers get involved, civil disobedients may be 
elevated to the position of the stronger, while the regime becomes weaker. As 
described by Michael Lipinsky, “the essence of political protest consists of 
activating third parties to participate in controversy in ways favorable to 
protest goals”. 291  If civil disobedients successfully mobilize the larger, 
on-looking populace to stand with them, it becomes easier for them to achieve 
their goals.292 
 
This technique of persuading the audience to one’s side becomes all the more 
important considering the fact that there are always lots of politically inactive 
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citizens in a democracy. In almost every democracy a large segment of the 
adult population is indifferent to or only superficially involved in political 
affairs.293 They have no interest in the political campaigns, are unconcerned 
about the outcomes, and are uninformed about the candidates and issues. 
Moreover, there are many others who are so uninvolved that they have no 
wish to vote most of the time.294 But, when these inactive citizens are 
mobilized to participate in the political process, sometimes they are strong 
enough to change the status quo. This is why it is essential for the challenger 
of the status quo, certainly including the civil disobedients, to activate these 
citizens. 
 
A third party can show its support to the civil disobedients in many different 
ways, not necessarily in the form of participating in their civil disobedience. 
For example, they may choose to show their support by voting against those 
candidates who are hostile to the civil disobedients, retreating from their 
cooperation with the regime, taking part in all kinds of legal protests, writing 
letters to the government and the legislator, and so on. As long as they are 
activated to show their support, the political battle lines will be changed. 
 
Lastly, the third party need not be limited to the citizens of the civil 
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disobedients’ state. The whole international society could be involved and 
become a third party, which is even more so in the age of the “global village”. 
The anti-apartheid movement of South Africa is a good example. For a very 
long time, the movement led by Mandela failed to find enough support in 
South Africa to abolish the discriminating system; it was abolished only after 
international society was stunned by the injustices and began to act actively 
against the regime. 
 
C. Coercion through Nonviolence 
 
A third weapon which makes civil disobedience so powerful is its character of 
nonviolent coercion. 
 
a. Coercion in Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience is not performed only in words, but in actions. Despite the 
insistence of a few scholars that civil disobedience is always persuasive and 
never coercive,295 it does contain some elements of coercion or pressure. The 
                                                        
295 For example, it is claimed by Joel Feinberg that the only pressure involved in civil 
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coercion and pressure involved in civil disobedience mainly include the 
following:296 
 
First, civil disobedience is a provocative act against the government. By 
engaging in law-breaking disobedience the dissenters pose a question to the 
government to which the government must respond immediately. The 
government in the case of civil disobedience has only two choices, either 
recognizing, explicitly or implicitly, the cause of the disobedients by refraining 
from punishing them, or rejecting their appeals by punishing them. No middle 
ground, such as playing the technique of delay or keeping silence, is left for 
the government. In other words, the government is placed on the defensive in 
the case of civil disobedience, having to defend its actions or inactions in 
public.297 In short, civil disobedience is a question posed to the government 
demanding a decision for or against it and the government has to answer 
immediately. 
 
Second, by persuading non-cooperation with the government, acts of civil 
disobedience exert pressure on the function, even subsistence, of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1992), at 152. Rawls also holds the view that civil disobedience should 
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government. As has been noted, the smooth function of the government is 
dependent on the voluntary cooperation of great numbers of people even when 
the government seems to rely on repression. But civil disobedience tries to 
persuade the public to withdraw their cooperation with the government on 
some laws in order to protest their undemocratic nature. Once large numbers 
of people are convinced to withhold their cooperation, the ability of the 
government to fulfill its functions may be adversely affected. It may become 
helpless in enforcing its rules and regulations, and, moreover, may lose its 
justification for existence and its claim to legitimacy. Therefore, civil 
disobedience exerts considerable pressure on the government by threatening to 
erode its support.298 
 
Third, in addition to indirectly eroding the basic support of the government, 
civil disobedience also constitutes a direct burden to the government. For 
example, civil disobedients may temporarily block the entrance to or trespass 
on government buildings. In the case of mass civil disobedience, too many 
arrests may make the prisons and the courts of the state congested, even totally 
disabling them. Therefore, civil disobedience sometimes consumes many 
                                                        
298 The threatening nature of civil disobedience to a government was most cogently 
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resources of the government that otherwise could be allocated to other areas. If 
too many resources, whether in the form of personnel or economic resources, 
were redirected to cope with civil disobedience, the normal functions of the 
government would be undermined. Mass civil disobedience can not only make 
the government inefficient but can also inhibit the performance of its functions 
as occurred in the United States during the anti-Vietnam War movement. 
 
Coercion or pressure is a very efficient way to induce change because the 
responses of the governments to the suffering of people often depend on the 
pressure that is put on them.299 Just as an individual is reluctant to admit his 
mistakes, the government is often unwilling to acknowledge its wrongdoings 
and reverse its policies unless external pressure is imposed. Pressure can 
induce the government to change its policies by making it realize that not 
compromising or not making concessions may be too costly in relation to the 
benefits of maintaining the status quo. 
 
Civil disobedience is normally a persuasive action. It tries to persuade rather 
than coerce the government to listen to the appeals of the disobedients. In 
Rawls’s words, it is an action appealing to the sense of justice; in Gandhi’s 
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words, it is an action aimed to change the hearts of the opponents. But the 
hearts of the opponents are not always readily changed, especially for those 
opponents with dogmatic convictions. Their hearts may be insulated from any 
kind of rational or emotive appeal. Under such extreme circumstances, the 
only alternative way in a democracy to open their hearts is to persuade them 
through pressure, making them understand that maintaining the status quo is a 
much higher cost than compromising with the protestors. According to Elliot 
Zashin, civil disobedience, sometimes, is a question of convincing the 
opponents that the costs of concessions are smaller than the costs of enduring 
the protest campaign.300 
 
History also proves that civil disobedience often succeeds most fully when it 
imposes direct economic and political pressure on the opponents. In civil 
disobedience, persuasive appeals are important, but it is often backed by such 
nonviolent direct actions such as sit-ins, boycotts, mass marches, strikes, 
trespasses, and upsetting of government works. Therefore, civil disobedience 
is not merely a persuasive or spiritual power as claimed by some scholars; it is 
also a political and economic power that exerts considerable pressure. It 
remains predominantly nonviolent, but nonviolence also can be used as a 
powerful way to press for change.301 
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b. Debates about Coercion 
 
Coercion is very efficient in bringing changes to the society, but not all 
scholars see eye to eye on this issue. Some worry that to the extent that it uses 
coercive techniques civil disobedience risks itself becoming a form of 
repression in which protestors attempt improperly to impose their personal 
political preferences on others. This is a concern of Rawls, who insists that 
civil disobedience should be a form of speech, an expression of conviction and 
an appeal to the sense of justice of the majority rather than a form of 
coercion.302 And that is also the very reason that makes Gandhi appear 
paradoxical. On the one hand, he believes (generally) that civil disobedience 
should not involve coercing opponents, 303  while on the other hand he 
endorses many techniques of compulsion such as obstruction and 
non-cooperation with the government.304 But there are other scholars who 
would like to see coercion to play a greater role in civil disobedience. For 
them, those worries that civil disobedience will become repressive are 
understandable, but they believe that such worries have been exaggerated 
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because the coercion used by civil disobedience is not in any sense evil.305 I 
prefer the second view, but my reason is slightly different. The main reason 
why I am open to coercion as a legitimate part of civil disobedience is not 
because it is not evil, but because it is compatible with democracy. 
 
In fact, coercion is prevalent in democracy; democracy does not reject 
coercive techniques without differentiation. All forms of political protest, legal 
and illegal, are designed to be coercive, in the sense of being designed to 
pressure the authorities to act in a particular way. For example, “pressure” 
groups use pressure as the main way to achieve their political goals. Even 
techniques such as boycotting and lobbying which are generally considered as 
very soft often create tremendous pressure.306 Therefore, democracy does not 
totally reject coercion as a way of solving problems. A protest can be coercive 
and democratic at the same time. 
 
Richard Chappell suggests that in liberal democratic societies civil 
disobedience may never be acceptable because if you are really morally right, 
then you ought to be able to persuade your fellow citizens of this, and have the 
needed reforms implemented through legitimate democratic processes.307 One 
                                                        
305 Supra note 145, at 142. 
306 Even the mere existence of the nation state is conceived in and maintained by force. 
Otherwise, what principle other than force gives a democratic people the right to exclude 
those who reject democracy from that portion of the earth possessed by the democrats? 
307  Richard Chappell, “The Ethics of Activism”, 
<http://www.philosophyetc.net/2006/08/ethics-of-activism.html>, last accessed on 
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of the assumptions of this argument is that legitimate democratic processes are 
persuasive, not coercive, while civil disobedience is coercive, and therefore 
unacceptable. But the analysis in the previous paragraph suggests a 
shortcoming in this argument that it fails to acknowledge that both legitimate 
democratic protests and civil disobedience resort to coercion. Certainly, the 
coercion of civil disobedience may be more aggressive and even more likely 
to give rise to violence,308 but this does not mean that civil disobedience 
always brings more disruption and more chaos to society than lawful protests. 
Lawful protests are equally likely to degenerate into violence and cause social 
turmoil, as can be seen from what happened in Indonesia in 1998 when a 
lawful protest demanding more economic help from the government 
degenerated into brutal and violent attacks on Chinese-Indonesians and their 
properties. The danger of degeneration into social chaos is a tactical question 
that must be assessed in each context rather than being dismissed outright; it is 
not right to reject civil disobedience merely because it adopts coercion as a 
possible way to achieve its political goals. 
 
The ultimate standard, in my opinion, to judge whether coercion of civil 
disobedience is acceptable is to ask whether the coercive techniques are used 
in a democratic way, i.e. whether they are used in a manner consistent with 
                                                                                                                                                 
September 3, 2008. For a complete rebuttal of this article, please see Brian Berkey, 
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democratic values. If they are used in this way they are acceptable; otherwise, 
they should be banned. My argument is that they are normally both democratic 
and acceptable. 
 
First, civil disobedience is committed to nonviolence which does not involve 
physical injury, violence or the threat of violence. Violent action is against the 
spirit of democracy, but nonviolent coercion is not necessarily so. While the 
presence of violent coercion always invalidates an agreement as a principle, an 
agreement can still be considered to be democratic and valid with the presence 
of even considerable nonviolent pressure. As discussed earlier, the production 
of almost any law, any decision, in a democracy is accompanied by pressures 
from different groups and persons. For example, the process which gave rise 
to the American Constitution, as well as almost all democratic constitutions of 
the world, was full of pressure with, in the American case, different states and 
many representatives threatening to leave the meeting if their requests were 
not satisfied from the very beginning. But this does not deny the democratic 
nature and validity of the constitution. According to Thomas Frazier, the 
difference between violent coercion, in which deliberate injury is inflicted, and 
nonviolent coercion, in which injury indirectly results, is a difference of such 
great degree that it is almost a difference of kind.309 Or as suggested by 
Haksar, though violent coercion is not acceptable in democracy, nonviolent 
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coercion is not inconsistent with the spirit of democracy unless it involves an 
unfairness or a wrong to others, especially the coerced group, by taking 
advantage of the vulnerable position of others and becoming a dirty trick.310 
The coercion of civil disobedience may inflict an unpleasantness on the 
authorities or the dominant group by trying to deprive them some of their 
privileges, but it is democratic as long as it is practiced strictly according to 
requirements of civil disobedience. 
 
Second, the will of the government is not unfairly restricted in the case of civil 
disobedience. The government still has a choice to support the laws it enacts. 
One of the important reasons that coercive civil disobedience is not acceptable, 
as claimed by Harry Prosch, is that it leaves the government with no choice 
but war, in the sense of having to use violence to defend its principles.311 
Unfortunately, the argument is based on the misunderstanding of the 
nonviolence character of civil disobedience; it fails to attach enough 
importance to the strong commitment of civil disobedience to nonviolence. 
Most civil disobedients are true peace-lovers; they are prepared to submit 
themselves peacefully to any arrests and punishments if the state determines to 
support its laws. Therefore, it is not difficult for the government to support its 
laws if it determines to do so. Another criticism of civil disobedients is that 
                                                        
310 Supra note 233, at 44-58. 
311 Harry Prosch, “Limits to the Moral Claim in Civil Disobedience”, (1965) 75 Ethics 
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they are demanding so forcefully for the state to reconsider its laws that the 
government is forced to give an answer, either by agreeing with them in some 
form or using its coercive powers to uphold the law. But, in my opinion, this is 
not a sufficient reason to reject civil disobedience because it does not restrict 
the will of the government in any way. A court has to dispense a judgment on 
an appeal, but this does not mean that the will of the court has been restricted 
so as to eliminate choice. The only restriction of civil disobedience on 
government is that it might be compelled to give priorities to the discussion of 
some topics. But this is not in conflict with the spirit of democracy. 
 
Third, civil disobedience works ultimately through democratic processes. Its 
aim is not to overthrow the democratic system; it tries only to modify some of 
its laws. Whether the law protested will finally be altered still depends on 
whether civil disobedients can gain enough support from the society. If they 
fail to persuade enough people to sympathize with their cause, their aims will 
not be realized. Thus, the civil disobedients, as noted by some scholars, always 
try to represent their values and aspirations as public values and aspirations 
because this is the most feasible way to gain support for their claims.312 The 
civil disobedients defiance of the law is done only to expose the law’s 
undemocratic nature and to trigger democratic mechanisms to change it; they 
do not normally intend to change the law other than through already existent 
                                                        




Thus, the coercion used in civil disobedience is not necessarily 
anti-democratic. As long as it is practiced strictly according to its core 
principles, it is democratic and acceptable. 
 
III. The Question of Success 
 
Having explained the role of civil disobedience in a democracy, I will now 
consider an argument about its utility. It has been proposed by some scholars 
that civil disobedience can be justified only if there is a high probability of 
producing positive changes through the disobedience because only this can 
justify exposing one’s society to the risk of harm. This point is made very 
clear by Leslie J. Macfarlane in his paper “Justifying Political Disobedience”: 
Civil disobedience, like any other political activity, must be judged on the 
basis of “whether it is likely to improve the situation complained of, stop it 
from getting worse, or stop it from getting worse than it otherwise would. If 
there are no real grounds for believing it will do any of these things, then it is 
doubtful whether the proposed acts of disobedience are justifiable, even 
though there may be no doubts as to the case for committing the act except in 
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terms of its consequences”.313  On this view, whether civil disobedience 
should be undertaken depends on its utility in achieving positive social 
changes. If it is highly likely to produce social changes, then it should be; 
otherwise, it should be prevented, even if its aims are just. 
 
This is a utilitarian view according to which civil disobedience must be 
assessed solely by reference to its utility or disutility in producing social 
changes. The overall consequences are what really matter. On this view, 
unsuccessful civil disobedience, i.e. civil disobedience which fails to or is 
unlikely to produce positive changes, is unjustified disobedience. This view, 
no doubt, has an element of truth. It helps to remind the civil disobedient that 
he needs to establish a relationship between act and consequence such that the 
latter provides adequate grounds for the former. The consequences of the 
disobedience are not known, of course, until after the act has been 
committed,314 but the civil disobedient must keep in mind that the probable 
consequences play an essential part in the determination of whether to engage 
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in disobedience; after all, he is not taking action for action’s sake but pursuing 
some practical aims. But against Macfarlane’s view, I wish to suggest that 
even when the civil disobedience does not have or is unlikely to have its 
intended social or political consequences; it might still be justified because of 
its other potential effects. 
 
In fact, civil disobedience has other instrumental value other than inducing the 
changes of laws and policies. For example, even when it fails to bring about 
any change, it still can give the participants a stake in the system and a sense 
of power and belonging.315 For Johan Galtung, when there is a conflict in 
society, there are two needs that must be dealt with. These are the instrumental 
needs of resolving the conflict and the expressive needs of the participants. 
“An act may be said to be instrumental to the extent that it has the function of 
contributing to conflict resolution, and it may be said to be expressive to the 
extent that it serves the function of tension release from the latent intensity”.316 
Either way, it contributes to an easing of the conflict. So even when it fails to 
contribute to a final resolution of the conflict by bringing about social changes, 
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civil disobedience might still moderate the conflict by satisfying the 
participants’ need for expression. Seen in this light, it is unreasonable to 
consider all civil disobedience that fails to bring about social change as 
unjustified. Inducing social change is not the only value of civil disobedience; 
even its failure might have worthwhile consequences for its practitioners.317 
 
From another perspective as well, the standard proposed by Macfarlane (i.e. 
using the practical success to judge the justifiability of civil disobedience) is 
questionable. The usefulness of this standard as a practical guide is seriously 
damaged by the difficulty in determining whether positive social changes 
intended by the civil disobedience action have been realized. In most 
circumstances, the bad law or policy targeted by the civil disobedience cannot 
be repealed by a single disobedient act. Very often, its repeal is the outcome of 
a series of struggles over a long period. It is difficult to say which action in 
this series is useless and unjustified.318 Therefore, it is far from practical to 
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use practical success as the sole standard to judge the justifiability of civil 
disobedience. 
 
In short, civil disobedience is an action that has value even apart from its legal 
and political consequences. It is unreasonable to reduce it to a mere instrument 
of legal reform which deserves to be practiced only when it is capable of 
achieving its aims. Likewise, it is neither right nor practical to use its political 




Throughout the history of democracy, civil disobedience has played a 
significant role in many social reforms that we take for granted today. It is 
unimaginable what many societies would look like today if there had been no 
civil disobedience. Civil disobedience serves the growth of democracy in 
many ways. First, it enhances the development of democracy by helping 
imperfect democracy to attain a higher level; secondly, civil disobedience 
helps to stabilize democracy by functioning as a safety-valve and righting 
injustices in the society; thirdly, civil disobedience helps to prevent democracy 
from degenerating into authoritarian regimes by desanctifying the state and its 
laws; and fourthly, civil disobedience is helpful in developing particular 
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characteristics of citizenship which are essential to the smooth functioning of 
democracy.. 
 
Lawful channels and protests are also helpful to the development of 
democracy, but compared to them, civil disobedience is more effective and 
powerful. Even in those situations in which lawful channels do not work, civil 
disobedience still can function well to remind the state and its citizens that 
reforms are needed. The effectiveness of civil disobedience comes from its 
special mechanisms. First of all, civil disobedience is a very powerful 
publicity instrument because of its tactics of dramatization; second, civil 
disobedience is very effective in persuading the public to sympathize with its 
cause because of the sufferings and self-sacrifices involved; and finally, civil 
disobedience is not only about publicity and persuasion, it also exerts pressure 
and coercion on the opponents, although in a democratic way. Intertwined 
with each other, these three tactics of civil disobedience often help to achieve 
reforms that seem almost impossible through legal means. But civil 
disobedience is not only an instrument which can be used to achieve legal 
reforms. It has other instrumental uses, such as self-expression; and so civil 
disobedience may be justified regardless of its success or failure in achieving 
practical legal reforms.319  
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Having examined the justifiability of civil disobedience and explained the 
positive role of civil disobedience in a democracy, I proceed to discuss the 
legal status of civil disobedience in the next chapter: since civil disobedience 
is justifiable and plays an important role in the development of democracy, 
should there be a right of civil disobedience? Should there be a duty of civil 
disobedience? In other words, should a right of civil disobedience, or more 
radically, a duty of civil disobedience be recognized in the legal system to 
further promote civil disobedience? 
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Chapter V: 
Civil Disobedience: Right or Duty? 
 
Since civil disobedience is justified and plays an important role in democracy, 
I will take a closer look at civil disobedience in this chapter by discussing its 
legal nature. There have been many scholarly disputes about the nature of civil 
disobedience. Some claim that civil disobedience should be a right, while 
some others claim that it cannot be a right in any legal sense. At the same time, 
there are others who contend that civil disobedience is not only a right but also 
a duty. So what is the nature of civil disobedience? Is it a right? Is it a duty? 
Or both a right and a duty at the same time? These are the main questions I 
will consider in this chapter. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on whether 
there is a legal right of civil disobedience. My conclusion is that civil 
disobedience can be a legal right in only a very limited sense, that is, in the 
sense of being entitled to a mitigation of punishment. The second section 
concerns the duty of civil disobedience. I argue that civil disobedience 
becomes a duty in some unusual circumstances. The third section is devoted to 
the definition of a good citizen, discussing what kind of citizen is most 
suitable for democracy. I argue that those citizens, who are courageous enough 
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to fulfill their responsibility of civil disobedience when necessary, in view of 
their potential contributions to democracy, should be considered good citizens. 
Other citizens, by avoiding their responsibility for democracy and yielding to 
the despotic threat in some cases, are not culpable, but become meritless. 
 
I. Could there be a Right of Civil Disobedience? 
 
Is it appropriate to speak of a legal right of civil disobedience? Some may 
hastily conclude here that since the justifiability of civil disobedience has been 
established in previous chapters, there must be a right of civil disobedience. 
But being justified is different from being a right. One particular kind of action 
is justified does not mean that there must be a right for the people to practice it. 
For example, it is a justifiable action for Tom to help his friend who is in 
urgent need of money, but it would be improper to assert that Tom has a right 
to help his friend irrespective of the will of his friend. Similarly, the fact that 
civil disobedience is justifiable is one thing, but it is quite another thing that it 
should be considered a legal right. Thus, determining whether civil 
disobedience should be a legal right is a new task for us, which is relatively 
independent of the question of justification. 
 
There are many opinions about the legal nature of civil disobedience. The 
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prevailing opinion is to deny the possibility of the existence of a right of civil 
disobedience. The right of civil disobedience is considered a logical 
contradiction because it is impossible for law to stipulate a right of no law. 
However, I take the opposing stance by affirming the possible existence, at 
least in a limited sense, of a right of civil disobedience. 
 
A．The Proposition of Civil Disobedience as a Sub-right 
 
As mentioned in Chapter III, some scholars suggest that resorting to civil 
disobedience should be made a right when alternative means are unavailable, 
but at the same time most of these scholars see no need to establish a special 
kind of right, viz. the right of civil disobedience. The constitution, as they say, 
has provided enough protection for the practice of civil disobedience. There is 
no need, therefore, to establish an independent right of civil disobedience 
since the practice of civil disobedience has already been protected by the 
constitutional rights such as the freedom of speech and the right of 
participation.320 Civil disobedience, in their opinion, should be protected as a 
sub-right of these constitutional rights rather than as an independent right. 
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Freedom of speech is the most frequently used constitutional right to support 
civil disobedience. Under the speech/conduct dichotomy in US constitutional 
law, says Peter Meijes Tiersma, civil disobedience should be classified as 
expressive conduct in the United States because it is intended to communicate 
a message and is able to be reasonably understood by audiences.321 Haksar 
also contends that the action of civil disobedience should be understood as a 
practice of free speech because it is a form of address to the authorities.322 
And, moreover, it is suggested by these scholars that civil disobedience is a 
unique speech which is highly powerful. Susan Tiefenbrun emphasizes that 
breaking the law can be a forceful means of expression and is very effective in 
bringing reform to bad laws which are immune to lawful protests.323 This 
view is also shared by Charles R. DiSalvo. Civil disobedience, for DiSalvo, is 
a unique mode of communication which can move people when argumentation 
and exhortation fail, not only signifying a distinct substantive message but also 
signaling the protester's depth of commitment.324 
 
For some other scholars, civil disobedience is part of the right of participation. 
The right of participation, in the eyes of these philosophers, is the right of 
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rights or the father of all rights, enjoying a very special position in the 
spectrum of constitutional rights.325 Due to the extreme importance of the 
right of participation in the family of rights, extensive ways should be 
provided to the governed in order that they have enough chances to take part 
in the making of laws and policies. Civil disobedience is an important way of 
participating, and it is especially so when the normal avenues are obstructed. 
Thus, civil disobedience is constitutional, as part of the right to participation, 
and both democracy and constitutionalism is not safe unless individuals are 
secure in their right to defend it through acts of civil disobedience.326 
 
In order to weigh the reasonableness of the claim that civil disobedience is a 
constitutional action and protected by the freedom of speech or the right of 
participation, we must determine how far the protection of free speech and 
right of participation really goes. However, the conclusion I reach after a 
careful examination is disappointing: according to the current interpretation of 
constitutional rights, at least in the United States, neither freedom of speech 
nor the right of participation is able to provide a full protection to the practice 
of civil disobedience. While in a small number of instances, these basic 
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constitutional rights could justify some actions of civil disobedience,327 they 
are hardly broad enough, by any interpretation, to provide justification for 
most acts of civil disobedience. For example, while disobedient acts which are 
clearly symbolic and expressive are protected by the freedom of speech; many 
acts of civil disobedience are not so simple as to be merely expressive. They 
involve great pressures, even physical coercion, of the government. These acts 
of civil disobedience are not purely symbolic. In the words of Robert T. Hall, 
an act cannot be classified as symbolic speech merely because the agent says 
that it is an attempt to communicate with his opponents. 328  Therefore, 
freedom of speech may protect someone who merely bends the grass on the 
lawn of a government building and is charged with criminal trespass, but it can 
hardly justify disobedient acts that involve enormous pressure and coercion. 
The same is true to the right of participation which can protect a small number 
of civil disobedience actions, especially when lawful means of participation 
are totally denied or ineffective,329 but it cannot provide relief when normal 
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means are open to the civil disobedient. 
 
In short, according to the current interpretation of constitutional rights, at least 
in the United States, civil disobedience is not fully covered by either freedom 
of speech or the right of participation. The fact that some acts of civil 
disobedience are justified by these rights does not mean that there is now a 
sub-right of civil disobedience under these constitutional rights. It would also 
be mistaken to claim that civil disobedience is legal just because some forms 
of it could be justified by these rights. That is to say, there is no such a 
sub-right of civil disobedience at present either under the freedom of speech or 
under the right of participation. 
 
B. The Proposition of Civil Disobedience as an Independent Right 
 
Since civil disobedience is neither protected by the right of participation nor 
by the freedom of speech, should there be an independent right of civil 
disobedience in the sphere of legal rights? 
 
“The answer of the state, at least, is clear. It is no. There can be no law to 
which obedience is optional, no command to which the state attaches an ‘if 
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you please.’ Consequently, there can be no legal right to disobey the law.”330 
Actually, this view is held not only by the state, but also by the majority of 
scholars who have touched on the topic of civil disobedience, though most of 
them agree that civil disobedience may be politically or morally justified. 
Stuart M. Brown suggests that no legal system can allow that the breach of a 
valid law is no breach.331 Frank M. Johnson contends that the law cannot as a 
matter of law officially recognize a right of civil disobedience.332 Joseph Raz 
gives a detailed explanation for this attitude in The Authority of the Law, 
saying that civil disobedience cannot be recognized by the law because, if it 
were recognized by the law, there would no longer be any need for civil 
disobedience.333 
 
However, the aforementioned view is not accepted by all. Some scholars insist 
that there is indeed, or there should be, an officially recognized right of civil 
disobedience. Branislav Stevaonić suggests that any assumed list of human 
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Journal of the History of Ideas 411, at 413. 
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rights would not be complete without the right of civil disobedience because it 
is permitted by all contractual and other theories which insist on the 
sovereignty of the people.334 Moreover, some philosophers point out that the 
right of civil disobedience has been actually recognized by legal texts in many 
occasions already, which stretch from the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of Citizens of 1789 to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.335 
 
Which view is more reasonable, then, the view opposing or endorsing a right 
of civil disobedience? I will defer my answer to the end of this section. For 
now, another question needs to be considered first: if we suppose those 
scholars who support a right of civil disobedience are correct (i.e., there is 
indeed a right of civil disobedience), what are the implications of the right? In 
response to this question, a typical explanation is given by Haksar in his article, 
“The Right to Civil Disobedience,” in which he contends that 
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[the] view that people have a right to civil disobedience implies, 
firstly, that even if they are punished, they have a claim not to be 
prevented from breaking the law. Secondly, they have a claim not to 
be punished or to have a reduced punishment.336 
 
Obviously, according to Haksar, there are two levels of meaning to the right of 
civil disobedience. First, the right means that the civil disobedient has a 
freedom to practice civil disobedience and the government has a responsibility 
to refrain from interfering with the practice or attempts to practice. Instead of 
preventing the action of civil disobedience from practicing, the government 
should allow the civil disobedient to complete his practice according to his 
plan and to attain his aim of addressing to the public. 
 
Second, the right implies that the civil disobedient is entitled to no punishment 
or reduced punishment. If the actions of the civil disobedient are justified or 
reasonably wrong, according to Haksar, the disobedinet is entitled to such 
treatment. Though not all civil disobedient will go free, no matter how wrong 
they are, when the social case for punishment is weak, the civil disobedient 
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should be exempted from punishment altogether.337 
 
Now that we have a better idea of the implications of the right of civil 
disobedience, now I turn to the question whether there could be a right of civil 
disobedience. 
 
C. The Nature of the Right of Civil Disobedience 
 
In order to find an answer to the question whether civil disobedience should be 
a legal right, we must answer another question in advance: what is legal right? 
Here, I will rely on the conception of a right given by Joseph Raz and Tony 
Honore: for a right to exist the potential holder must have an interest weighty 
enough to provide a sufficient reason for holding some other person to have a 
duty towards him, and, at the same time, two further related items, recognition 
and remedy, are needed to prevent the structure of a right from collapse.338 
That is to say, for a right to exist three standards ought to be met: first, there is 
an interest weighty enough to be protected; second, there is recognition of the 
right; and third, a remedy is available. 
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The first standard concerns what constitutes a sufficient reason for a right to 
exist, i.e. for an interest to be protected in the form of right. According to 
Honore and Raz, only those interests which are weighty enough can be 
considered sufficient. However, confusions will unavoidably arise here on 
what “sufficient” and “interest weighty enough” mean.339 The existence of 
borderline cases which could reasonably be classified as sufficient or 
insufficient is inevitable. Almost no taxonomy in the social sciences can avoid 
borderline cases. But, fortunately, there are also many cases which are 
clear-cut. Civil disobedience is such a clear-cut case which involves a 
sufficiently weighty interest. What, then, is the interest behind civil 
disobedience that makes it suffice to be a right? The answer is its role in 
protecting human rights and safeguarding democracy. As we have seen, civil 
disobedience plays an important role in both of these respects. Without civil 
disobedience, the danger of a society sliding into autocracy or anarchy or 
tolerating substantial injustice increases.  
 
Some may argue here that civil disobedience itself is also dangerous, with 
potential to destroy the democratic order that it seeks to protect. This 
challenge has already been answered in Chapter III. But it is beneficial to 
point out here that the right of civil disobedience, if it exists, will not be an 
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absolute one, but a limited one which must be weighed against other interests 
and rights. Thus, there is no need to worry unduly about its negative 
consequences. Some might argue further that if the right of civil disobedience 
has to be balanced against other interests and rights, then it is not a complete 
right, only a quasi-right. My answer is that each right has to be balanced 
against other interests, which, nevertheless, does not affect its nature as a 
right.340 
 
The second standard is that the right must be recognized in a proper way. This 
does not necessarily mean that a right must be officially or formally 
recognized by written laws. There is informal recognition as with customary 
law. But even in the case of customary law, the intervention of the state is 
essential. Only when it is supported and enforced by the state can customary 
law be called a law. According to Honore, when the state affirms a right, it 
either creates a new right which is from the beginning formal or turns an 
existing informal right into a formal one.341 Therefore, if civil disobedience is 
to be a right, it has to be recognized, by the state, formally or informally. 
Opponents of the right hold that no state can recognize such a right because it 
is a right to no law. It is simply a more sophisticated way of saying that a man 
is entitled to take the law into his own hands. This in turn means government 
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by force, not by law. It means might makes right. Such a doctrine is morally 
unsound and practically untenable.342 To be sure, no legal system can afford 
to acknowledge that the breach of a valid law is no breach. If the right of civil 
disobedience means a right to no law or a right to break the law any time the 
disobedient wants to, then there is no state which can afford to recognize such 
a right. But it does not necessarily mean that advocates of the right are wrong. 
In fact, no advocates claim that the right of civil disobedience is a right that 
entitles the disobedients to break any law any time they want. They define the 
right only in a very limited sense and the right has to be balanced against other 
interests and rights. And civil disobedience itself also has strict disciplines 
such as nonviolence and willingness to accept punishment. A right of civil 
disobedience in this sense is less threatening to the state and hence easier for 
its legal system to recognize. Indeed, most liberal states have shown some 
kind of tolerance to civil disobedients in the form of the mitigation of their 
punishments, especially when compared to the totalitarian regimes in which 
the civil disobedient is punished harshly. Therefore, whether the right to civil 
disobedience can be recognized depends on the implications of the right. If the 
right to civil disobedience is defined as a right to no law as claimed by its 
detractors, then no state can recognize such a right; but if it is defined only in a 
limited sense such as in the sense of a mitigation of their punishments, then 
there is no insurmountable barrier for a democratic government to recognize 
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such a right. 
 
It might be objected that it is illogical to recognize a right of civil disobedience 
because, if civil disobedience is legalized, there would no longer be any need 
for civil disobedience. A right to civil disobedience, therefore, is legally 
impossible.343 In other words, if a right to civil disobedience is legalized, civil 
disobedience would disappear because one of its necessary characteristics is 
breach of law. I will dwell on this point in detail in the next chapter when I 
discuss the reconciliation of civil disobedience and democracy. So it suffices 
to briefly point out here that the viability of this argument depends on the 
implications of the right of civil disobedience. If the right of civil disobedience 
means the complete legitimating and immunization of civil disobedience, then 
the notion of civil disobedience would collapse. But, if the right only means 
that some kind of mitigation to be extended to civil disobedience after trial, 
then I do not see any inconsistency here because the right means only that the 
court should take the good characteristics of civil disobedience into account 
when passing judgment, rather than means the total and blind elimination of 
the illegality character of civil disobedience. When the punishment for a civil 
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disobedient is exempted or mitigated, it is based on the understanding that he 
breaches the positive law, but the breach is partially justified on the ground of 
civil disobedience. A right in this sense is not a right to comprehensively 
legitimate civil disobedience; it merely claims that the peculiar characteristics 
of civil disobedience should be taken into account when punishment is given 
out. This question will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
 
The third standard concerns the remedy for violations of the right. As opined 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, there is no right without 
relief.344 When violations of a right happen, there must be a remedy for those 
violations; otherwise the right should not be considered an actual right because 
it is “naked and unprotected”. An unprotected right is no more a right than is 
an unprotected fortress a fortress.345 So, is there an effective remedy for the 
right of civil disobedience in the legal system? There cannot be any legal 
remedy for the right of civil disobedience if it is understood as a right to no 
law because law itself has been destroyed by it. But if the right is interpreted 
as some kind of mitigation of punishment for the civil disobedient, then the 
remedy is available. The necessity defense, the good motive defense and the 
prosecutor’s discretion are all able to be used to mitigate punishments for the 
civil disobedients in certain cases, though they are not without defects. The 
best choice, in my opinion, is to establish a special defense, i.e. the civil 
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disobedience defense, in the criminal law system to provide relief for the civil 
disobedient. This is the main topic I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
Having analyzed the three standards for a right to exist, now it is time for me 
to give a final answer to the question whether there can be a right of civil 
disobedience. But my conclusion may be very disappointing to those who seek 
a definite and clear-cut answer because the answer is “it depends”. The 
conclusion is whether there can be a right of civil disobedience depends on the 
implications of the right. The right of civil disobedience is able to be defended 
in a very limited sense, i.e. in the sense of some kind of punishment mitigation. 
But it is never defensible in the sense of a right to no law. In other words, if 
the right of civil disobedience means the complete legitimating and 
immunization of civil disobedience, such a right could never be 
institutionalized. But at the same time there is no insurmountable obstacle to 
institutionalize a right of civil disobedience with a limited sense.346 Obviously, 
this is a right in a very weak sense. Perhaps, then, the most acceptable answer 
would be to consider civil disobedience as neither legal nor completely illegal. 
As suggested by Maria Tella, it would be useful to think of degrees of legality 
or illegality. In this sense, an act of civil disobedience is of the nature of a 
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paralegal action, which means an intermediate position between the 
completely lawful and the clearly unlawful, partaking of the characteristics of 
both legality and illegality.347 
 
II. Is Civil Disobedience A Duty? 
 
Rights and duties are normally two opposing poles in a legal relationship. The 
former indicates a position of power, the latter, a burden or obligation. 
Normally, if an act is a right, then it cannot be a duty at the same time, and 
vice versa. But, as I will show, this principle does not apply to the case of civil 
disobedience, because it can be considered as both a right and a duty under 
special circumstances. 
 
A. Civil Disobedience as a Duty 
 
For some scholars, civil disobedience is not only a right but also a duty. It 
seems that most scholars who champion civil disobedience also support the 
idea that civil disobedience should be made obligatory at least in some 
circumstances. We can easily find such comments from the writings of 
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Thoreau, King, Gandhi, Dworkin and many other scholars. 
 
Thoreau believes that each of us must accept personal responsibility for 
injustice. One should not become complicit with evil governmental policies, 
therefore, when one is required by the government to do injustice, civil 
disobedience becomes an obligation:  
 
If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of 
government, let it go, let it go; perchance it will wear smooth — 
certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a 
pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you 
may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but 
if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice 
to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter 
friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, 
that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.348  
 
Thoreau does not think that it is a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote 
himself to the eradication of any or even the most enormous wrong in society 
because he may have other concerns to attend to. But Thoreau does believe 
that it is a man’s duty to “wash his hands of the wrong”, that is to say, not give 
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the wrongdoing any practical support.349 It is on this belief that Thoreau 
refused to pay his tax, that is, in case the money would be used to support the 
unjust cause of enforcing slavery law or waging wars on Mexico. 
 
Compared to Thoreau, Gandhi and King are more ardent in supporting the 
idea of civil disobedience as a duty. They discard the idea that the duty of civil 
disobedience should be limited to rare circumstances, when one is required to 
be the agent of injustice; rather they contend that civil disobedience should be 
made obligatory in a more extensive sense. According to Gandhi, civil 
disobedience should become a sacred duty when the State becomes lawless 
and corrupt.350 For him, civil disobedience is a necessary adjunct to any 
democratic political system. It is not only an inherent right of citizens, but also 
becomes a “sacred duty” when the State degenerates into corruption or 
lawlessness. On this point, King’s point of view is very similar to that of 
Gandhi. King claims that all people have a moral and a legal obligation to 
obey just laws, but they have an equally important moral obligation to disobey 
unjust laws in order to obey a higher, natural, or divine law whose authority 
preempts man-made laws.351 “He who passively accepts evil is as much 
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involved in it as he who helps to penetrate it. He who accepts evil without 
protesting against it is really cooperating with it.”352 It is obvious, in King’s 
opinion, that both the general public and those who practically participate in 
the evil are obligated to protest the unjust law, which is a much stronger view 
than that of Thoreau. Why do both Thoreau and Gandhi hold such a strong 
view of civil disobedience as a duty? One possible explanation is that this may 
be related to the roles of Gandhi and King in their time, who were not only 
philosophers but also leaders of major movements, and who therefore needed 
to persuade as many people as possible to join them and support their causes. 
 
For modern scholars, the duty of civil disobedience comes from the citizen as 
an independent and rational man. Each individual in a democracy has a right 
and a duty to evaluate the laws and policies of the government. While 
formulating his own judgment, the individual may and should seek the counsel 
of others, but to be intellectually honest, as a rational man, the final decision 
must be up to him. Accordingly, he must be responsible for his own decision: 
“After his personal decision that an ‘evil’ exists, the individual is morally 
obligated to resist not only the evil, but the instrumentality responsible for 
it.”353 And so, according to Rawls, we are ultimately individually accountable 
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for our actions and therefore “we cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility 
and transfer the burden of blame to others.”354 
 
B. The Nuremberg Trials 
 
The scholars’ argument that one has a duty to disobey unjust man-made laws 
reflects the legal reasoning of the Nuremberg Tribunals which were 
established to conduct trials of Nazis after the World War II. The judgments of 
the Tribunals established the principle that an individual has a legal duty to 
disobey unjust state orders, to be disobedient; otherwise he will be legally and 
personally responsible for carrying out unjust laws, even if he claims to have 
merely obeyed superior orders.355 
 
The Nuremberg convicted twenty-two high-level German governmental 
officials of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity.356 Many of the defendants in these trials, criminally charged with 
their acts of atrocity during the war, offered the defense that they owed an 
allegiance to the legally constituted Nazi government and in the performance 
of their acts they were executing direct orders of this government and thus 
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could not be held individually accountable for the crimes. However, this 
defense was adjudged unacceptable by the tribunals, which indicated that the 
fact the defendants were only following orders of a legally constituted 
government did not serve as a sufficient defense; the defendants were 
obligated to exercise their individual conscience and question the morality or 
immorality of their actions. 357  Though the Tribunal did not extend 
international criminal liability to low-level officials and combatants or to 
civilians, it did stress that individuals have international duties which 
transcend the national obligations imposed by domestic governments. Those 
people who violate such international duties, whether private citizens or 
governmental officials, are subject to prosecution and punishment under 
international law.358 The International Law Commission, acting on the request 
of the United Nations General Assembly, produced in 1950 the report, 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,359 in which Principle IV is 
about the defense of superior orders. Defense of superior orders, the principle 
states clearly, is not a defense for international crimes, although it might 
influence a sentencing authority to lessen the penalty. “The fact that a person 
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve 
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him from responsibility under international law provided a moral choice was 
in fact possible to him.” 
 
The Nuremberg Trials not only served as a model for the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, which tried Japanese officials for crimes against 
peace and against humanity in its time, they also had a great influence on the 
development of international criminal law. The principles established in the 
Trials have been expressed in many international conventions and in the 
legislation of many states. For example, the Genocide Convention of 1948 
clearly stipulates that “persons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”.360 That is to say, the 
defense of obeying superior orders, even under a democratic form of 
government, will not suffice to exempt the defendant from the crime of 
genocide. Similar principles can also be found in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Geneva Convention on the Laws and Customs of War, and 
the Convention on the Abolition of the Statute of Limitations on War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity. In addition, the present-day courts at The 
Hague, for trying crimes committed during the Balkan wars of the early 1990s, 
and at Arusha, for trying the people responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, 
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are also obviously influenced by the reasoning of the Nuremberg Tribunals.361 
 
C．Should Civil Disobedience Be Established as a Legal Duty? 
 
We learn from the Nuremberg Trials and subsequent jurisprudence that 
obeying superior orders is not a sufficient guarantee to escape liability. In 
other words, the Nuremberg Trials advanced a new legal norm according to 
which one should not obey a particular law or order, even if it has been legally 
and democratically accepted into the statute book. 362  Those who obey 
illegitimate orders will probably be considered criminals and penalized. In this 
way, as remarked by Maria Tella, the Nuremberg Judges transformed the right 
to civil disobedience into a duty, the non-fulfillment of which was punished 
accordingly.363 
 
The principle that emerges from the Nuremberg Trials is consistent with the 
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thoughts of many liberal thinkers such as Thoreau, Gandhi, King, and 
Dworkin who argued that civil disobedience should be considered a duty. But 
others strongly oppose this view. For example, Agassi claims that the 
Nuremberg solution is not tenable: if, in principle, every citizen can determine 
for himself whether the law ought to be obeyed, there is no place for law; no 
legal system is possible with that legal limitation, and no society can exist 
without a more or less acceptable legal system.364 As far as civil disobedience 
is concerned, this worry is not warranted; as argued earlier, civil disobedience 
is a strictly self-limiting and peaceful action which is unlikely to lead to the 
destruction of the legal order. However, there is another problem which should 
concern us if civil disobedience is established as a normal legal duty. The 
problem is that the individual will be forced into a dilemma: on the one hand, 
he is obligated to obey the law, otherwise he would be punished; on the other 
hand, he has to ask himself continuously whether a particular law should be 
obeyed because if he obeys a law which is subsequently considered 
illegitimate, he might later be liable to punishment.365 This is an enormous 
burden for the ordinary citizen who might not be able to judge the legitimacy 
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of every law, especially given the abundance of borderline cases. Therefore, 
even if a duty of civil disobedience can be established, it ought not to be an 
extensive duty; rather it should be extremely narrow in scope. There are two 
reasons for this. 
 
First, the duty of civil disobedience is not justified in borderline cases. 
Borderline cases are those cases in which it is difficult for the ordinary people 
to determine whether the law or superior order involved is legitimate. To 
recognize a duty of civil disobedience in these cases would be perplexing and 
make any concept of legal order impossible. But the situation is totally 
different in manifestly illegitimate cases. By “manifestly illegitimate cases” I 
mean cases in which the illegitimate nature or the fallacy of the superior order 
is so obvious that every citizen with an ordinary sense would be able to see it, 
for instance, the genocide in the Nazi Germany and present-day genocide in 
Sudan. In these cases, anyone who collaborates with the evil order should be 
subject to punishment. In short, the duty of civil disobedience does not arise 
every time the legitimacy of a law or superior order is in question, but it does 
arise when the law in question is so manifestly illegitimate as to contradict the 
fundamental values of democracy. That is to say, the duty of civil disobedience 
is not justifiable on an extensive base, but only in a limited sense, i.e. when the 
illegitimate nature of the superior order is manifest enough. 
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Second, the duty of civil disobedience does not apply to all people. Ordinary 
people have a very limited role to play in the determination and execution of 
the law. It would be unfair to ask them to be responsible for what they do not 
participate in and have no ability to control. Such persons, according to 
Michael Walzer, may be morally obligated to help the victims, but it would be 
absurd to claim that they are similarly obligated as those decision-makers and 
active collaborators because the ordinary people had never incurred any duty 
to do so.366 Moreover, even if the duty is made applicable to ordinary people, 
that is to say, ordinary people would be punished as the decision-makers for 
obeying the law, such a rule would not work well because the punishment 
which may be imposed after the fact is much less dangerous than the 
immediate punishment which would be imposed if they join the disobedient. 
Therefore, it is proper for the duty of civil disobedience to apply only to 
decision-makers and active collaborators for these people are either the origin 
of the evil or its direct agents. 
 
From the above analysis, we can see that civil disobedience does become a 
duty in exceptional cases, as was the case in the Nuremberg Trials. But, we 
should acknowledge that this is not a typical approach: the usual approach is 
to conceive disobedience as a right and not as a duty. Perhaps, this is the main 
reason why, despite liberal thinkers’ claim that it is man’s right and it is man’s 
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duty to fight the evil regimes and laws, the duty theory that men can be 
obligated to disobey has not played as much a part as the right theory in the 
development of democracy. 
 
III. Who Is the Good Citizen? 
After settling the question of right and duty, now I will turn to see whether 
civil disobedience is a vice or virtue. Instead of discussing the question 
directly, we will see the issue from a different perspective, i.e. the perspective 
of the good citizen. Both vice and virtue have no meaning if isolated from 
human beings. Therefore, I will answer the vice and virtue question by 
answering the question of who is the good citizen. 
 
The “good citizen” is a very broad concept that can be defined in different 
ways. For example, it may be expressed by contributing to one’s country’s 
treasury more than one’s due according to the tax laws or by serving in the 
army for longer than the term specified by laws. Therefore, before I begin to 
discuss who the good citizen is, I must limit my study to a certain 
understanding. Here, the point I will focus on is to see which conceptions of 
citizenship would best advance democracy. That is to say, which kind of 
citizen is the one who benefits democracy most: the one who obey laws 




In pursuit of this aim, I find a tripartite classification of citizens is very helpful. 
Therefore, I will divide citizens into three groups, i.e. the obedient citizen, the 
conditionally obedient citizen and the rebellious citizen. After defining them, I 
will turn to discuss which group serves the democracy best. My final 
conclusion is that those citizens who are prepared to resort to civil 
disobedience when necessary behave in the best interests of democracy 
because democracy does not demand that citizens be servants but requires that 
they be autonomous individuals capable of formulating their own ideas and 
evaluating the laws and policies of the state. 
 
A．Three Kinds of Citizen 
 
In terms of citizens’ attitudes towards law abidance and legal authority, three 
kinds of different citizens can be distinguished: the obedient citizen; the 
conditionally obedient citizen and the rebellious citizen. 
 
1. The Obedient Citizen. The obedient citizen takes a more procedural view of 
law, and would obey every law as long as it is legislated by a qualified 
authority. The most important tenet for this kind of citizen is that law is law 
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which must be obeyed by everyone in the society and the lawbreaker must be 
punished as pre-stipulated irrespective of whom he is and for what reason he 
breaches the law. Certainly, these citizens may grumble at the injustice or 
undemocratic nature or inappropriateness of the law, and sometimes they 
might even stage a legal protest against the law, but the imperfection of the 
law does not affect their willingness to obey it because it is their belief that 
even imperfect laws must be obeyed before they are changed in a legal way. 
Civil disobedience and other illegal means of changing the law are never an 
option for them. A typical representative of this kind of citizen is Socrates who 
would rather to be executed unjustly than to run away from the prison because, 
for him, obedience to the commands of the city (and to other authorities) is 
precisely what it means to be just. The just person is the one who obeys.367 
 
2. The Conditionally Obedient Citizen. Conditionally obedient citizens take a 
more substantive view of law; they think that the law must not only be enacted 
through democratic procedures but must also conform to the basic principles 
of democracy in a substantive sense. In principle, they acknowledge the need 
for legal authority, either as a means of facilitating the reasonable coordination 
of man or as a useful tool to protect and enhance democracy, thus they are 
                                                        
367
 Curtis Johnson, “Socrates on Obedience and Justice”, (1990) 43 The Western Political 
Quarterly 719, at 721. Socrates' argument proceeds from the statement of a perfectly 
general moral principle to its application in his particular case: One ought never to do 
wrong even in response to the evil committed by another; but it is always wrong to 
disobey the state; hence, one ought never to disobey the state. And since avoiding the 
sentence of death handed down by the Athenian jury would be an action in disobedience 
the state, it follows he ought not to escape. (Crito 50e, 52e) 
  218
prepared to abide by the law legislated by the legal authorities; however, they 
differ from the obedient citizen in that they would not confine their fighting to 
the legal means to change the law if they find the law repugnant and 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democracy.368 They think that 
law can be wrong or undemocratic, so it needs to be scrutinized by individuals. 
Moreover, legal means may be unavailable or ineffective to redress unjust 
laws, so civil disobedience is vital. In short, the conditionally obedient citizen 
is the one who would normally give priority to obeying the law, but 
nevertheless, when the need arises, would break it (through civil disobedience) 
in the name of democracy. Thoreau, probably one of the few most famous 
representatives of this kind of citizen, said, “I seek...an excuse for conforming 
to the laws of the land…I am but too ready to conform to them”.369 
 
3. The Rebellious Citizen. The rebellious citizen holds a generally hostile 
attitude towards law and legal authority. For the conditionally obedient citizen, 
the existing political system is roughly acceptable though its laws may 
occasionally go wrong, so the conditionally obedient citizen is not willing to 
revolt against the government, but rather seeks the redress of some its laws or 
policies. But the rebellious citizen completely denies the legitimacy of the 
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existing regime; therefore his aim is to change the whole system rather than 
some of its laws. Correspondingly, rebellious citizens do not try to restrict 
their fighting to peaceful disobedience as conditionally obedient citizens do; 
armed struggle, even terrorist actions, are all options for them. 
 
B. Who Is the Good Citizen? 
 
After mapping three kinds of citizen, it is time for us to answer the question 
that is of central importance: who is the good citizen? That is to say, what kind 
of citizen do we need to support an effective democratic society? The answer 
to this question would also be an answer to the question whether civil 
disobedience is a virtue. 
 
a. The Obedient Citizen 
 
One theory holds that the obedient citizen should be regarded as the good 
citizen. The theory is based on the assumption that to solve social problems 
and maintain democracy, citizens must have good character; they must be 
honest, responsible and, foremost, law-abiding members of the community.370 
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There is much truth in this view. After all, society is composed of numerous 
men and women; if most of them are unused to deferring to the law, it would 
be hard to maintain order and justice. But what is neglected in the theory is 
that it fails to acknowledge that a satisfactory society cannot be achieved 
solely on the basis of exact and narrow adherence to the law.371 There are 
important shared goods in the society that can be realized only if there is a 
significant body of citizens who have a sense of common concerns, and who 
are prepared to stand up against the existing authority if necessary. Adherence 
to law rather than disobedience of law is sometimes more dangerous. As I 
emphasized in Chapter II, historically, the most terrible things, war, genocide 
and slavery, have resulted not from disobedience, but from obedience. Seen in 
this light, a theory that merely insists a strict obedience of law fails to take into 
account the dangers of life: the not uncommon tyranny of the majority, the 
tendency of power to corrupt, the chauvinism of nations and of groups within 
nations.372 
 
A further failure of the theory is that it fails to see the demands of democracy 
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on citizenships. The spirit of obedience to law is vital to the smooth function 
of democracy, but it is not about democratic citizenship because tyrants of a 
totalitarian regime would be as delighted as leaders in a democracy if their 
citizens were imbued with the spirit of subservience. Tyrants, aware of their 
fragile position, seek to sanctify their laws and make it impossible for citizens 
to think and behave in an autonomous way. This is the essence of tyranny. But 
it is different in a democracy in which citizens are expected to have their own 
views about policies and laws. They are not expected to follow the law simply 
because it is law or because politicians or the authorities tell them to do so; the 
ideal situation is that they follow the law out of a genuine commitment, that is 
to say, after a careful consideration of its merits and demerits. Therefore, mere 
emphasis on loyalty or obedience works against the kind of critical reflection 
and action which is essential to the democratic society.373 
 
The powerlessness of the obedient citizen will become especially apparent 
when he or she is faced with a regime which is very corrupt or has a high 
tendency of slipping into totalitarianism. Under extreme conditions, no legal 
means is able to halt the degeneration of the regime. Thus, it is completely 
necessary for citizens to hold the right of resistance under such circumstances 
as an ultimate restraint on the political order.374 That is to say, there is a 
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different way to be a good citizen besides obeying the law unconditionally. 
 
b. The Conditionally Obedient Citizen 
 
I have argued above that the obedient citizen is not the kind of good citizen 
demanded by democracy. The good citizen should be the kind of citizen who 
has the spirit of obedience in the normal times, but who is also prepared to 
resort to all necessary means, including illegal ones, to protect democracy 
when democracy or its fundamental values are endangered. This kind of 
citizen is the conditionally obedient citizen. The conditionally obedient citizen 
not only has the calmness and determination to make a democratic order 
possible but also has the vigilance to protect the order.375 According to T.R.S. 
Allan, it is not the quiet submission to political power, born of habit or 
tradition or self-interest, which characterizes the good citizen in a democracy, 
but a cautious, more measured compliance, with civil disobedience as a 
possible last resort.376 However, this point of view is not shared by everyone 
and there are many arguments against it. 
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The first counter-argument is that social consequences are difficult to predict 
and an individual’s judgment is so subjective and biased that opposing one’s 
judgment to that of society as reflected in its laws is too dangerous. Even if the 
original intention of the civil disobedient is to help the democracy, his action 
might ultimately be counter-productive. Thus, it is difficult to say that the 
conditionally obedient citizen is the good citizen as his disobedience may do 
more harm than good to the society. There are three responses to this argument. 
First, it is true that an individual’s judgment is unreliable, but the same is true 
of laws, which are not one hundred percent reliable either. It is not justified, 
therefore, to ask the people to follow laws always.377 Second, there are some 
laws that are obviously illegitimate, such as those that are in breach of basic 
human rights and principles of democracy. When this happens, it is completely 
unjust to ask the citizen to follow the laws, especially after all legal means 
have been exhausted. Third, from a historical point of view, democracy gains 
much from civil disobedience. Although some specific acts of civil 
disobedience might unfortunately do more harm than good, civil disobedience 
on the whole contributes significantly to the development of democracy. Thus, 
the occasional misjudgment of the conditionally obedient citizen will not 
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undermine his status as good citizen. 
 
Another fear related to the first argument is that this kind of citizen’s judgment 
about when to obey and disobey the law will lead to terrible consequences 
such as social chaos. I have already answered this question in chapter III when 
I tried to justify civil disobedience by refuting the arguments against civil 
disobedience. There, I argued that there is little danger that civil disobedience 
will lead to social chaos because of its highly self-restricting nature, for 
example, its strong commitment to nonviolence and willingness to submit to 
punishment. But here I should add another argument from the standpoint of 
human nature. As we know that to be a civil disobedient means great 
self-sacrifice; one who disobeys the law has to experience all the danger and 
unpleasantness that comes with being a fighter against the state. Sometimes, 
he has to serve the cause at the risk of losing his job, freedom, even life. 
Therefore, normally there are not many people among the society who are 
brave enough to be civil disobedients because of the harm-evading instinct of 
human beings. In the words of the American Declaration of Independence of 
1776, “mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to 
right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.” This 
is precisely why Richard Swedberg contends that “there are many people who 
show courage on the battle field, but this is much less common in life outside 
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the military.”378 The human nature is such that only a few can be truly good 
citizens, i.e. citizens who are courageous enough to resort to civil disobedience 
when necessity arises. Most people choose to join the brave only after they see 
that the success is forthcoming or the dangers have been greatly lessened. 
Thus, social chaos is unlikely to be caused by the disobedience of these few 
individuals under normal circumstances. Seen in another light, this is precisely 
what makes the conditionally obedient citizen a good citizen. Compared with 
ordinary citizens, they are more determined, courageous and are more willing 
to fight for the good of the whole society, irrespective of their own risk. 
Obviously, there is a much easier path for them to choose, that is to say, to lie 
back and obey any law, whatever the law happens to say, whatever politicians 
have made into law on the basis of selfishness, but they do not choose this 
easier path by joining the obedient citizen. Rather, they choose a more risky 
path by voluntarily taking a heavy responsibility to check the law of the 
country and to guard the democracy which they cherish so much. In other 
words, they are determined to serve their country not only with their minds, 
but also with their bodies.379 
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c. The Rebellious Citizen 
 
In response to my argument that the conditionally obedient citizen is a good 
citizen, some might object that rebellious citizens also can satisfy the standard 
because they are also determined, courageous and would like to risk 
themselves for their cause. It is true that the rebellious citizen also can 
contribute to the social good, if we admit rebellion can ever be justified. But 
we have to notice at the same time that rebel is suitable only for those 
extremely totalitarian regimes in consideration of the potentially great and 
damaging power of a rebellion. Often, what a rebel brings is not the seed of 
peace and love, but the seed of a new cycle of chaos and hatred. The rebellious 
citizen’s contempt for authority and the sweepingly destructive power of the 
rebel are too dangerous for most societies. In any case, rebellion is not a real 
choice for any kind of liberal democracy. No rebel can be justified in the 
context of a democracy, if it is a genuine, not pseudo, democracy. Therefore, 
rebellious citizens may be viewed as “good” and courageous under very rare 
circumstances, for example, when rebellion was really needed in a cruel 
regime such as the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, but it would be totally wrong 
to acclaim them as good citizens for all societies because they lack the equally 
valuable spirit of cooperation and obedience which is dearly needed by any 
kind of society. At the very least, the rebellious citizen is not the good citizen 
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required by a democracy. 
 
After analyzing three kinds of citizen, we can now discern who the good 
citizen is. Actually, the answer to this question has been hinted at by some 
philosophers when they say that a vigilant yet patient people are the best 
safeguard of democracy.380 To be more precise, the good citizen is not the one 
who offers blind allegiance to the state or who consigns infallibility to his 
elected and appointed officials. Rather, the good citizen is a watchdog who is 
legally responsible and prepared to violate laws on the books in order to be 
true to the ideal democracy.381 
 
C. Citizenship and Democracy 
 
There is a very popular view which holds that to be a citizen under a 
democratic system is very easy because he enjoys extensive rights while at the 
same time has only minimal responsibilities. As observed by political scientist 
John Muller, “democracy is really quite easy; any dimwit can do it.... People 
do not need to be good or noble, but merely to calculate their best interests, 
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and if so moved, to express them.”382 Is democracy really so easy that it 
makes nobility and goodness unnecessary? 
 
It is totally understandable that in a democracy people always pay more 
attention to their own rights and interests than to the duties and so-called 
public interests because that is the way in which democracy is supposed to 
work. It is widely believed that if diverse people in a society are all 
encouraged to protect their own interests and to pursue their own happiness 
and prosperity, then the ensuing interactions and compromises with each other 
will be able to prevent a tyrannical dominance by any faction or even coalition 
of factions. The popularity of this view is reasonable because the pursuit of 
self-interests makes democracy possible and operational, but it will be absurd 
to assume that in a democracy nobility is unnecessary. Actually, to be a citizen 
in democracy is neither easy nor simple. The smooth function of democracy 
needs citizens to take far more responsibilities than they would under 
totalitarian regimes. In the totalitarian regimes, the responsibilities of a citizen 
required by the state are simply to passively follow the law since the 
authoritarian government has determined everything for him, even what he 
should think. But the situation is totally different in a democracy, the smooth 
function of which needs the extensive participation of the citizen and requires 
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that the citizen be able to exercise his own judgments. It hopes that if a citizen 
in a democracy follows a law, he is acting on his own judgment not merely 
because he is told to do so.383 The spirit of participation and the ability to 
make independent judgments are essential to the functioning of democracy; 
without the participation of the citizen or without the citizen who has the 
ability to evaluate the policies of the government, democracy would lose its 
base. The concept of democracy presupposes the concept of obligation. It is 
built on the assumption that many of its citizens would fulfill their 
responsibilities of participation and exercise their ability to distinguish 
between laws that are worth supporting and those that are corrupt and 
oppressive and which ought, therefore, to be overthrown. 
 
Therefore, in a democracy, the good citizen is one who has a spirit of 
participation and an ability to make independent judgments rather than one 
who is accustomed to obeying everything decreed by the government, for it is 
those active and independent citizens who make democracy possible. 
Although the unconditionally obedient citizen generally is not punishable, he 
or she becomes meritless compared to the participative citizen. This may serve 
as additional proof that the spirit of the conditionally obedient citizen is more 
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Civil disobedience can be a right in a limited sense, i.e. in the sense of being 
entitled to some kind of punishment mitigation. It can also be a duty at the 
same time, though only in very rare circumstances. The ideal citizen needed 
by democracy is not a citizen who is ready to obey any order of the state, but a 
citizen who holds a critical view of the state, i.e. a citizen who would like to 
obey the law under normal circumstances but at the same time who is not 
afraid of resorting to civil disobedience to defend democracy if necessary. 
 
Since civil disobedience can be a right, and even a duty, and since civil 
disobedients might be hailed as ideal citizens of democracy, an important 
question that follows is how to reconcile civil disobedience and democracy. 
The most important goal in reconciling civil disobedience and democracy is to 
find a way to soften the predicament of civil disobedients. It is improper to 
punish civil disobedients on the one hand and, on the other hand, call them 
heroes. If they are regarded genuinely good citizens who are an integral part of 
democratic society, that society in turn must show them due respect. So, in the 
following chapter, I will explore possible ways of doing so. 
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Chapter VI: 
The Reconciliation of Civil Disobedience and Democracy 
 
I explained in previous chapters that civil disobedience plays a substantive 
role in the development of democracy and the civil disobedient, not the 
unconditionally obedient citizen, is the good citizen. But the fact is that civil 
disobedience has never been warmly welcomed by any form of government. 
Even in today’s liberal democracies, it still faces fierce resistance from the 
state; sometimes it is directly denounced as profoundly misguided and as a 
threat to safety and democracy. Consistent with the attitude of the state, the 
existing criminal system also punishes the civil disobedient harshly and the 
court generally refuses to take the special circumstances of civil disobedience 
into account. The state fears that if civil disobedience, a form of purposeful 
breach of law, is given special consideration, the whole criminal law system 
will collapse. However, in this chapter I will argue against this view by 
insisting that the democratic state is obligated to tolerate civil disobedience 
and there is a viable way to make changes to the criminal system to 
accommodate civil disobedience. My argument will be presented in two steps: 
First, I emphasize that democracy has a special responsibility to tolerate civil 
disobedience. Though the authoritarian regime has every reason to be afraid of 
civil disobedience, democracy does not. Civil disobedience poses little danger 
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to the subsistence of democratic system even though it could topple a 
totalitarian regime. Second, I analyze how to adapt the criminal law system to 
accommodate civil disobedience, that is to say, to alleviate punishment for 
civil disobedience. A variety of suggestions have been proposed by scholars on 
this point, for example, both the mistake of law defense and the good motive 
defense have been proposed as defenses for civil disobedience, but neither of 
them has been widely recognized. My argument begins with the analysis of 
the advantages and disadvantages of these suggestions. After analyzing them, I 
propose a solution: the establishment of a partial defense as the most 
appropriate way to soften the punishment for civil disobedience. I also suggest 
that in those not so liberal states without a competent judicial system, the 
protection of civil disobedience under constitution and other legislations may 
be considered. 
 
I. The Appropriate Response to Civil Disobedience 
 
Though the contributions of civil disobedience to the social development are 
generally recognized, there is no unanimity, both among the professionals and 
the laymen, on how properly to treat the perpetrators of civil disobedience. It 
has been claimed by most scholars that they have to be punished since they are 
law breakers. The voice which calls for the exemption of punishment for them 
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is weak. But here, I will join the latter group by arguing that a democratic 
society, to distinguish itself from an authoritarian regime, has a special 
responsibility to tolerate civil disobedience. This special responsibility comes 
at least from three aspects: first, civil disobedience poses less danger to a 
democratic society than to an authoritarian regime, in other words, civil 
disobedience is more affordable to the democratic system; second, democracy 
is a system which is committed to leniency and development, while the 
dictatorship is just the opposite; third, democracy is a system which is 
committed to justice, so it is highly problematic to punish the civil 
disobedient. 
 
A. Different Attitudes towards Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience as a strategy of resistance is treated with both respect and 
revulsion.384 Scholarly opinions fall between two limits. One is identifiable 
with conservativism, which holds that civil disobedience is incipient rebellion 
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and must be punished according to law. The other is on the outer frontier of 
institutional libertarianism and claims that civil disobedience as “non-violent 
revolution” should be given legal immunity.385 
 
How should the government deal with those who practice civil disobedience? 
Many people think that the answer is obvious: they must be punished if they 
have disobeyed the law. As Charles E. Wyzanski, Chief Judge of the United 
States District Court in Boston, said: “Disobedience is a long step from dissent. 
Civil disobedience involves a deliberate and punishable breach of legal 
duty.”386 There is no immunity conferred by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States to those individuals who insist on a right of civil disobedience. 
The philosophy that a person may determine for himself whether a law should 
be obeyed or resisted is foreign to the rule-of-law theory.387 It is also held by 
this view that even personally the civil disobedience deserves sympathy, but 
officially they must be punished, as claimed by US President John F. Kennedy 
in the 1960s. At the time of the black demonstrations in Birmingham, 
Kennedy gave many signs that, as an individual, he was in sympathy with the 
goals of the demonstrators, but he also made it clear that, as Chief Executive, 
he could give neither permission nor approval to such actions.388  
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Some are even less sympathetic, insisting that civil disobedience be treated as 
terrorism.389  What makes these people hold such a strict view on civil 
disobedience? Probably, the most common argument is the slippery argument 
which I have discussed in Chapter III. The argument is made from the danger 
of instability and anarchy, which states: if every Tom, Dick, and Harry takes it 
into his hand to disobey the law whenever he thinks necessary, anarchy may 
result.390 This point of view was stated very clear by Victor Hanson in his 
recent article “Socratic Question: What Is the Rule of Law?” According to this 
article, if civil disobedience is immunized,  
 
the entire edifice of a once unimpeachable legal system will collapse. 
We (America) would then become no different from those nations 
whose citizens are now fleeing to our own shores to escape the wages 
of lawlessness. That worry is why Socrates, 2,400 years ago, taught us 
that the deliberate violation of the rule of law would have been worse 
for ancient Athens even than losing its greatest philosopher.391 
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Certainly, there are also other arguments which are used by conservatives to 
support their strict view on civil disobedience, but here I will not elaborate and 
analyze them; I will withhold my comments on them until later. 
 
In sharp contrast to the above standpoint is the view held by some liberals 
whose outstanding representatives are Thoreau, Dworkin, Rawls and 
Habermas. Though their conclusions are based on different arguments, they 
agree that civil disobedience deserves some kind of toleration. Dworkin argues 
that there are good reasons for not prosecuting those who commit civil 
disobedience. One obvious reason is that they act out of better motives than 
those who break the law out of greed or a desire to subvert government. 
Another reason is that our society suffers a loss if it punishes a group that 
includes some of its most loyal and law-respecting citizens. Jailing such men 
solidifies their alienation from society, and alienates many like them who are 
deterred by the threat.392 Rawls is of the same view that civil disobedience 
should be tolerated to some degree; he argues that “courts should take into 
account the civilly disobedient nature of the protestor’s act, and the fact that it 
is justifiable (or may seem so) by the principles underlining the constitution, 
and on these grounds reduce and in some cases suspend the legal 
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sanctions”.393 For Habermas, tolerance of civil disobedience is a litmus test 
for democracy. If civil disobedient is treated as a criminal and punished 
accordingly, that means the democratic system is distorted into the 
authoritarian legalism.394 
 
B. The Responsibility of Leniency to Civil Disobedience 
 
These two views about the treatment of civil disobedience have co-existed for 
a very long time; neither can persuade each other. Actually, this is not a 
question of right or wrong. Both of them tell part of the truth. However, I find 
the liberal view more persuasive, on balance, because after comparing 
democracy to dictatorship I find that democracy has a special responsibility to 
tolerate civil disobedience. Even if it cannot tolerate all acts of civil 
disobedience, it should at least tolerate some. This special responsibility 
comes both from the inner characteristics of democracy and from the peaceful 
nature of civil disobedience which determines that it is not a significant threat 
to the order of a democratic society. 
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a. The Dangers Posed by Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience actions have been harshly penalized in authoritarian or 
quasi-authoritarian regimes, past and present, because these regimes generally 
do not distinguish civil disobedience from ordinary crimes. The leaders and 
activists of civil disobedience movements are often arrested, jailed, and even 
executed as being no different from other criminals (and they may even be 
seen as worse). So why are rulers of the authoritarian regimes so afraid of civil 
disobedience? 
 
The answer lies in the fact that civil disobedience poses a great danger to the 
rule of the authoritarian regime. From the perspective of traditional liberal 
theory, the rule of an authoritarian regime is illegitimate because it is not based 
on the consent of the governed. It is also supposed that such a system is not 
good at responding quickly to the needs and aspirations of the populace due to 
the restriction of dissenting channels. In such undemocratic systems, many 
individuals thus feel alienated from society; intense dissatisfaction is also 
prevalent among the people. However, because harsh penalties may be meted 
out by the authoritarian government at any time, dissatisfaction is generally 
only latent. But it is very easy for that dissatisfaction to be ignited by acts of 
civil disobedience. If the populace finds that dissenting actions go unpunished 
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or the punishment imposed by the government is no longer unbearable, they 
might abandon their attitude of submission and silence, quickly transforming 
latent dissatisfaction into overt, large-scale resistance beyond the control of 
the authoritarian regime. This is precisely what happened in East Europe and 
former Soviet Union where communist rule collapsed in a short time once the 
people found that the control of the government became not so strict.395 The 
act of civil disobedience itself might cause little harm to the totalitarian regime, 
but the enormous dissatisfaction it ignites could engulf the whole system. In 
fact, this is also why normal protests such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and 
strikes are also largely prohibited in undemocratic regimes. Dictators 
understand that even limited protests could ignite the enormous anger among 
the people. Therefore, any dissent, not merely civil disobedience, is viewed as 
extremely threatening by the dictatorial ruler and, therefore, the scope of 
dissent is so limited in authoritarian regimes that practically any form of open 
protest is forbidden. 
 
But it is totally different in democratic states. Democratic systems are 
supposed to be founded on the consent of the people, and there are various 
dissenting avenues to facilitate communication between the ruled and the 
government. Thus, in democratic systems, intense dissatisfaction is mostly 
concentrated in a very limited population; even extreme forms of protest 
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evoke little sympathetic response from the general population. Therefore, civil 
disobedience rarely causes the disruption of the whole society in a democratic 
system, even though it can be very destructive to the authoritarian regime. As 
Gandhi remarked, while civil disobedience is dangerous to the autocratic state, 
it is harmless to a democratic state which is willing to listen to the voice of 
public opinion.396 The rare instances in which serious disruptions are caused 
by civil disobedience only serve as a reminder that something has gone wrong 
in the democratic society and adjustments are urgently needed. Seen in this 
light, democracies need not view civil disobedience as a serious threat, at least 
not to the same extent as an autocratic regime. A dissent which is threatening 
to rulers in one system will not necessarily distress rulers in another.397 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that civil disobedience is a less serious 
threat to a democratic society than it is to an autocratic regime. In a democracy, 
civil disobedience enhances democratic legitimacy and at the same time poses 
little danger to the continuing development of democracy, whereas in an 
autocratic regime, civil disobedience enhances the discrepancy between the 
official and real order, between an artificially maintained picture of political 
community and the inner desire of the people for a just society.398 In short, 
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while the effect of civil disobedience in a democratic society is to help it 
become more stable, its effect for a totalitarian regime is to accelerate its 
dissolution. It is appropriate and obligatory, therefore, for democratic systems 
to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards civil disobedience than totalitarian 
regimes which are generally intolerant of any open dissent. 
 
b. The Commitment to Tolerance 
 
One characteristic of liberal democracy that is said to distinguish it from other 
types of political systems is the great tolerance that it extends to political 
dissenters. Rather than suppressing political dissent, as did by authoritarian 
regimes, democratic systems encourage different views to be expressed. 
 
The typical attitude of authoritarian regimes toward political dissident is 
characterized by two essential features: orthodoxy and the repression of 
dissent. First, the regime maintains an orthodoxy which takes the form of an 
officially approved political, religious, or moral ideology. Second, dissenters 
from that orthodoxy are persecuted, prosecuted, or in other ways officially 
excluded from full participation in the political community.399 Generally, such 
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a regime is not prepared to tolerate any political dissent even when it is not 
threatened by an immediate revolution or any other substantial forces which 
can endanger its existence. But this is not the case in democratic systems. 
Democratic systems welcome, even encourage, new ideas and changes, 
because the existence of different theories and opinions is seen as a core 
requirement of democracy: “it is only through free debate and free exchange 
of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and 
peaceful change is effected.”400 Accordingly, democracy takes a very tolerant 
attitude toward dissenters: “Ruthless tactics that might be contemplated in 
other societies are not entertained as real alternatives” in a democratic 
society.401 Democracy is a system which has a strong commitment to leniency 
and tolerance.402 
 
But the commitment to tolerance does not necessarily and automatically mean 
that democracy must tolerate everything, from peaceful to violent dissents. 
Tolerance should not be unlimited. Even democratic societies must remain 
vigilant against the tendency of tolerating too much. As suggested by 
                                                        
400
 In De Jonge v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief 
Justice Hughes: “It is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that 
government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. 
The right to speak freely and promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of 
the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
401
 Supra note 85, at 339. 
402
 It is argued that tolerance, traditionally conceived, involves an asymmetrical, 
paternalistic relationship between a sovereign party and the tolerated party. The sovereign 
party unilaterally bestows tolerance upon the tolerated party as an act of benevolence. 
Lasse Thomassen, Deconstructing Habermas (New York: Routledge, 2008), at 70. 
  243
Bollinger, we have only a limited capacity to tolerate because it is dangerous 
to become too tolerant.403 Therefore, we must see whether civil disobedience 
is beyond our capability to tolerate before we extend our leniency to it. 
Actually, the question has been answered well by Rawls’ analysis. When 
responding to the questions: “How shall citizens of a liberal democracy treat 
those who are politically unreasonable? Does justice require the tolerance of 
the intolerant?” Rawls’ answer is clearly “no” if they threaten security and 
public order. But he points out further that if they “are of no immediate danger 
to the equal liberties of others,” then the intolerant should be tolerated, not 
suppressed.404 The rationale behind Rawls’ answer is clear: acts of civil 
disobedience may be restricted if they pose a threat to the liberty or equality of 
others, otherwise, they should be tolerated. This implies that civil 
disobedience should be tolerated in principle; only in rare cases, in Rawls’ 
own words, “only in the special cases when it is necessary for preserving equal 
liberty itself”, should the limitation apply. How many acts of civil 
disobedience threaten liberty itself by endangering the public order? This is a 
question which has been settled in Chapter III. In reality, very few acts of civil 
disobedience can endanger liberty itself due to the benign character of civil 
disobedience and other reasons considered earlier. Civil disobedience 
committed by individuals, and even mass civil disobedience, rarely brings 
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panic and chaos to a democratic society. Thus, it is safe to conclude that most 
civil disobedience is entitled to be tolerated in some sense by the democracy. 
 
c. The Problem of Punishment 
 
It might also be excessively unjust and problematic to punish civil 
disobedience as ordinary offences. As has been argued earlier, civil 
disobedience is committed not or not only for personal gain but for the 
interests of the whole society, or the so-called common good.405 It is often in 
the interests of everyone involved, including democratic institutions, the 
development of which depends on the ability of different views to be fully 
discussed and communicated. Punishing civil disobedience which is beneficial 
to democracy, therefore, is counter-productive for the whole society. From this 
it follows that a democratic government has a special responsibility to try to 
protect civil disobedience and soften the predicament of its practitioners.406 
King on the one hand received a Nobel Prize and was honored for his 
contribution to society by the President of the United States, but, on the other 
hand, he was prosecuted and jailed for his actions. Is it always necessary, we 
might ask, that the person who performs civil disobedience be arrested and 
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punished? Why must a man suffer for an act which ultimately benefits society? 
Would it not be possible to make some provision to show leniency and to 
soften the predicament of such courageous practitioners?407 The answers to 
such questions are contentious. But, if a government deserves the name of 
democracy, it cannot be indifferent to the suffering of these courageous 
practitioners and punish them as ordinary criminals, while claiming to be a 
democracy committed to fairness and justice. 
 
Actually, according to classic theories of punishment, it is also problematic to 
punish civil disobedience. Since the civil disobedient is a good man and does 
not commit the “crime” for his own interests, there is no need to punish him 
for the purpose of correction. Similarly, it is also inappropriate to punish him 
for the purpose of retribution since his acts bring almost no harm and may 
finally be proved in the interests of the common good and helpful to the social 
development. It seems that the only theory which can support the punishment 
of civil disobedience is the deterrence theory which claims that punishment 
may be justified by the need to prevent more people from imitation.408 That is 
to say, the penalization of civil disobedience is necessary because others might 
follow suit. This sounds reasonable under some circumstances, especially in 
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those cases which are very likely to stir large-scale imitation. But it must be 
noted that it is highly unjust to punish one person solely for the reason that his 
actions may be imitated by others and the severe punishment for him may 
deter others from imitation.409 The use of such a tactic to deter imitation must 
be with conditions and limitations in a democracy which is committed to 
building a just society and treating everyone alike. 
 
What, then, is the appropriate stance which should be assumed by the 
democracy to civil disobedience? The answer is clear: the democratic system 
has a special responsibility to be tolerant of civil disobedience; it should 
tolerate civil disobedience in some sense as long as its subsistence is not 
endangered. 
 
II. Civil Disobedience and Punishment 
 
I considered above how democracy should respond to civil disobedience and 
the final answer is that democracy should assume a tolerant stance to civil 
disobedience. But the question remaining is how to show the tolerance, i.e. in 
what way should democracy express its tolerance to civil disobedience? The 
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most important way, undoubtedly, is to reduce or eliminate the penalty for 
civil disobedience. But how can this be done specifically? In my opinion, the 
legislative branch, the executive branch and the judicial branch of the state all 
have a role to play. But, I believe, in most cases, that the most trustworthy 
branch which can be charged to protect civil disobedience is the judicial 
branch. This is not only because the court is a neutral place where disputes are 
mostly expected to be fairly resolved, but also because “the proper treatment 
of civil disobedience requires a highly individualized consideration of the facts 
of each particular case”.410 In contrast, the legislature can only pose the most 
general criteria under most circumstances. As for the executive branch, due to 
the fact that it will inevitably be a party to the dispute emerging from civil 
disobedience, it seems unwise to trust it with the task of judging whether to 
punish the civil disobedient. 
Thus, in the following paragraphs, I will mainly expound the courts’ role in 
protecting civil disobedience. But this is not to deny that the legislative and the 
executive branch also can play an essential role in defending civil 
disobedience. Under certain circumstances, for example, in those 
partially-liberal countries without an independent judicature, the legislature 
has a far more important role to play than the court in protecting civil 
disobedience. Therefore, the role of the legislature and the executive branch 
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will also be succinctly discussed. 
 
A. The Courts’ Role in Protecting Civil Disobedience 
 
As mentioned earlier, the courts are generally in the best position to evaluate 
acts of civil disobedience. In the past, legal scholars have recommended a 
variety of options for the court to consider in protecting civil disobedience. 
Some suggest protecting civil disobedience by extending the necessity defense; 
some claim that the mistake of law defense is better while still others claim 
that the good motive defense is more proper. However, in my opinion, none of 
these suggestions is sufficient. They are either impractical or with 
unacceptable drawbacks. Next, I will consider these suggestions one by one. 
 
a. The Necessity Defense 
 
The necessity defense is a social policy that recognizes that individuals should 
at times be free from legal restraints in order to avoid imminent, serious 
harms.411 When proved successfully, it justifies criminal behavior, thereby 
avoiding the application of the usual criminal rule. What, then, constitutes a 
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necessity defense? There are many theories about its constitution, among 
which the four-prong test is probably a typical one in many jurisdictions. The 
four-prong test holds that four requirements must be met before the necessity 
defense can be accepted.412 First, the defendant was faced with an evil and 
chose the lesser evil, which is the reason why the necessity defense is also 
known as the “competing harms” or “choice of evils” defense413; second, the 
harm was imminent; third, the defendant must reasonably believe that his act 
is essentially helpful to the avoidance of harm, that is to say, a reasonably 
cause-effect relationship must be anticipated in advance; fourth, there was no 
other legal choice but to violate the law. All these requirements mirror the 
principles on which the defense of necessity is based: justice is not always 
served by blind adherence to the law, and there are times when a technical 
breach of the law will bring about a more desirable result than adherence, so it 
is unjust to punish such persons who seek to achieve the greatest good. 
 
The necessity defense is very attractive to the practitioners of civil 
disobedience because it allows them to deny guilt without renouncing their 
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values and beliefs. In addition, the necessity defense also allows civil 
disobedients to voice their reasons for lawbreaking in a public forum.414 As 
noticed by Bauer and Eckerstrom, the elements of the necessity defense 
provide an excellent structure for publicizing and debating political issues in 
the judicial forum. “In proving the imminence of the harm, they demonstrate 
the urgency of the social problem. In showing the relative severity of the 
harms, they can show the seriousness of the social evil they seek to avert. In 
establishing the lack of reasonable alternatives, they can assault the 
unresponsiveness of those in power in dealing with the problem and prod them 
to action. And in presenting evidence of a causal relationship, they can argue 
the importance of individual action in reforming society.”415 The opinion that 
the necessity defense should be made available to the practitioners of civil 
disobedience is also supported by many philosophers.416 In practice, however, 
courts in most jurisdictions have been very unreceptive to political necessity 
arguments. For example, in the United States, virtually all protesters who tried 
to avail themselves of the defense lost in the court. Success is very rare.417 It 
is generally insisted by the courts that there is no necessity for the protestors to 
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break the law. For example, in the protest against nuclear plants and armament, 
almost all protesters who committed civil disobedience by trespassing on 
property and blocking the entrance to nuclear plants were denied the necessity 
defense on the grounds that there had been no imminent danger and the 
trespassing protesters could not reasonably have believed that their actions 
would halt the manufacture of nuclear materials.418 Similarly, the defense has 
also been denied in civil disobedience cases involving protests against U.S. 
policy abroad, the homeless problem, lack of funding for AIDS research, 
harmful logging practices, prison conditions, abortion, environment 
movements, and human and animal rights violations.419 
 
Some theorists claim that it is wrong for courts to rule out the necessity 
defense as a way to soften the punishment for civil disobedience.420 However, 
I cannot agree with them even though I share the view that the civil 
disobedient must be tolerated as far as possible in a democracy. The following 
reasons make me believe that the necessity defense is not the proper way to 
pardon the civil disobedient. 
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In the first place, applying the necessity defense to civil disobedience cases 
will extend the necessity defense too much. Though the rules for the necessity 
defense were always purposely flexible from the beginning so that justice can 
be served, it cannot provide a broad protection to the actions of civil 
disobedience. Perhaps because of this, some theorists call for the 
re-explanation or re-invention of the necessity defense in order to let civil 
disobedience actions be protected by it. William Quigley, for example, claims 
that the four-prong test used by American court in evaluating the availability 
of the necessity defense in civil disobedience cases is too strict and a 
re-explanation of the defense is desperately needed.421 He argues, for instance, 
that the imminence requirement of the necessity defense should be eliminated 
altogether;422 the causal relationship between civil disobedience action and 
the harm it seeks to prevent should only be proved as reasonable;423 and the 
lack of reasonable alternatives ought to be interpreted as no highly effective 
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alternatives rather than no alternatives. 424  Undoubtedly, such purposeful 
re-inventions will allow civil disobedience to be covered by the necessity 
defense, but unfortunately these inventions unavoidably extend the necessity 
defense so much as to include almost all of the lawbreaking actions. 
According to the court in People v. Weber,425 to accept the defense of 
necessity in such cases would mean that “markets may be pillaged because 
there are hungry people; hospitals may be plundered for drugs because there 
are those in pain; homes may be broken into because there are unfortunately 
some without shelter; department stores may be burglarized for guns because 
there is fear of crime; banks may be robbed because of unemployment.” The 
picture given by court may be an exaggeration because other deterrents to 
criminal conduct would still remain even if courts relax necessity requirements, 
but it is not totally ungrounded. A much relaxed and over-extended necessity 
defense is not necessarily in the interest of the whole society. 
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A second problem with the necessity defense is that the court would have to 
make judgments on political issues if it is widely applied to civil disobedience 
cases. In effect, when the judge or jury is permitted to entertain the necessity 
defense in a civil disobedience cases, they are deliberating on policy issues. 
They are asked to make a decision whether the facts alleged by the defendant 
were as extreme as the defendant claims, and if so, whether the defendant 
made the correct choice based on prevailing community standards.426 This 
runs counter to some important notions of constitutional democracy such as 
separation of powers and majority rule. Policy-making powers, in a democracy, 
are vested in the legislative and executive branches; therefore, the court should 
refrain from making decisions on political issues. The principle is famously 
known as the political question doctrine.427 The rationale behind the doctrine 
is that the legislative and executive branches are more appropriate to make 
policy decisions than the judiciary which is neither democratically elected nor 
responsible to the people. Asking courts decide political issues would risk 
distorting “the role of the judiciary in its relationship to the executive and the 
legislature and open the judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 
government by injunction.”428 Although some commentators have argued that 
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jury is in a better position than the courts to make policy, actually jurors are 
likewise unelected and lacking in policymaking expertise: “indeed, jury 
selection probably ensures that the jurors sitting are as unfamiliar with the 
issue as possible.”429 
 
Thus, for these reasons, it is unwise to extend the necessity defense to civil 
disobedience cases. It causes more problems than it solves. 
 
b. The Good Motive Defense and the Mistake of Law Defense 
 
Two other defenses have also been proposed by philosophers as potential 
solutions to the problem of punishing civil disobedience. One is the “good 
motive” defense; the other is the mistake of law defense. 
 
The good motive defense arises from the fact that the most important 
difference between civil disobedience and crime lies in the motivation of the 
actor. Criminals generally commit crimes for selfish aims, nevertheless the 
disobedient attempts to support and to further just institutions.430  Since 
criminal law mainly concerns itself with punishing those individuals who are 
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morally blameworthy, the legal system, therefore, should distinguish between 
those who are morally blameworthy and those who violate law out of 
goodness.431 Thus, Martin Loesch suggests that one solution to the problem of 
how to respond to the difference is to allow civil disobedients to do what they 
all want to do: make arguments to the court about why they did what they did. 
The court, if convinced by the defendant that he was motivated by good 
reasons, can acquit them.432 However, in reality, the good motive defense, just 
as the necessity defense, is seldom recognized by the court. For example, in 
United States v. Cullen,433 the court explicitly ruled that the defendant’s 
motive has nothing to do with the determination of guilt. The judge claims that 
if the defendant perpetrates the prohibited act voluntarily and knowingly (or 
reasonably should have known), the burden to prove the requisite intent has 
been met; proof of motive, good or bad, has no relevance to the judgment. 
 
The other defense proposed by both philosophers and lawyers is the “mistake 
of law” defense. They claim that if a defendant really believes that a law is 
unconstitutional and consequently violates that law to obtain a chance to 
challenge the law, then the mistake of law defense should be available to the 
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defendant even though the law does meet constitutional requirements.434 
Nevertheless, to an even greater extent than the necessity defense and the good 
motive defense, the mistake of law defense has never, in civil disobedience 
cases, been accepted by the courts, which insist that the mistake of law 
defense is only available to those who have genuinely misunderstood the 
requirements of the law. The civil disobedient cannot satisfy this requirement 
because he or she knowingly and intentionally violates the letter of law.435 
 
The unreceptive attitude of the courts to these defenses has been criticized 
fiercely by some philosophers. The typical attack on the courts is on the 
ground that they are unduly influenced by unnecessary fear as to be 
unresponsive to the reality, i.e. the reality that civil disobedience has become 
an important part of political life.436 This criticism is not totally ungrounded 
because judicial responses to civil disobedience are unsatisfactory; the 
significance of the civil disobedience is not properly reflected in the criminal 
justice system; the civil disobedient is still treated no differently from an 
ordinary criminal. But it is one question whether the civil disobedient should 
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be treated as different from the ordinary criminal; it is quite another question 
whether the special treatment should be given in the form of these defenses. 
After all, there are many ways to show our tolerance to civil disobedience, 
accepting these defenses may be not the best way, even not a proper one. 
Courts may be wrong in refusing to be tolerant, but at the same time they may 
be right in refusing accepting these defenses. Actually, in my opinion, the 
court has more reason to reject rather than embrace the good motive defense 
and the mistake of law defense. 
 
The court is set up mainly as an institution to dispense justice, not as a 
political forum to discuss broad political issues. It therefore should refrain 
from encroaching on the political duties of other government branches because 
such encroachments are not only against the principle of separation of powers 
but also will adversely influence the public’s perception of the court as a 
neutral institution.437 But if the good motive defense or the mistake of law 
defense is allowed to be raised in the case of civil disobedience, the court will 
unavoidably make judgments on political issues on a large scale. In these 
cases, the court has to decide whether the law or policy protested by the civil 
disobedient is so, at least superficially, unconstitutional or unjust as to entitle 
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the defendant to be excused. Some opponents of the political question doctrine 
may point out that the court has never adhered to the doctrine strictly, 
sometimes the court can and does make political judgments.438 The courts 
have interfered in the political issues in the past and, with the advent of 
constitutional court in some countries, some might think that the judiciary 
would intervene more often in the political issues; however, at least in the 
foreseeable future, there is good reason to keep the court sufficiently-detached 
from politics so as to remain as a neutral institution. It can intervene in politics 
in rare cases, especially when an issue has become deadlocked in the political 
area, but its intervention in politics should not become prevalent. However, the 
acceptance of the good motive defense and the mistake of law defense in civil 
disobedience cases would undermine this aspiration and further politicize the 
court. Due to the broadness of the policies and laws challenged by the civil 
disobedient, almost all of the policies, from nuclear armament, foreign and 
military affairs, globalization to environmental policy, freedom of abortion and 
homosexual marriage, have the potential to be brought into the court. Such a 
politicized court definitely is not desirable. Moreover, in most cases of civil 
disobedience, the protestors are seeking to air a generalized grievance. In other 
words, the disobedients themselves are seldom injured in any particularized 
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way by the alleged illegality; they raise the issue of legality in its most abstract 
form. The court, obviously, is not the right place to discuss abstract policies.439 
 
Thus, neither the good motive defense nor the mistake of law defense is a 
proper solution to the predicament of the civil disobedient because of their 
potential devastation to the judicial system. 
 
c. The Establishment of the Civil Disobedience Defense 
 
Neither the necessity defense nor the good motive defense is a proper solution 
to the problem of punishing civil disobedience, then, what is the appropriate 
solution? In my opinion, the most appropriate solution is to establish a special 
defense for civil disobedience, i.e., a formal rule that a finding of civil 
disobedience is a factor that must be taken into account in mitigation of the 
penalty imposed.440 Thus, in the present section, I will offer arguments in 
favor of the establishment of such a defense for civil disobedience in the 
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criminal system. Owing to the different situations of politics and law in 
different countries, the way to establish such a defense and the parameters of 
the defense will not be the same. The defense must be tailored to meet the 
different requirements of the different situation. So, in the thesis, I will only 
outline the main points of the defense. The main points include: What is the 
content of the defense? What are its purposes? What is the outcome of a 
successful defense? What advantages does it have compared to other solutions? 
These are questions which must be answered before a theory of civil 
disobedience defense can be established. 
 
I suggest that a civil disobedience defense means that when a case comes 
before the court, the court should first decide the case on the merits according 
to the normal principles of criminal law. When it finds the defendant guilty, 
and a claim of civil disobedience is raised, it should then decide whether the 
conduct amounted to civil disobedience and, if so, whether it is sufficient to 
warrant a reduction of or exemption from punishment. In other words, if, after 
a finding of guilt, the court finds that the prosecuted action fully satisfies the 
standards of civil disobedience (intentional breach of law in order to show a 
protest, committed nonviolently, publicly and with a general willingness to 
accept punishment, the response is reasonable and proportional etc.), then it 
can decide to reduce or abolish the punishment for the defendant according to 
the specific situation. Otherwise, the court would punish him as usual. 
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The establishment of such a defense is to solve the conflict between the 
rigidity of the law and the benign nature of civil disobedience and show our 
due respect to the civil disobedient as a courageous man. At the same time, it 
is also an official recognition of the potential contribution that civil 
disobedience could make to a democratic society. However, this does not 
mean that all acts of civil disobedience will be automatically exonerated. Vice 
versa, when a case comes to the court, the court is still entitled and has a duty 
to decide whether the act of civil disobedience is totally justified or only 
partially justified, the former might result in the total exemption of the 
punishment while the latter would lead only to a reduction of the punishment. 
Which acts of civil disobedience are acceptable and which are not will 
inevitably depend on the specific situations of different countries. For example, 
the most liberal democratic states may choose to tolerate most cases of civil 
disobedience because the cohesion of these societies is robust enough to 
withstand even the fiercest civil disobedience, while those partially-liberal 
societies will have only a limited leeway to pardon civil disobedience because 
they have to pay more attention to the preservation of social order and 
democracy. Thus, due to the different situations of different countries, it is not 
possible to give a unified formula for the courts to consider when they are 
faced with civil disobedience cases, but it is still helpful to elaborate the 
elements which the courts need to take into account when civil disobedience 
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cases are on trial. 
 
The standards used by the court to judge whether an act of civil disobedience 
is justified could be explained from two perspectives. First, from the 
substantive perspective, the courts can decide whether the civil disobedience 
action is related to basic human rights. For those actions which are linked to 
the struggle for basic human rights, the courts may decide to show more 
tolerance when other things are equal. For those policy-based civil 
disobedience cases,441 the courts may decide not to show tolerance or only 
show less tolerance. Second, from the formal perspective, the courts should at 
least take the following criteria into consideration: whether other reasonable 
means are available to the protestors and whether they have fairly tried those 
means before staging civil disobedience; whether the ends sought by the civil 
disobedient are in proportionality with the means used by the disobedient; the 
level of coercion and violence involved. After an overall analysis of these and 
other relevant elements, the courts could decide whether to pardon or partially 
pardon the civil disobedient, but the court should always refrain from 
discussing whether the proposition of the civil disobedient is a better policy 
than the one supported by the government. In other words, the court should 
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consider only the formal and external characteristics of the action and should 
not discuss the disobedient’s view on the government policy. The logic behind 
this is that mitigation of the punishment is based on the good motives of the 
actor and the benign and highly self-constrained nature of the action rather 
than on the recognition that the protestor’s alternative suggestion is superior to 
the one adhered to by the government. And it is also because, as argued earlier, 
the courtroom is not a suitable place to make such political judgments.442 
 
The advantages in establishing such a defense for civil disobedience are 
obvious. First, it can help to bridge the gap that currently exists in the law 
between moral and legal guilt and to resolve the predicament of the civil 
disobedient. The civil disobedient is often hailed as a courageous person, or 
even as a hero, among the populace, but he or she is punishable by the law. If 
the gap becomes too large, the justice of the law would be doubted and its 
authority eroded.443 The establishment of a civil disobedience defense would 
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help solve the problem by exonerating justified disobedience. Moreover, the 
introduction of such a defense into the legal system would help to give equal 
protection to all civil disobedients. In the past, one of the most striking 
features of many civil disobedience cases on trial is the arbitrary treatment of 
the civil disobedient. The civil disobedients’ arguments for necessity or any 
other defense may be found admissible or inadmissible, both arbitrarily. There 
is no uniformity in the way civil disobedience cases are handled by the courts, 
and this variation leads to dissimilar outcomes, sometimes for similar offenses. 
For example, sometimes the disobedient is allowed to present arguments for 
necessity, sometimes not; there is no unified standard. 444  But the 
establishment of a civil disobedience defense would greatly improve the 
situation, ensuring that all disobedients have a chance to be considered for 
reduction or exemption of the punishment. 
 
Second, it can prevent the court from becoming a political forum. The 
implementation of this rule requires only that the court consider the formal 
characteristics of the protest action rather than the content of the protested 
policy. This would help to maintain the image of the court as a neutral 
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dispute-resolution institution. On the contrary, the necessity defense is far 
more dangerous to the image of the court because it requires the court to 
compare the importance of different political interests. For example, in the 
anti-Vietnam War Movements in the United States in the 1970s, if the 
necessity defense had been widely applied to anti-war civil disobedience cases, 
the courts would have to consider and compare the importance of the war to 
the United States and the harm which could be avoided by the prevention of 
the war, whereas the civil disobedience defense I proposed would require only 
that the courts consider whether the protest actions are consistent with the 
standards of civil disobedience, i.e. nonviolence, willingness to submit to 
punishment etc.445 
 
Third, the civil disobedience defense I proposed would ensure a more just 
treatment of the civil disobedient than the good motive defense and the 
mistake of law defense. Civil disobedience is committed out of a good motive 
and sometimes there is mistake of law, but these are not the only reasons why 
civil disobedience should be tolerated. As discussed in the third chapter, the 
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main reason is its peaceful and benign nature; justified civil disobedience is a 
highly self-constrained action with little or no harm to the society. Thus, this 
benign nature of civil disobedience must be considered by the court and 
reflected in the punishment; otherwise, it would be unfair to practitioners. 
However, neither the good motive defense nor the mistake of law defense 
reflects this important characteristic of civil disobedience. In contrast, the 
defense I suggested requires a more comprehensive evaluation of the 
characteristics of civil disobedience and, therefore, a just treatment of its 
practitioners. 
 
Certainly, the defense suggested by me is not without potential criticisms; 
many opposing arguments may be leveled against it. Therefore, in the latter 
part of this chapter, I will respond to these arguments. The last point I would 
like to highlight before moving to the next topic is that the civil disobedience 
defense I proposed here is not in conflict with the necessity defense and any 
other defense available in the criminal law. If the practitioners of civil 
disobedience find these defenses are useful, they should still be allowed to 






B. Alternative Means of Protecting Civil Disobedience in 
Not–So-Liberal States 
 
In the above section, I suggested the establishment of the civil disobedience 
defense as the preferred way to solve the predicament of the civil disobedient. 
But, the suggestion is based on the assumption that the courts are strong 
enough to shoulder such a task. However, the assumption is not always right. 
In some illiberal and partially-liberal states, the courts may be only a 
subsidiary to the executive branch or even a subsidiary to an individual ruler. 
Neither the independent nature of the judicial branch nor the integrity of the 
judges is assured. Under such circumstances, obviously, other ways must be 
designed to protect the civil disobedient from excessive punishment. Certainly, 
the fundamental solution is to build a more liberal society, but it does not 
mean that nothing can be done before the realization of such a society. What I 
am going to suggest in the following paragraphs is that when the courts are not 
able to provide effective protection to the civil disobedient, the constitution 
and the legislature may have a role to play. 
 
a. Constitutional Protection of Civil Disobedience 
 
A useful choice to protect civil disobedience in partially-liberal states is to 
stipulate it in the constitution. The constitution in these states may fail to be 
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enforced fully, but at least it signifies supremacy. If civil disobedience can find 
a way into it, the justification of civil disobedience will become clearer and the 
protection of civil disobedience will become much easier. 
 
Civil disobedience is protected by the constitution is not an original idea of the 
thesis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many scholars have argued that 
certain basic human rights such as right of participation, freedom of speech 
and rights of protest could provide a justification for civil disobedience.446 
But an obvious defect of these arguments is that the existing interpretation of 
these constitutional rights can provide only a partial protection to civil 
disobedience. Not all civil disobedience actions are symbolic speech which is 
aimed merely to communicate information and, consequently, protected by the 
freedom of speech. Similarly, not all disobedience actions could fall exactly in 
the shelter of the right of participation. Therefore, in order to offer a more 
forceful and more comprehensive safeguard to civil disobedience, it is 
necessary directly to stipulate it in the constitution. The Basic Law for Federal 
Republic of Germany has an article which says that German citizens have the 
right to resist any person seeking to abolish the constitution when other 
remedies are not available.447  This article could be easily interpreted to 
protect civil disobedience. I propose that constitutions of the illiberal and 
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partially-liberal states should model what Germans have done. Even a state as 
liberal as Germany has worries about the subsistence of its constitution and 
determine to protect the constitution by arming the people with the right of 
resistance, those states less liberal than Germany have more reason to do so. 
Bringing civil disobedience into the constitution is not only helpful for the 
disobedient, but also beneficial for the subsistence of the constitution because 
civil disobedience is an effective way to defend democracy when all other 
legal means prove futile. Fortunately, some new states have realized this and 
began to do so. For example, the Constitution of newly independent East 
Timor has such an article which reads “every citizen has the right to disobey 
and to resist illegal orders or orders that affect their fundamental rights, 
freedoms and guarantees.”448 
 
b. Legislative Role in Protecting Civil Disobedience 
 
Another institution which may be dependent on to protect civil disobedience is 
the legislature. The legislature is able to make laws to pardon civil 
disobedience and, in some countries, the legislature may also be empowered to 
give amnesty to some kind of criminals. When the courts are not reliable and 
when it is hopeless to amend the constitution, the legislature may become 
critical in protecting civil disobedience. The problem of amnesty is much 
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complex in different countries, so I will only discuss the possibility of 
defending civil disobedience through legislation. 
 
The legislature could make laws in many aspects to show tolerance to civil 
disobedience, but the most important is to mitigate the punishment for civil 
disobedience practitioners. Therefore, it is equally important for the legislature 
to incorporate the defense of civil disobedience which I proposed above into 
the criminal code. For the civil law jurisdictions and for those states which are 
only partially liberal (this often means the lack of a competent and 
independent court system), it is essential. 
 
I suggest having such a stipulation in the criminal code: 
The violation of criminal standards of conduct is justified if the 
violation is an act of civil disobedience and conforms to the following 
criteria: 
(a) committed after all other legal means have been fairly tried, 
(b) the violation is public, predominantly nonviolent and the actor is 
with a general willingness to accept punishment, 





C. Other Means for Expressing Tolerance 
 
In the previous sections, I discussed in detail the possible ways to protect civil 
disobedience from the criminal punishment. The courts and the legislature all 
have a role to play. Generally, the courts are the most appropriate institution to 
dispense justice for the civil disobedient, but when the courts are not strong 
enough, the intervention of the legislature is essential. But it deserves to point 
here that our tolerance of civil disobedience can be expressed in much more 
ways than merely help them to avoid the criminal punishment. The executive 
branch and even ordinary citizens all have a role to play. 
 
For example, tolerance may be expressed in the process of police enforcement. 
One of the main tasks of the police today is to preserve the basic orderliness of 
the community, but this obligation does not mean that the police must suppress 
any behavior which breaks habitual routine because such action would place 
police power in support of the status quo regardless of its imperfection. The 
objective of the police power should be “to limit excesses in behavior which 
would destroy the social life of the community but not to block change of all 
kinds.”449 Therefore, as argued by J.L. LeGrande, the police philosophy in the 
case of civil disobedience should show an understanding of the social conflict 
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and strive to balance the interests involved in the protest. On the one hand, it 
should be concerned primarily with the maintenance of the civil order and 
public safety, but it should also try to ensure that the maximum freedom of 
expression of the individual is permitted.450  
 
Police officers today often have broad discretionary powers in deciding 
whether to make arrests to end a protest and enforce the law. Therefore, the 
police have enough discretion to express their tolerance of civil 
disobedience.451 For instance, in many instances of civil disobedience, the 
police officer may choose to ignore the offense and warn the disobedient 
verbally rather than physically arresting the disobedient. When a road is 
blocked by disobedients, the police may choose to channel the traffic flow to 
another road instead of breaking up the gathering to clear the road. Moreover, 
taking a tolerant attitude, as proved by LeGrande’s study in which he 
compares the tolerant and strict attitude towards civil disobedience by the 
police, is also in the interest of police. In many circumstances, a strict attitude 
could ignite the anger of the protestors which would frustrate the goal of 
maintaining public order and endanger the image of the police in the 
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Another way of being tolerant of civil disobedience is by allowing lawyers to 
counsel the civil disobedient. Nowadays, it is generally prohibited by laws, 
ordinances or rules of professional conduct for the lawyers to counsel the civil 
disobedient.453  The rationale behind the prohibition is to view the civil 
disobedience as an anti-social or criminal action which is against the rule of 
law. But, as I have said before, the civil disobedient is not an anarchist. At the 
core of his concern is a respect for the law and his effort is directed not at the 
abolition of law, but at its reform. The courageous and self-sacrificing 
character of the civil disobedient should be respected to some degree by a 
democratic society. Changing the rules to allow lawyers to provide advice to 
the civil disobedient in advance is beneficial to both the civil disobedient and 
to the society as a whole. Disobedients, in dialogue with their counselors, 
could test the strength of their ideas and the wisdom of their tactics:  
“They will be informed by the law before, not after, actions are taken; 
the results of counsel might then be acts of civil disobedience that are 
more accurately targeted against offending laws and policies, or acts 
that would subject the disobedient to the fewest adverse consequences 
necessary to effectuate his purposes, or the adoption of a tactic more 
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effective than civil disobedience.”454  
The society too would gain. Lawyers’ professional advice would help the civil 
disobedient better understand and balance the interests involved. After 
counseling, the civil disobedients could become calmer and their actions may 
become more restricted and accurately targeted, with less disruption. 
 
There are also many other ways to show tolerance to civil disobedience in a 
democratic society both in the law itself and through the enforcement of law. It 
is impossible to enumerate all the ways in which a government could show 
tolerance to civil disobedience. It suffices to observe that tolerance of civil 
disobedience could be expressed in various ways. One of the responsibilities 
of a democratic society is to find more ways to tolerate dissent, including civil 
disobedience. After all, the tolerance of dissent is the badge of a democracy. 
 
D. Potential Criticisms Considered 
 
In the above, I proposed to reduce or eliminate the punishment for civil 
disobedience, but not everyone could agree with that proposal. The proposal 
will unavoidably be met with disagreement. I have already alluded to some of 
the pertinent objections. Therefore, in this section I will focus on two of these 
major complaints and respond to them respectively. 
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a. No Punishment, No Civil Disobedience? 
 
One main argument which may be leveled against my suggestion is that if the 
punishment for the civil disobedient is eliminated, then there will be no civil 
disobedience, for breach of law is an essential character of civil disobedience. 
Since all civil disobedience involves illegal activity, such acts could not 
receive legal protection; otherwise, they could be lawfully eliminated.455 
 
At the first blush, this is a very powerful argument because it is true, as it 
claims, that civil disobedience must involve some form of illegality. Illegality 
is the most important character which differentiates civil disobedience from 
lawful protests.456 In this sense, if there is no illegality involved, then there 
will be no civil disobedience committed. But is it a sufficient argument to 
oppose the reduction or elimination of punishment for civil disobedience? The 
answer is definitely not. 
 
The most important flaw in the argument is that it confuses punishment with 
illegality. Illegality and punishment, though closely connected, are two 
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 The obvious difference between legal protest and civil disobedience is that the former 
lies within the bounds of the law while the latter does not. Please see “Civil 
Disobedience”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available online at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/>, last accessed on January 3, 2009. 
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different phenomena. Illegality is generally followed by some kind of 
punishment, but not always, that is to say, illegality is a necessary cause of 
legal punishment, but not a sufficient one. More than often, illegal actions go 
unpunished, which may be because the illegal action is negligible or because 
the defendant is too young, too old, and so on. That no punishment is given 
out does not necessarily mean that no illegality is involved. Thus, one of the 
faults of the argument is that it fails to acknowledge the difference between 
illegality and punishment. The essence of civil disobedience is illegality rather 
than punishment; hence the pure abolition of punishment does not necessarily 
mean that the unpunished action would lose the character of civil disobedience. 
It could retain its illegal character superficially and, at the same time, go 
unpunished. As mentioned above, the reason that we decide not to punish 
some cases of civil disobedience is due to their benign nature rather than their 
justness and lawfulness. The logic is that these actions, while formally against 
the existing law, are trivial and with the potential to benefit the whole society 
in the future; therefore, it is better to let them go unpunished or reduce the 
punishment for them. 
 
Moreover, it is important to reaffirm here that the suggestion I gave above 
does not mean that all civil disobedience actions would go unpunished. After 
the suggestion is realized in practice, some acts of civil disobedience would 
still be punished, or only have the penalty reduced, according to their 
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consistency with the standards of principled civil disobedience. Thus, due to 
the uncertainty, it is not easy for the civil disobedients to know accurately in 
advance whether their actions would be punished or not. They have to defend 
themselves in the court first and only after the trial would they know the 
success or failure of their defense. This situation is totally different from 
lawful protests such as parades and demonstrations whose participants are 
fully aware that they could not be arrested or penalized. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that the difference between civil disobedience and lawful protests is 
not unduly blurred by recognizing civil disobedience as a factor to be 
considered in mitigation of punishment. 
 
All in all, punishment is not an essential part of civil disobedience, illegality is. 
It is difficult to imagine civil disobedience without illegality, but it is 
reasonable to say that there can be civil disobedience without punishment. The 
exemption of punishment will not automatically forfeit the status of civil 
disobedience. 
 
b. The Efficiency of the Civil Disobedience 
 
Another main argument against the reduction or elimination of punishment for 
civil disobedience is that the defense would negatively influence the 
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persuasive power and efficiency of the civil disobedience. It is believed that 
punishment would help civil disobedients to enhance the publicity of their 
claim and to gain the support and sympathy of the public.457 However, the 
proposal here would allow some civil disobedients to avoid punishment and, 
consequently, reduce the effectiveness of civil disobedience. According to 
Brent Wride, in an important sense the exemption of punishment for the civil 
disobedient “not only conflicts with a commitment to order and majority rule, 
but also robs the protest itself of some of its demonstrative power.”458 
 
Willing acceptance of punishment indeed can help the civil disobedient to gain 
sympathy by showing his sincerity and, moreover, it can be unimaginably 
effective sometimes, as what happened when Gandhi, King and Mandela were 
jailed. But it is wrong to conclude from this that accepting punishment is 
always the most effective way, at any time and under any circumstances. For 
example, the civil disobedient may decide that he should stay outside to 
publish criticisms of the government and to amass pressure on the state rather 
than accept the punishment passively and go to jail. For this reason, he avails 
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himself of the defense and remains outside. Here, it would be highly difficult 
to tell which is more effective in arousing the public and bringing the changes 
– staying outside or going to jail. The answer could be either. Thus, it is wrong 
to claim that avoidance of punishment will always undermine the 
persuasiveness and effectiveness of the civil disobedience. 
 
Also, the availability of protection measures is meant only to provide the civil 
disobedient with an option of whether or not to accept punishment willingly.459 
According to his own judgment, he could choose to accept the punishment or 
try to avail himself of the protection measures. If he thinks accepting the 
punishment is more helpful to his struggle, he could choose not to seek the 
exemption of the punishment. On the contrary, if he thinks he would be better 
off staying outside, he could avail himself of proper measures to avoid to be 
jailed. It is reasonable to provide the civil disobedient with such a choice 
because the civil disobedient himself is in the best position to decide whether 
accepting punishment is more effective than seeking mitigation. Thus, the 
chances are small that the provision of protection measures for the civil 
disobedient would greatly affect the persuasiveness of the civil disobedience; 
rather, it would enhance the effectiveness of the civil disobedience by giving 
its practitioners an alternative way of avoiding punishment. 
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E. The Protection of Civil Disobedience in Situations of 
Emergency 
 
After reading the above part about the defense for civil disobedience, one 
puzzle may arise among the reader. What will happen to the civil disobedients 
when a state of emergency is declared? Will their right for no or less 
punishment be set aside? Or what they have is a non-derogable right which 
cannot be deprived or suspended even in situations of emergency? 
 
States have a duty to protect those living in their jurisdictions from being 
injured by civil war, terrorist attacks, foreign invasions, natural disasters and 
any other enormous dangers. Often this job is facilitated by the declaration of 
an emergency. The broadly-recognized international legal norms also allow 
the states to do so when necessary. For example, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights460, the European Convention on Human Rights461 
and the American Convention on Human Rights462 all have clauses which 
allow state parties to take measures derogating from their obligations under 
the instruments in times of public emergencies. But the state of emergency 
opens the door to possible abuses of human rights at the same time. In practice, 
many countries declared states of emergency too arbitrarily, only to maintain 
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power and to silence opposition rather than to protect civil liberties. Thus, the 
international covenants all put strict limits on the use of emergency powers at 
the same time when they authorize it. In the case of ICCPR and the ECHR, 
state of emergency should be used only when the life of the nation is 
threatened and, in the case of the ACHR, only when the independence or 
security of the state is endangered. In addition, the international covenants 
recognize that even after a state of emergency is publicly proclaimed, there 
should still be some fundamental rights which cannot be derogated.463 
 
Therefore, the protection enjoyed by the civil disobdients is not necessarily to 
be deprived under circumstances of emergency. We must further examine 
whether it is a derogable or a non-derogabe right and, if derogable, under what 
circumstances. In my opinion, the protection for civil disobedience is not 
non-derogable at all times. As said in the justification of civil disobedience, 
acts of civil disobedience are not likely to create social chaos and threaten the 
life of the nation, but the detrimental effect of civil disobedience on the 
existence of the nation can be aggravated by the prevailing circumstances. 
Mass civil disobedience actions could, for example, erode the safety of a 
democratic state when it coincides with an external invasion from an 
authoritarian regime. Under such circumstances, it is wise to allow some 
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restrictions on the protecting measures of civil disobedience. However, this 
does not mean that the protection for civil disobedience must be sacrificed any 
time an emergency is declared. There must be some limits on the use of 
emergency powers in the case of civil disobedience. After all, civil 
disobedience is an instrument which is devised to tackle problems even in 
times of strife. 
 
The first limit on the use of emergency in the case of civil disobedience is that 
the state of emergency must be duly proclaimed and to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies. The declaration of emergence should be carried out 
with great care. A country’s legislature should be entitled to review and 
oversee any such declaration and the courts should be able to rule on its 
validity. Any unduly proclaimed state of emergency must be resisted and, as a 
result, should be declared void. Our toleration to civil disobedience, under 
such a pseudo-state of emergency should not be discounted anyway. 
 
Secondly, the toleration of civil disobedience should not be curbed in all kinds 
of emergencies. Some causes which lead to the state of emergency being 
declared are far from a sufficient reason to justify the curb on civil 
disobedience. The state of emergency declared after the Fukushima nuclear 
plant crisis in Japan in March of 2011, for example, could not justify a change 
of our attitudes towards civil disobedience. In my view, the curb on civil 
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disobedience is justifiable only when the democratic system is threatened. The 
means should not be put before the ends. The aim of the civil disobedience 
action is to improve democracy. Therefore, when civil disobedience threatens 
the right democracy which it intends to protect and improve, the restrictions 
on it are justified. But for those states which are still unjust and undemocratic, 
any curb on civil disobedience is hardly to be justified even when the safety of 
the state is threatened because the toppling of the old government may mean 
the emerging of a new democratic society. 
 
In conclusion, the state of emergency does not necessarily justify the curb on 
civil disobedience. Only in those emergencies when democracy is threatened, 
would it be justified to limit civil disobedience. But for those authoritarian 
states, the curb on civil disobedience is rarely justified even through the 




Democracy has a special responsibility to tolerate civil disobedience compared 
with the authoritarian regimes. Civil disobedience is consistent with the spirit 
of democracy and poses less danger to the democratic state than to the 
totalitarian regime. In the authoritarian regime, it can topple the government or 
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make the government more difficult to control the society by igniting the 
anger which otherwise is only latent among the people; in a democratic society 
it can make the society more consistent with its ideals. 
 
Civil disobedients are not ordinary criminals; any democratic state, if it is 
genuine rather than pseudo-democracy, is obligated to treat the civil 
disobedient leniently. There are various means of showing respect to the civil 
disobedient, but the most important way is to alleviate their punishment. 
Existing criminal law principles are unable to address this problem, so the 
establishment of a special defense for mitigating punishment of civil 
disobedience is necessary. Not only could it help to soften the punishment for 
civil disobedience, but it could also bring less harm to the role of the court as a 
neutral arbitrator of disputes. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
I. Main Findings and Suggestions 
 
In this thesis, I have argued for a definition of civil disobedience which is, I 
think, more useful and proper than the definitions provided by some scholars. I 
have not insisted on pure nonviolence and unconditional subservience to the 
authority, rather I welcomed the idea of predominantly nonviolence (discussed 
in Chapter II) and democratic coercion (discussed in Chapter IV). The mere 
existence of sporadic violence and the mere use of coercive measures should 
not forfeit the status of civil disobedience. The advantages of this broad 
definition are obvious: on the one hand, it can cover almost all typical cases of 
civil disobedience took place in history and keep the concept relevant to what 
is going on today in practice, and, on the other hand, it can keep civil 
disobedience as an independent phenomenon distinguishable from other kinds 
of protest. 
 
Additionally, in this thesis, I have argued that civil disobedience is justified in 
the modern western democracy. Civil disobedience tends to be viewed as 
threatening, subversive and destructive of democracy and the reaction of 
public authorities has been mainly repressive. But, I suggested that citizens 
  287
who are firmly committed to the democratic system in its present form have to 
realize that as it is currently practiced democracy is seriously malfunctioning 
and those citizens who are troubled by the defects of the existing democracy 
might find civil disobedience a viable way of eliminating the gaps between 
ideals and the practices, especially when conventional channels are 
unavailable or unlikely to bring about change. 
 
I have also in this thesis attempted to provide evidence of the usefulness of 
civil disobedience to the democratic system. I argued that civil disobedience 
plays a very important role in both the establishment and development of the 
existing liberal democracies. Many liberties we take for granted today were 
won by civil disobedience or with the assistance of civil disobedience. In 
addition, by functioning as a safety-valve to prevent complaints in the society 
from erupting into large-scale violence, civil disobedience might be a 
stabilizing device. And, by taking a limited view of both the government and 
law, civil disobedience can help people to remain vigilant in relation to the 
authorities and their actions, possibly with the effect of preventing the 
democracy from degenerating into totalitarianism. 
 
Another key point I argue in the thesis is that the civil disobedients are good 
citizens which should be cherished by democracies. In the face of grave 
injustices and serious erosion of the values of democracy by laws, citizens 
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have two choices. One choice is to follow everything commanded by law; the 
other is to defend justice and democracy even by engaging in civil 
disobedience. Compared to the latter, the former poses a real danger for 
democracy. If every citizen is prepared to acquiesce to everything commanded 
by law, it is difficult to be optimistic about the survival of liberal-democratic 
values because the subservience of the citizen would constitute an invitation to 
monarchy and dictatorship. 
 
A democratic system has a special obligation to tolerate civil disobedience. 
Civil disobedience is detrimental to an authoritarian regime, but it is beneficial 
to a democracy. Moreover, democracy is said to be a system committed to 
openness and freedom. Suppression of civil disobedience, which is a highly 
self-restrained protest, in defense of the system subverts the values for which 
it was established. In addition, the tolerance of some acts of civil disobedience 
in a democracy is unlikely to inspire further violence, as often happens in an 
authoritarian regime where the great anger of the suppressed may be ignited 
by even the slightest tolerance of civil disobedience. 
 
Finally, I proposed that the best way to soften the predicament of the civil 
disobedients is to mitigate their punishment by establishing a special defense 
for civil disobedience. When a claim of civil disobedience is raised in the 
court, the court should decide whether the conduct amounted to civil 
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disobedience, and if the court finds that the prosecuted action fully satisfy the 
standards of civil disobedience, it can decide to moderate or suspend 
punishment of the defendant. Suggestions such as the mistake of law defense 
and the necessity defense all have internal defects which cannot be overcome 
easily. On the contrary, my suggestion can be conveniently applied to all cases 
of civil disobedience while at the same time retaining civil disobedience as a 
viable means of protest in a democracy. 
 
II. Final Thoughts and Proposed Areas for Further Research 
 
My thesis is an attempt to reconcile civil disobedience and democracy, and, to 
this end, I have discussed the main questions about the reconciliation of the 
two, such as the justification of civil disobedience in a democracy and the 
mitigation of punishment for civil disobedients. However, there are still 
questions which have been untouched or mentioned only briefly, so I would 
welcome further research in the following areas. 
 
I proposed in the third chapter that civil disobedience is justified on the basis 
of the imperfection and tentative nature of the existing democracy, but what is 
left mostly unanswered in the chapter and the rest of the thesis are the precise 
circumstances in which civil disobedience is justified. In other words, under 
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what circumstances is civil disobedience justified or what justifies civil 
disobedience? Some philosophers have lightly touched upon the question, for 
example, Rawls proposes that civil disobedience is not justified unless in the 
case of substantial and clear injustice464 and Habermas also contends that civil 
disobedience is justified when law and policy are produced in an insufficiently 
deliberative manner.465 But this is far from enough. If we want to make the 
theory more meaningful in practice, we must provide a clear account of the 
various circumstances which justify civil disobedience. 
 
Another area which needs further clarification is in what degree the 
punishments for civil disobedience should be mitigated. I suggested in the 
thesis that the civil disobedient should be treated with due respects in the 
liberal democracy and the best way to do it is to mitigate their punishments by 
the establishment of a special defense. But I do not expound on what type of 
civil disobedients under what circumstances should go completely unpunished 
and what type of civil disobedients under what circumstances should only get 
the punishment reduced. This is partly because it is as much a pragmatic 
question as a theoretical question; different states, different cultures and 
different jurisdictions in different stages might have different answers to it. For 
example, in a state which is often endangered by social disorder, the standard 
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for complete elimination of punishment for civil disobedience may be 
understandably more strict than in those states which have no difficult at all to 
maintain a good social order. Therefore, further efforts are still needed in order 
to apply the strategy to specific countries. 
 
Another larger question that comes out of my thesis is the place of civil 
disobedience in quasi-democracies and other political forms of the state. I 
have shown in the thesis that civil disobedience plays an important role in 
democracy and democracy has a special responsibility to show tolerance to the 
civil disobedient, but it is still in question whether it is wise at all to resort to 
civil disobedience to protest an authoritarian regime and whether totalitarian 
regimes ought formally to tolerate the disobedient in its legal regime. 
 
These are all important and challenging questions. I hope, however, that this 
thesis and its attempt to reconcile civil disobedience and democracy provide a 
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